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Abstract 
The responsibility of public education is rarely attached to public officials, urban 
planners, or the business community. Instead much of the research today looks to parents, 
school administrators, or students in an attempt to understand the problems of America’s 
public schools. The objective of this project is to explore the use of public schools in the 
re-creation of spaces of marginalization and isolation, by city officials and business 
leaders in their path toward ensuring that the city of Chicago becomes a global city. This 
project represents a counter narrative to the dominant stories on black communities and 
public schools that preach the cultural deficiency of disinterested students, uninvolved 
parents and community members, and inefficient teachers. Instead, by focusing on 
Renaissance 2010, the Chicago model of mayoral control and privatization for the nation, 
this project presents community voice(s) to offer an alternate story of disinvestment in 
Chicago’s children of color.  
This mixed methods project uses both quantitative and qualitative data to discuss 
the geography of opportunity for students of color in the Chicago public school system. 
Using critical race theory, this project seeks to analyze the effect of the creation of spaces 
of whiteness, and the commodification of schools in the city of Chicago. With a focus on 
the Richard M. Daley administration, from 1995 to 2010, this study details how his 
involvement in the city’s public schools, as well as the involvement of the city’s business 
community, has increased over time, finally culminating in the Renaissance 2010 
initiative.  
This project uses geographic information systems (GIS) software to produce 
images that spatially depict Renaissance 2010 school placements and public school 
closures, each resulting in the displacement of students of color around the city for the 
purpose of schooling. The contribution of this study is the visual depiction of a very 
standardized practice of disinvestment. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
When there is a high degree of inequality in a city or nation, it can be difficult to maintain civic 
order and security, seek justice, provide needed welfare and so on… The degree to which access 
to education is left to the marketplace, for example, will have a profound effect on opportunities 
for intergenerational mobility throughout a nation (Abrahamson, 2004, p. 95). 
 
After finding that I held an utter contempt for the phrase ‘Black-White achievement gap’ 
and its failure to center structural barriers and disparate access to educational opportunities, I 
began to search for terminology that more adequately captured my own schooling experiences 
and what I knew to be true of Black students, parents, and community members historic 
commitment to the power of education. Much of the rhetoric surrounding Black student 
achievement and urban schools use a language of failure to cast blame solely on teachers, 
parents, and students for sub par standardized test results.  Instead research that highlights 
disparities in access to material educational resources and opportunities, as problematic for Black 
student achievement, provides the theoretical foundation for this research project. This 
dissertation examines the larger themes of access to quality education, and school choice, for 
Black and Latino/a students in the city of Chicago. Within this broad description is a thirst to 
know more about the radical student sorting methods and school redistribution going on around 
the city. Which types of children receive top ranking schools within their neighborhoods, and 
which types of children do not? How exactly does the city decide where to put certain schools? 
Does the possibility of choice truly exist for Chicagoans of color? 
This dissertation serves as one counter-narrative to theories of Black student self-
sabotage, familial dysfunction, and other cultural deficiency rationales for Black student 
achievement. It is not the intention of this project to suggest that inequitable access to academic 
achievement for students of color will be entirely solved by improving factors beyond the walls 
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of the school buildings. Instead, this project will serve to broaden the discussion of the 
educational opportunities available to Black and Latino/a students by providing an analysis of 
the relationship between school choice, community involvement, and educational policy in the 
city of Chicago. 
This dissertation stands on the shoulders of much of the research on Chicago that has 
traced racism in Chicago and its education system throughout its many transformations. Shipps 
and White (2009) argue that as school leaders, principals have always enacted accountability 
within their schools by shielding themselves from outside influences—and instead working from 
an internal and collective sense of morality and professionalism. They note that the new move 
towards high stakes policies has caused most to realign themselves with external influences. This 
coincides with Henig’s (2009) argument that elected school boards have been overtaken by the 
‘new breed’ of education executives (composed primarily of mayors, governors and presidents) 
who’s main objective is perhaps not education, but general purpose politics and increasing the 
viability of corporations. This latest transformation has large implications for democratic 
participation nationwide, especially for low-income groups and people of color who have not 
sustained a large degree of political power. 
The newest form of racism in Chicago cannot be confined to just one or two areas. In the 
case of public education, there is no one solution. There are societal ills like poverty that directly 
relate to the disparate funding formula of Illinois, and legislation that retreats from enforcing 
equity. And yet, primarily, the highly racialized political struggles within Chicago have largely 
contributed to current school reforms, which are fairly complicated expressions of ethnic 
competition, power, and control (Wrigley, 1997).  Much of the research on race relations in 
Chicago have contributed a great deal to the theoretical foundations of this project, and primarily 
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this study relies on the groundwork of Homel (1984), Shipps (1997), Danns (2003 & 2008), 
Lipman (2004), Neckerman (2007) and Boyd (2008).  This dissertation explores the use of 
public schools in the re-creation of spaces of marginalization and isolation, by city officials and 
business leaders on the path towards ensuring that Chicago becomes a global city. Using critical 
race theory (CRT), this study seeks to analyze community response to Renaissance 2010 
(Ren10), and the commodification of schools in the city of Chicago. With a focus on the 
Renaissance 2010 school choice policy, from 2004 to 2010, this study investigates mayoral 
control and corporate involvement in the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) system. Interest lies 
specifically with the culmination of their partnership with the Renaissance 2010 (Ren10) 
initiative.   
The focus on Chicago’s mayor is emphasized because of his crucial role in maintaining 
the current relationships of power operating within the public education system. After the 
Chicago School Reform Act of 1995, which brought an abrupt end to any semblance of power 
for Local School Councils (LSC’s), the public school system was placed under mayoral control.  
It is important to note that corporate interest has attempted to influence public schools in 
Chicago publicly since 1877 (Shipps, 1997). Mayoral control is also not a new or unique 
occurrence in Chicago and, once the democratic machine mayors provided both the centralized 
power and the social stability for a more silent partnership, business interests were represented 
quietly through mayoral control from 1937 until the death of Richard J. Daley in 1976 (Shipps, 
1997). Thus, although corporate influence has been represented in Chicago Pubic Schools almost 
since their inception, this dissertation begins with the 1995 reforms precisely because the result 
of these reforms (that eliminated independent boards in favor of mayor-appointed boards and 
focused on local centralization to improve student performance) highlights two important threads 
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within contemporary urban school reform initiatives: (a) it introduces the ideology that in order 
to improve student performance, those outside of parents, students, and educators are needed and 
(b) it signals the shift away from participatory democracy. The ideological, political and 
structural changes in Chicago’s educational landscape are important not only because Chicago is 
a leader in school reforms to which the rest of the nation looks, but specifically, for this project, 
these shifts represent Mayor Richard M. Daley’s disinvestment in Black and Latino/a children. 
Shipps (1997) argues that due to corporate influence for the last few decades in Illinois, 
the difference between the legislation of 1988 and that of 1995 was not the display of parental 
power and democratic revitalization but the shift from centralized professional control to 
decentralized business management. Describing Chicago as a cautionary tale, Shipps (1997) 
notes that the arrival and reinforcement of the public policy advantages of business in school 
politics has been shaped by the structural and institutional factors of (a) extreme forms of racial 
segregation and (b) highly centralized government. 
Voice, or narrative, is a critical element of the theoretical foundation of this project and, I 
assert that those without access to power and without adequate social capital to effect social and 
structural educational change are students and parents of color, and low income residents within 
the city. Mayoral appointed boards take power away from poor, working class residents as well 
as from residents of color. Although this demographic relies heavily on public schools for their 
educational needs, they hold the least amount of power to influence the policies that impact their 
children’s educational opportunities (Chambers, 2006; Stone, 2004). In Illinois, the move away 
from participatory democracy in 1995 was the precursor to the neoliberal reforms taking place 
within the Chicago Public School system today. It is this tradition of denying residents of color 
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the access to create, change, or contribute in any meaningful way to the design of their system of 
public education that Renaissance 2010 exemplifies.   
Primary Dissertation Questions 
 
Our students deserve the least restrictive environment in which to learn. 
--Teacher, Guggenheim Elem. Closure Hearing, 2/2/10 
 
The larger objectives of this project are to explore the structural influences that shape the 
educational opportunities for low-income groups and communities of color. More importantly, I 
seek to document the dominant narrative of communities of color as they assert their rights to 
participate in the schooling of their children. To undertake this goal, the subsidiary research 
questions are designed to assess the demographic characteristics of primarily Black 
neighborhoods in the city, to provide the proper context for understanding community responses1 
to the geographic distribution of Chicago Public Schools (from 2004 to 2010). Thus, the primary 
question for this project is twofold. It first seeks to understand the school community’s (parents, 
teachers, administrators, students) response to Renaissance 2010. It then seeks to understand the 
reasons for such a response. In the end, results from this research will help to challenge 
narratives which define disparities in achievement opportunities as academic achievement gaps, 
as well as those which assign blame to parents, students and communities using arguments based 
on cultural deficiency models.  
It is important to note that the policy, Renaissance 2010, is not observed in isolation, but 
as a current example of policy decisions that inversely reward city inhabitants by race, class, and 
spatial location. Much of the research pertaining to Chicago details various cases of the city's 
historic disinvestment in its Black and Latino/a populations, and while acknowledging this 
                                                
1 Within this paper, a school community is defined as the parents, teachers, administrators, and 
students of schools with predominantly Black populations.   
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history, this study seeks to extend the discussion further by focusing specifically on the quality of 
schooling opportunities for Black children in the city. 
Race and Competition in Chicago Public Schools 
This project uses geographic information systems (GIS) software to produce maps of 
Renaissance 2010 new school placements, the termination of public neighborhood schools, and 
the relocation of students around the city for the purpose of schooling. It is necessary to place 
race at the center of this project, as this will aide in the analysis of the city’s role in the recreation 
of public spaces and its current affect on Black student access to equitable schooling 
opportunities. Centering race also recognizes the need for intergroup social capital coalitions in 
order to accomplish any magnitude of school reform for both low-income children and students 
of color within the city of Chicago. 
Acknowledging the role that race plays in the politics of urban education, in many ways, 
corrects for the diagnoses of urban schools that routinely overlook significant patterns of 
inequity within the schools serving students of color. By using critical race theory, this project 
acknowledges the challenges associated with urban school improvement and building 
cooperative arrangements between groups that control very different sectors of public education. 
Placing race at the center of the policy arena allows for the acknowledgment of intergroup 
competition, due to the historical legacy of mistrust within public policy built throughout years 
of racial divisions and Black subordination (Chambers, 2006; Orr, 1999). Because race is not 
simply included but placed in the forefront, the project is able to move beyond its 
acknowledgment and towards the development of the visual depiction of a very standardized 
practice of disinvestment. GIS maps, coupled with ethnographic methods combine in this project 
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to highlight community voice, and each contributes to a more accurate account of the educational 
opportunities for students of color in the city of Chicago.   
It is essential that social capital, the mistrust of public policy, and intergroup competition 
be understood in the context of Renaissance 2010.  Globalization and neoliberalism have 
affected the politics of schooling in Chicago by the introduction and prioritization of business 
interests above the pre-existing, and often competing, interests of residents. To attract 
professional and middle class families, highly publicized reforms like Renaissance 2010 act as a 
sort of advertisement of the city’s separate educational programs. The combination of marketized 
individualism and control through a constant and public comparison, clearly privileges wealthy 
and middle-class parents, who have the ability to both decode and manipulate the deregulated 
systems of choice (Apple, 2001).  
With the introduction of globalization and the prioritization of neoliberalism, the interest 
of business out ranks the competing interests of residents. Orchestrated by corporate leaders, the 
neoliberal urban agenda is to increase accumulation by restructuring the institutions and local 
government of urban cities. Thus, the city’s budget and attention are repurposed. Budgets focus 
on investments in retail, corporate services, tourism, culture, pricey residential developments—
and the educational spaces for those developments (Demissie, 2006, p. 20). Global cities require 
many trained bodies for their efficient operation; they need large numbers of both highly paid 
professionals and those that service them in low wage professions (Lipman, 2004). As the focus 
shifts to appealing to foreign investments, and ensuring that government regulations favor all that 
is entrepreneurial, there is no concern for those without the political clout to ensure that their 
interests are valued and represented in the market. The severe inequalities produced by an over 
reliance on the market and an underdeveloped social welfare system have significant 
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consequences for those without a role in the governance of urban schools and the creation of 
education policy.  
The former role of a city, or municipal government—to pass laws, regulate behavior, and 
provide services to citizens—is transformed and replaced by the global cities new task to provide 
transnational corporations with the space and unified infrastructure to efficiently facilitate and 
control labor, communications, and capital worldwide (Homel, 2001). Globalization has elevated 
the importance and power of a now hierarchal list of urban global cities, as they compete for both 
access to resources and the ability to remain attractive to those that control the flow of capital, 
goods, images, culture, labor and information (Demissie, 2006). 
Globalization is one of the most recent methods of accumulation, and urban spaces like 
Chicago—new global cities—play a vital role in the dissemination of capital, goods, images, and 
people. The most noticeable role that globalization has taken in Chicago has been the 
deindustrialization2 of its economy, which in turn decentralized the manufacturing industry, 
significantly impacting the economic and social lives of people of color and low income people 
that dwell within the city’s limits. As a global city, Chicago is unique in both its hyper-
segregated residential structure and concentrated poverty, thus experiencing quite severe forms 
of racial and social inequality after deindustrialization (Demissie, 2006).   
Chicago, like many city governments, has incorporated neoliberal doctrines and urban 
policy strategies by recreating its urban spaces for both market-oriented economic growth and 
elite consumption practices. Global cities are where the tenuous relationships between wealth 
and poverty, and power and marginalization (which typify neoliberalism and globalization) 
                                                
2 Deindustrialization is the process that occurs during the shift to service-based economies and the application of 
advanced informational technology. It has been used to privatize public services and increase the profits of industry 
through increases of: low wage and casual employment, rates of unemployment, racial and social polarization, and 
poverty in urban communities (Demissie, 2006).  
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unfold shaping both the tensions and the trends of educational policy (Demissie, 2006). 
Ideologically, neoliberal discourse erodes the very concept of education for democratic 
participation. It shapes educational policy, using the human capital development argument, to 
define education as merely the preparation for the employment sector (Lipman, 2004). And, 
although the tiering of educational experiences and opportunities is nothing new, with an 
increasing credentialism and the decreasing living wage, who has access to what knowledge is 
critical in the information economy (Lipman, 2006).  
Project Design 
 
In developing a project featuring Renaissance 2010, mayoral control and neoliberalism in 
the development of American educational policy, this project is most inspired by the work of 
Lipman and Haines (2007). What separates this project from their contribution is the inclusion of 
critical race theory (CRT), spatial analysis and the argument of intent. Lipman and Haines (2007) 
ground their work in participatory research, and argue that Chicago’s new plan for choice 
demonstrates a middle and upper-middle class conquest of the city’s education system. Their 
critique reveals the necessity of cross community collaborations, and a growing broad-based 
opposition to Ren2010.  In all fairness, their work questions the intent of corporate leaders 
(Chicago Commercial Club members) and local state officials when designing and implementing 
Ren2010. Still, although it includes an analysis of race, the article presents the policy as the 
product of neoliberal interests and ideologies that negatively impact communities of color. In 
centering race and racism, this project asserts that it is because of institutional racism that Ren10 
was designed. I argue that the goal of the policy is to disrupt the educational opportunities of 
students of color, cast their communities in a language of failure, and claim their spaces.  
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Chapter 2 introduces a review of the literature surrounding neoliberalism, race and 
achievement. This section provides a brief history of corporate involvement in the governance of 
the Chicago Public Schools, following the role of the Chicago Commercial Club from 1906.  It 
then highlights the transition from the Chicago Reform Act of 1988 to the Renaissance 2010 
initiative, to make sense of the city’s educational policies and the transition from centralization 
to decentralization and then toward recentralization. This chapter provides the groundwork for 
later conversations on Blacks and the Chicago Public Schools system, by briefly detailing the 
history of schooling and educational opportunities for Blacks in Chicago. Finally, the chapter 
ends with a discussion on democratic participation in an era where educational policy is scripted 
around market principles.  
Chapter 3 introduces CRT as a theoretical framework, and using GIS and participant 
observation as narrative. It reviews the research questions for the project, and details how maps 
will be used. This section offers a detailed explanation and description of the quantitative and 
qualitative data collected and analyzed for this study. 
Chapter 4 contributes a descriptive analysis of the Chicago Public Schools located in 
primarily Black and Latino/a neighborhoods, using the maps produced by the research methods 
explained in chapter 3.  This sections focus is the relationship between Renaissance 2010 
(Ren10) schools, neighborhood schools and race in the city of Chicago. This section also 
provides a historical and political analysis of the complicated intersections between race, politics 
and class in the city of Chicago, to aide in understanding GIS results. Chapter 4 presents a 
counter narrative to the portrayal of Renaissance 2010 by supporters of the plan by employing 
simple spatial analysis procedures alongside CRT’s narrative (as gathered through observation 
and secondary data analysis). The counter narrative will place the voice(s) and experiences of 
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Chicago community members in the forefront, with a particular focus on (a) community response 
to school closure notifications and (b) the practical consequences of excluding community 
knowledge.  
Chapter 5 provides the concluding discussion of the research problem, offers future 
research implications, and ends with a critique of Renaissance.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Chicago Public Schools: Race, Space & Global Ambitions 
 
In 1988, the Chicago Reform Act legitimized parent and community power by legally 
turning over schools to parents and community groups but by 1995, the implementation of 
mayoral control laid the foundation for Renaissance 2010, which delegitimized parents and 
community members along with the public school system itself. This larger discussion of 
democratic participation and cultural capital occurs within the subsections of chapter two, which 
explores the main themes found within the literature on educational reforms in urban cities. 
Thus, chapter two provides the context necessary to understand the relationship between public 
education in Chicago and (a) race, residential segregation, and poverty and (b) mayoral control, 
corporate interests, and global ambitions. However, before discussing the latest Chicago 
education reforms in great detail, and therefore neoliberalism and globalization, it is necessary to 
first provide the context of their development. 
The Collapse of the Rust Belt and the Beginning of Neoliberalism 
The distinction between the Fordist era and present day is seen most clearly in the power 
dynamics between business (capital), labor and unions. During the Roosevelt administration, 
significant gains in the labor movement were made due to militant unionism, like the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW), who wanted to create one big union across industries. Credited to 
Henry Ford, Fordism refers to the concept of mass production in industry. Taylorism improved 
upon the Fordist assembly line technique with down to the second calculations designed to 
produce efficiency. President Roosevelt attempted to secure labor peace by implementing labor 
laws that, within the context of the preparation of the global dissemination of Fordism and 
Taylorism, respected and guaranteed workers rights to organize, bargain and unionize (Ranney, 
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2003). After consistent strikes and techniques of pointed aggression from labor, the relationship 
between capital and laborer resulted in a compromise between the two, and bargaining power for 
unions.  
 In Chicago, this relationship was exemplified in the steel industry where unions, wielded 
great power and control over their labor and were able to require autonomy, a good salary and 
suitable working conditions. Laborers were also able to help affect the employment security of 
their children by arranging training for technical jobs, so that they might save for college or have 
a direct point of entry into secure employment. For Black Chicagoans during the Great 
Migration, although their conditions were improvements from southern employment 
opportunities, they did not equal the progress made by European immigrants when they arrived 
in mass between 1895 and 1910. Black migrants were barred from competing as individuals and 
were instead shuffled into positions of service (unskilled and semi-skilled) (Homel, 1984).   
Blacks entered the racially segregated labor market during the Roosevelt administrations New 
Deal programs, which enforced the segregation policies of the mid-thirties. The improving 
relationship between Black workers and labor unions significantly contributed to the Black 
occupational differentiation that represented upward mobility into the middle class (Homel, 
1984).   
By 1950, it was estimated that over one-third of Chicago’s Black workforce was 
employed in the manufacturing industry (Demissie, 2006). The collapse of the rust belt 
eliminated these high paying, blue-collar positions and replaced them with low wage service 
positions, many of which had been moved to suburban areas. Blocked by discrimination and 
transportation, many of these positions were inaccessible to the majority of Black job seekers 
(Demissie, 2006; Moberg, 2006). Chicago manufacturing spaces merged the distinction between 
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home and work as entire communities and neighborhoods soon revolved around the 
manufacturing industry. So, when the manufacturing industry failed, entire neighborhoods (gas 
stations, schools, churches, small businesses, and grocery stores) failed along with them 
(Ranney, 2003). Currently, these areas are either gentrifying or continuing to deteriorate 
(Ranney, 2003, p.90). As neighborhoods formerly known as the Black Metropolis became ghost 
towns, the traditional focal points for organization—both home and work—disappeared and 
individuals were geographically dispersed. The collapse of the manufacturing industry thus 
quickly decreased both the economic and political power of not only these workers for 
generations, but for those that relied on their income, like neighborhood business’ and 
dependents (Ranney, 2003). 
In the hypermobility of both industry and capital, dual cities are created within the same 
space as some are pushed to the margins of the economy while others fight for the command 
positions at its center (Lipman, 2004). So, globalization and neoliberalism affected Chicago 
politics in two ways. First, Chicago’s economic evolution began post-WWII, due to the growing 
concerns of business leaders over the economic decline of Chicago’s central business districts. 
These districts suffered from both dropping property values and retail sales, in addition to the 
loss of manufacturing jobs to suburban areas. Thus, the entire 21-year tenure of mayor Richard J. 
Daley, from 1955-1976, was marked by both overlapping developments and a collaboration 
between the mayor, the city’s business leadership, and the agencies of municipal planning as 
they attempted to transform the city to maintain its reputation as a major economic hub 
(Demissie, 2006). Secondly, the economic and urban revitalization benefits for both the city and 
its local business leaders had a significant effect on Chicago’s working class. The corporate 
rationale which increased profit through capital mobility devalued the labor power of workers, 
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not only in Chicago, but domestically, because company’s who moved to new locations accrued 
more labor time for smaller wages from new employees. The direct and indirect job loss 
resulting from the shifting economy disproportionately affected women and people of color who, 
because of the high supply of workers, had a hard time replacing their living wage incomes. 
Their median incomes were cut in half, their health care access was non-existent, and with their 
positions no longer available, their previous skills were devalued in the changing market 
(Ranney, 2003). Thus, although this shift produced more profit for corporations (Koval, 2006)3, 
for workers in Chicago this meant that due to the limited availability of jobs, they were forced to 
replace their salaried expectations4 with temporary jobs that paid significantly less. These 
workers were also criminalized by welfare reforms, as they navigated through the lack of 
services in place to help alleviate the pressures from their sudden and in some cases, perpetual 
unemployment (Homel, 1984).   
This is where an understanding of globalization and neoliberalism becomes important. 
From the perspective and ideology of the changing economy of the workers, money price is the 
only value, and so, what is efficient (read: cheaper) for business is good for the market. The 
effect on individuals is only significant as it affects one’s ability to consume. Actually, the 
rationale for the movement of industry by some public policy analysts, economists, and 
politicians, and its effect on workers is as follows: the distorted wages of blue collar workers 
kept them from improving their quality of life through higher education, and so, this shift will 
                                                
3 In the manufacturing sector of the nation’s new economy, productivity increases mean that 
companies can produce about eleven times more product using 65% fewer employees than it did 
65 years ago.  
4 When I say this, I mean that the living expenses of these workers and the quality of life 
expectations held inherently and by family members remained the same. Of course, although 
some discretionary materials could be lived without, their basic human needs of food, shelter, 
health care, etc remained. 
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encourage them to realize that they need to improve their skills, education, etc., so that they will 
be able to better compete individually in the market for their needs (Ranney, 2003). 
Globalization: Neoliberalism  
Globalization and neoliberalism are mutually dependent. Globalization is a method for 
the accumulation of surplus, and neoliberalism is a means to that end. David Harvey (2003) 
defines neoliberalism as, “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well 
being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to 
such practices” (p. 2). Although the definition of globalization has been contested, its simplest 
definition is the movement of ‘stuff” around the world. When we read the work of a foreign 
scholar in a domestic journal, put on our clothing in the morning, snag a good deal on the 
internet but complain of its shipping costs, gain a new faculty member from Australia, or 
purchase anything without a ‘Made in the USA’ label5, we meet globalization. People and things 
have traveled throughout the world for centuries, so the idea of globalization is not new or 
revolutionary. For example during Roosevelt’s administration, globalization is seen in the 
implementation of the Bretton Woods agreement. This agreement was designed to rebuild 
Europe as it suited the US: the international standardization of the US dollar through institutions 
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Each organization held a specific role in the facilitation of European 
                                                
5 Although, the ‘Made in America’ label can now apply to things that have ‘negligible’ foreign 
content, and products made of ‘all or virtually all’ US materials and on US soil (which includes 
products made on the soil of developing countries, like Jamaica, in free trade zones). This is an 
example of neoliberalism. Retrieved on June 13, 2008 from: 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/madeusa.shtm  
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growth, and each allowed the U.S. to maintain a significant level of political control over 
international policy. The IMF’s role was to stabilize the value of currency for purposes of 
international trade, by providing short-term loans and assistance should inflation arise. The 
World Bank was established to mediate financial matters between lenders in the U.S., Europe, 
and Great Britain in the development of long-term projects. The role of the GATT was to 
facilitate trade amongst nations and to prevent expensive trade wars (Ranney, 2003, p. 36). Thus, 
it is the contemporary application of globalization and its effect on the methods of accumulating 
surplus in a capitalist society that have changed. Its contemporary application in urban spaces is 
usually associated with the rise of neoliberal approaches to public policy.  
Since the early 1970s, neoliberalism has revealed itself in political and economic 
practices and modes of thought, as evidenced by deregulation, privatization and the withdrawal 
of the state from many areas of social provisions (Ranney, 2003). This ideology directly 
followed the post-Fordist era, where both globalization and technology allowed for the global 
division of labor. The newfound ease in the movement of capital dismantled the Fordist era’s 
reliance on economies of scale and agglomeration. Ranney (2003) argues that the decline of the 
post-Fordist era led to an economic and political crisis in every capitalist nation, which then 
allowed for a new mode of surplus accumulation. Although providing space for leading 
academics and politicians to discuss alternative strategies and economic programs in forums held 
by the Trilateral Commission and the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation 
(OECD), the neoliberal movement was jumpstarted by the following: the Chilean experiment, 
credit, massive deindustrialization, an attack on organized labor in the developed world and, a 
staunch regime of austerity in the developing world (Ranney, 2003, p. 38).  
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It was in Chile on September 11, 1973 that neoliberalism as a state function was first 
attempted, after Augusto Pinochet’s coup against the democratically elected government of 
Salvador Allende threatened the domestic business interests of elites with its push towards 
socialism (Ranney, 2003, p. 7). Even though it occurred through undemocratic means, this swift 
military coup was supported domestically by traditional upper classes and internationally by U.S. 
corporations, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger (Harvey, 2005). Pinochet quickly repressed the social movements and political 
organizations of the left, like community health centers that served the poor, as he freed the 
market from regulatory restraints (Harvey, 2005). Chicago School trained economists of Chile 
were hired to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund, and subsequently, they 
restructured Chile’s economy along their guidelines. Their actions revived the Chilean economy 
briefly as it failed shortly thereafter during the Latin American debt crisis of 1982.  
The survival of neoliberalism depended on democratic means; therefore popular consent 
had to be rallied. This was done by disguising a call for the restoration of class power with the 
common sense language of freedom—specifically, the advance of individual freedoms through 
the market (Harvey, 2005, p. 7). To be more specific, the beginning stages of the New York City 
fiscal crisis, between 1974-1976, is credited as one of the defining moments which strengthened 
U.S. expressions of neoliberalism. During the Nixon/Ford era, the fiscal crisis of the city of New 
York became a national issue. As a result of the erosion of the economic base of the city by 
capitalist restructuring, deindustrialization and suburbanization, the city veered dangerously 
close to both bankruptcy and the closing of its municipal bonds markets (Lichten, 1979; Harvey, 
2005).  
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 Still, it is important to note that other modes of thought were prevalent at the time. Most 
sociologists attributed the fiscal crisis to the welfare state, loose fiscal management, the lack of 
managerial control, or unions. For example, the empirical study of the Temporary Commission 
on City Finances (TCCF) blamed the city’s fiscal crisis on powerful unions who forced fiscally 
unsound wage and benefits settlements in return for labor peace (Lichten, 1979). Economists, 
however, attributed the crisis to the city’s practice of borrowing money (from its creditors to pay 
its creditors) to conceal the gap between its operating expenses and its sales and real estate 
revenues (Lichten, 1979). Either way, partially due to the financial crisis in their own industry 
and within the overall capitalist economy, the financial industry—as the “powerful banks”—
refused to shoulder the burden of the city’s debt before several conditions were met. Of those 
conditions the most substantial was the demand that they secure the power to: (a) transform the 
structure of city government; and (b) increase interest rates. The solutions from the main 
financial institutions pushed the city further into its financial crisis (Lichten, 1979; Harvey, 
2005).  
The entire episode is regarded as a coup by the financial institutions to restore class 
power. It is also important to note here that the intensifying mobilization and organization of the 
working poor should be viewed as an example of the class struggle for the social wage—or more 
so, the attempt to abolish the connection between wages and the production of exchange-value.  
It is within the context of politicized class struggle that workers mobilized to apply pressure to 
the state sector to increase the value of their labor, thus redirecting some revenue from the needs 
of capital to the needs of workers and the poor. Therefore, capital’s response was an attempt to 
reestablish the relationship between production, wages, and profitability, and to regain primary 
control of the appropriation of surplus. From capitals perspective, if class struggle caused the 
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fiscal crisis, then the creation of an atmosphere of scarcity, austerity, and discipline was the 
solution (Lichten, 1979; Harvey, 2005). It is necessary to note that the effect of this austerity was 
not distributed equally between classes. Corporate welfare displaced the welfare of the people. 
The business class was able to increase interest rates through the Municipal Assistance 
Corporation, redirect state and federal tax benefits for its base, and secure its investments in the 
city. All of this was done in exchange for the benefits and security formally held by unions and 
city workers, and the needs of the poor. 
Although the banking industry was very much involved in the events leading to the fiscal 
crisis, specifically by withholding funds and underwriting and divesting city securities, after 
President Ford’s refusal to ‘bail out’ the city, the financial community gained formal power over 
the state board. With the formation of the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) on May 26, 
1975, the financial community controlled the city’s finances and budgetary expenses to secure 
city investments (Lichten, 1979; Harvey, 2005, p. 89). The organizing power of the financial and 
corporate communities through MAC presents an extremely clear picture of the success of 
capital in asserting its ideology. Big banks rallied to erode the infrastructure of the city, close 
many of its medical facilities, decrease and freeze wages, layoff city workers, and end the free 
tuition and open enrollment practices of the City University of New York (CUNY). Government 
became entrepreneurial as a more austere, non-elected control board, the Emergency Financial 
Control Board (EFCB), was created with the similar role of MAC, although EFCB was a legal 
mandate. Because it was not required to work with labor unions, residents or workers, EFCB was 
able to control union contracts, reduce city services, and facilitate the investment of union 
worker’s pensions into the city’s notes and bonds—the latter unions agreed lest the city default 
on its loans and enter bankruptcy. The investment of the municipal union’s pension funds 
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signaled a huge shift in their ability to negotiate with, and affect in any real way, capitals austere 
policies. Their pensions (and thus their futures) were tied to the fiscal stability of the city, 
although without the voice/vote traditionally wielded by investors. 
Neoliberal actions during the fiscal crisis of New York City made way for its introduction 
both domestically and internationally under Reagan and through the International Monetary 
Fund during the 1980s. The further solidification of the power of capital continued with the 
Supreme Court decision of 1976, which allowed corporations to legally contribute unlimited 
amounts of money to political parties and political action committees (PACs) (Harvey, 2005). 
PACs ensured the financial dependency of both parties. Although most known for their 
relationship with the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, dependent upon large 
contributions, also became directly vulnerable to the interests of big business (Harvey, 2005). 
In an effort to gather a committed electoral base, the Christian right was rallied through 
the rhetoric of religion, cultural nationalism, homophobia, racism and anti-feminism (Moreton, 
2007). For this population, liberals and excessive state power became popular adversaries 
(Harvey, 2005). Thus, by diverting attention from corporate power and its connection to 
economic issues, capital convinced the Christian right to vote against its material and economic 
class interests (Harvey, 2005; Moreton, 2007). As city government became increasingly 
entrepreneurial rather than socially democratic, ‘government’ transformed into ‘urban 
governance through public-private partnerships’ (Harvey, 2005, p. 47). Because the business 
class built alliances based on class rather than individual interests, they were able to use their 
wealth and resources to build a solid electoral base, and to use the Republican Party as a political 
class instrument. 
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 After perpetuating neoliberalism as the last hope for freedom and consolidating state 
power Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister of the U.K., and President Ronald Reagan used 
their powers of persuasion, co-optation, threat, and bribery to maintain the climate necessary for 
the prosperity of neoliberalism. It was Reagan’s election in 1980 and both his support of 
monetarism and opposition to inflation that ushered in the reduction of government in the 
regulation of industry, healthcare, the environment. With the establishment of the National Labor 
Relations Board, his leadership also made way for the transformation of the relationship between 
buyer and seller (Harvey, 2005, p. 52).  
Neoliberalism and the Destruction of Claims on Value 
Traditionally, in order to begin new modes of surplus accumulation, the old ways must be 
destroyed. The economic depression and two world wars posed a threat to both capitalism and 
the destruction of value (Ranney, 2003, p. 43). The Reagan administration continued the 
destruction—shifting the focus from production to finance—by increasing the affordability of 
the costs of production (by the movement of capital to cheaper locales), and by constructing 
capital-labor union relations in such as way as to prevent unions from affecting any real change 
in their working conditions. For example, when air traffic controllers went on strike to protest 
dangerous conditions and long hours, President Reagan, refusing to bargain, fired all strikers 
permanently and replaced them with military controllers until replacements could be trained. His 
actions signaled to corporations that firing strikers was politically acceptable and they 
immediately began to do so (Harvey, 2005, p. 43). 
Arguably the lowering of the social wage both internationally and domestically is the 
global effect of deindustrialization and the assault on labor unions in the U.S. (Harvey, 2005, p. 
44). During Reagan’s administration both austerity, through the deindustrialization of the rust 
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belt, and the persuasive rhetoric of the neoliberal goal of freedom for both capital and labor 
silenced any remaining union power. Although he slashed social spending, budget deficits 
greatly increased under Reagan because of his increase in military spending and tax cuts for the 
wealthy, and these debts continued into the next decade. The pursuit of full employment 
initiatives and the economy stimulating deficits of Fordism differed from that of Reagan’s 
neoliberal era because the deficits of the latter were increased within the context of evaporating 
social programs (Ranney, 2003, p. 41).  
Education in Chicago: Global Ambitions and Corporate Interests 
 
…cities of Blackness crammed inside larger cities of Whiteness… 
--Wayne Miller quoting Gordon Parks (p ix) 
Nicknamed the “White City6” during its hosting of the 1893 World’s Columbian Fair, 
Chicago became an idealized “vision of urban life at its noblest and most civilized” (Cronon, 
2000, p. 342). Even at this time, the city’s elite politicians and planners believed in Chicago’s 
manifest destiny as the exemplification of the perfect metropolitan vision. At the heart of this 
reality were extreme polarities—wealth and poverty, slum and skyscraper—which were 
accomplished by the creation of a fantasy urban life obscured from the productive labor of 
Chicago’s working class. 
The involvement of civic organizations like the Commercial Club of Chicago (CCC)7, 
whose membership consisted primarily of business leaders in the city, in the planning and 
                                                
6 Presumably, this name is due to the use of electricity and the large amount of lights that lit the 
city. 
7 One of the oldest elite business clubs in the city, members of the Commercial Club of Chicago 
would later negotiate both the 1988 and 1995 Chicago school reforms. Its members include the 
heads of the main philanthropic and civic institutions of the city, over 275 leaders in the cities 
top financial and commercial institutions, as well as the mayor and state governor. The club, 
operating under the principle of consensus decision-making, is the venue by which its members 
pool their resources to influence legislation and school policy. 
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policies of the city dates as far back as 1909 (Smith, 2006). In fact, after commissioning Daniel 
Burnham and Edward Bennett to prepare the “Plan of Chicago”, the Commercial Club played an 
aggressive role in creating the vision of Burnham’s quickly renowned plan. Burnham’s proposal 
was an ambitious plan for transforming Chicago into the preeminent city of America (Smith, 
2006). As early as 1904, Burnham advised members of the Commercial Club that if they sought 
to improve Chicago, they needed to pool their resources, establish an independent organization, 
and force the city’s public officials to do what they would not do without external pressure.  
Burnham’s advice—to target businessmen and investors and make the city more efficient and 
attractive to these groups—or risk the loss of their dollars; sentiments echoed in the policies of 
the city today. Burnham predicted that if Chicago “put on a charming dress” and became more 
visually appealing, wealthy residents would spend their fortune in their hometown instead of 
traveling or ‘running away’ elsewhere (Smith, 2006). Although frequently Burnham attempted to 
convince the poor as well as the rich of the worthiness of his ideas, he maintained that it was 
most important to cater ones ideas for wealthy Chicagoans, as their wealth and purchasing power 
would trickle down to the poor (Smith, 2006). 
The power of civic organizations both of the past and present should not be 
underestimated.  Even publicly elected officials were outranked when standing alongside 
powerful and wealthy members of civic organizations (Smith 2006). Commercial Club members 
consisted of a highly selective and elected group of those in the highest positions among the 
city’s business leaders. Burnham was himself an elected member of the Commercial Club by 
1901, and he shared the political views of members from these organizations who failed to 
distinguish between their personal interests and those of the city of Chicago. Club members 
resources included statesmen, politicians, academics, scientists, presidents, clergymen and the 
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like—high achievers with great reputations. Virtually all members were White, male, protestant 
and republican. These were men familiar with one another beyond their membership in the 
Commercial Club. They shared corporate board memberships, golf club memberships and other 
social, cultural and business relationships. This was a tightly knit group of the extremely 
influential, a collection of individuals motivated to protect and advance their interests.   
The governance of the public school system and the growth of the city have been 
intimately connected since 1906 to the interests of the business community. In October of that 
year, the executive committee of the Merchants Club called for a closed meeting where the main 
agenda items were: (a) the Chicago Plan; and (b) the reform of the public schools administration.  
In fact, the collective identified public school reform as one of their most important works, and 
their involvement with public education went hand in hand with the development of urban 
spaces. For example, in an attempt to sell the Plan to Chicagoans, the Commercial Club targeted 
parents via their children’s enrollment in public schools, and the Plan was integrated into the 
student’s curriculum and became a mandatory textbook (Smith, 2006).  
 It was with the creation of the Burnham Plan that business first aligned for the purpose 
of making systematic comprehensive changes to the physical development of a major city 
without the explicit involvement of government officials (Smith, 2006). Therefore, it was the 
vision and governing ideas of these twelve of so self appointed business leaders that recreated 
urban spaces for all Chicagoans (Smith, 2006). The early planners denied any appearance of self-
interest, instead, arguing that creating order and making a profit were congruent and not 
competing aims. They deemed downtown Chicago the heart of the city, and placed a call that 
Chicago’s responsible elite take the lead on controlling the urban masses (Smith, 2006). 
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Thus, Chicago city planners have actively sought to make Chicago a global city since the 
early 1900s. Although the term itself is new, Progressive planners recognized Chicago’s central 
location for Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Missouri and parts of Indiana and 
Michigan. They attempted to emulate the city designs of Paris, the architecture of Rome and the 
beauty and elegance of Athens (Smith, 2006). Placing its future amongst the established 
flourishing city’s of the time, early planners set out to first beautify the city (via the City 
Beautiful Movement), noting that bad urban environments devalued civilization and would 
produce both similar ideas and responses from the people. Additionally, their approach to 
improving urban life by creating grand parks, buildings and gathering areas complete with 
fountains and statues reaffirmed their belief that such structures were a better plan for the poor 
than providing public services which directly addressed social ills and inequities. By imposing 
their vision and values on the undesired communities of immigrants and workers, supporters of 
the program hoped to assert social control (Smith, 2006). Still, ever present in their marketing 
campaigns, was an undercurrent of rhetoric that encouraged the masses to accept and support the 
status quo, and a social and economic hierarchy that placed elite businessmen at the apex. 
In 1896, British journalist George Warrington Stevens wrote that he could not reconcile 
the juxtaposition of parks and slums or the clean air and foul stench, which simultaneously 
existed within the city of Chicago (Smith, 2006). Since at least the 1870s, Chicago was a place 
with sharply drawn class lines (Smith, 2006). One example lies in the George Pullman 
community created in the 1880s for the working class employees of the Pullman factory. The 
community was developed adjacent to the main factory, and included separate housing, retail 
outlets, a library, and even a separate church. In 2009, Chicago continues to be a city of mutually 
existing extremes. At once there exists extreme poverty and extreme wealth, extreme grandeur 
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and extreme squalor, majority Black neighborhoods, majority Latino/a neighborhoods, majority 
White neighborhoods. The separation or isolation of the working class from Chicago’s well to do 
has been the solution historically of city planners for addressing the “problem” of urban 
communities. The focus on race, space and opportunity in this research project is grounded in the 
recognition that institutional and sociopolitical racism are inseparable from urban development 
in Chicago (Street, 2007).   
Race & Global Cities 
Nationwide there has been an ideological shift. The acceptance of racism as a barrier to 
Black advancement has been replaced by support for a new and colorblind ruler: the market. 
Street (2007) introduces a new discourse, neoliberal racism, where status and wealth are solely 
dependent upon an individual’s success or failure in adapting to the free market. Giroux’s (2003) 
notion of neoliberal racism contends that human agency and misery are defined by personal 
choice. As such, social inequity is the result of an individuals poor choices or their lack of moral 
responsibility, each a private issue. If this philosophy is accepted, it is not the role of government 
to address the social disparities of race and class, but the individuals.  
The time of social welfare programs and policies designed exclusively for the benefit of 
those most in need, or the Fordist collaboration between business and laborers in their mutual 
pursuit of accumulation, is no more. This new era, the shift from a manufacturing economy to a 
service and information based economy—sometimes referred to as austerity, the new world 
order (NWO), or neoliberalism—holds a different belief in the utility of government. The 
function of government then, is to encourage individuals and businesses to become globally 
competitive, and to minimize any reliance on the government for the social welfare of its 
citizens. In this light it is neither economical nor is it rational to provide social provisions for 
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those that are unable to get their needs fulfilled by competing in the market (Ranney, 2003). The 
mantra of neoliberalism and globalization changed the ideology around notions of freedom. They 
celebrate and exploit individualism and consumption at the expense of social group efforts, while 
overlooking the collectives within the private sector. The policies of neoliberal governments 
function primarily to create corporate empires and build corporate wealth. In neoliberal regimes, 
social and democratic functions of the government are rescinded, as the left hand of the state is 
starved to feed the right (Street, 2007).  
Although recognizing that the broader effects of such policies affect not only the raced 
but the classed as well, Street (2007) is clear in his assertion that within the heavily racialized 
U.S., Blacks are disproportionately represented at the lower spectrum of the nations spatial 
hierarchies. And so, in this new, post-race era, the public is presented with images of successful 
African Americans who ‘transcend race’ like the newly elected President Barack Obama 
(Ladson-Billings, 2008).  Coupled with the language of diversity, the very presence of these hard 
working individuals is thrust forward as proof of the end of racism in America and more 
importantly, as proof that it is above all, self-determination that reaps the best rewards.  
Yet, Blacks in urban cities like Chicago continue to experience distinctively extreme 
forms of hyper segregation—a spatial apartheid—that one would not expect of a group that has 
lived in these cities in large numbers for decades. The European American ethnic groups that 
filled Chicago’s slums in the past are now filled with White yuppies that identify with no 
particular ethnic group, while Black slums continue to be replete with Black ethnic groups 
(Street, 2007). Deeming African Americans the truly ghettoized group in the city, Street (2007) 
points to the research of the Harvard Civil Rights Project as proof that Blacks in and around 
Chicago continue to live in concentrated isolation from other racial and ethnic groups, including 
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Latinos/as and Asian Americans. As of the latest census tract data in 2000, although Blacks are 
19% of the population in Chicago, the average Black Chicagoan resides in a census tract that is 
73% African American. Such figures support national reports that Chicago ranks as the fifth 
most segregated metropolitan area for Blacks in America and highlights the extreme isolation of 
Blacks in the city (Street, 2007). 
What’s the Fuss: Race and Education in Chicago 
 
In the history of Black education in Chicago, Black resistance to racially segregated 
educational options has been a reoccurring theme and, as early as 1863 just as racist ideas and 
legislation mandating segregated schooling emerged, so did Black resistance. Many families 
simply refused to send their children to the colored School and they continued attending their 
regular classrooms (Homel, 1984). After the ratification of the 13th Amendment to the federal 
Constitution, and in the same month of Lincoln’s assassination, the Colored School closed, 
ending the dejure racial barriers to the Chicago Public Schools (Homel, 1984). Still, the great 
migration provoked fear and hostility in younger Whites, who held no connection to the anti-
slavery movement. Racially segregated schools and unequal educational resources became the 
reality. Blacks again rallied through parent groups and organizations like the Chicago Urban 
League (CUL), the Chicago and Northern District Association of Colored Women (ACW), and 
the Chicago Council of the National Negro Congress (CCNNC), to protest and remedy the two 
most important education concerns for Black students during the 1930s and 1940s: overcrowding 
and school board representation (Homel, 1984).  
In addition to the weight of overcrowding and administrative representation, by the 1960s 
and 1980s, racial and economic isolation, an increasing drop out rate, and school violence were 
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added to the list of major issues for Black public school students (Lipman, 2006)8. An example 
of both the school reform efforts of Black Chicagoans and the beginning influence of 
neoliberalism in Chicago schools occurs in the case of the pseudo resignation of superintendent 
Benjamin Willis. After the warnings of business leaders to the mayor that the integration of 
schools would result in White flight, the interests of Black CPS students and the interests of the 
city of Chicago’s business aristocracy were immediately and diametrically opposed (Danns, 
2003).  
As a staunch supporter of segregation during the Richard J. Daley administration, 
superintendent Willis yielded his power to block desegregation attempts during his tenure 
(Danns, 2003). During the 1960s Freedom Day’s Boycotts, sponsored by the Coordinating 
Council of Community Organizers (CCCO), Blacks protested the increasingly unsatisfactory 
conditions of defacto segregation in the Chicago Public Schools, in addition to the role of both 
superintendent Willis, and the Board of Education in creating and preserving the segregated 
school system. It is not at all surprising that integration was one focus of the boycotts, as Willis’ 
solution to the overcrowding of the public schools Black students attended was a) the assignment 
of double shifts, where students attended school for half the day, and b) trailers—nicknamed 
Willis wagons. Willis’ solutions were presented during the same time that the construction of 
schools in White neighborhoods continued (Danns, 2003). Despite protests and multiple arrests, 
the city’s segregation focus continued to negatively affect the quality of educational experiences 
and resources for Black CPS students (Danns, 2003). 
So, it was on July 4, 1969 that the CCCO submitted a complaint to the Education 
Commissioner under Title VI, Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act, charging the Chicago Board 
                                                
8 Although the focus of this project is the educational opportunities for Black students, these 
were also the issues of Latino students attending Chicago Public Schools.  
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of Education, its president, and superintendent Willis with promoting a racially segregated and 
discriminatory school system. In the detailed report, the CCCO listed everything from instances 
of gerrymandering to the board’s legislative attempts to block integration efforts. Citing the 
Board’s preference for double shifts or building new, segregated schools for Blacks to address 
overcrowding—although White schools were geographically closer and underutilized—the 
complaint requested that federal funds be withheld (Danns, 2003). Education commissioner, 
Francis Keppel, determined on September 30, 1965 that although some of the statements 
required further investigation, federal funding was to be withheld until Chicago schools were up 
to code (Danns, 2003).   
Nevertheless, the school reform attempts of Black organizers were again thwarted when 
Mayor Daley met with President Johnson three days later to get the federal funds released and—
after the face saving concessions of the Whiston-Cohen Agreement, they were (Danns, 2003, p. 
54). The U.S. Office of Education’s choice to release federal funds, with evidence of purposeful 
segregation, severely weakened its ability to enforce Title VI defacto segregation (Danns, 2008).  
 The only repercussion to the city’s meticulous segregation policies was its receipt of a 
report from the Office of Education in January 1967, which listed a request that the city address 
Title VI concerns in faculty and student assignment, and open enrollment practices in trade and 
vocational programs. The new superintendent James Redmond’s suggestion was a one way 
busing program, moving a few Black students to White schools. This, he rationalized, would 
incite the least amount of White flight (Danns, 2008). The majority of White and Black 
communities objected to busing, albeit for differing reasons.  
Some members of Black communities rejected the notion of one-way busing and its 
underlying assumptions about the quality of Black neighborhood schools in relation to the 
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education programs offered in White schools. Some members of both communities believed that 
funds directed toward neighborhood school improvement would be the best solution. Other 
Whites rejected the plan that would bring ‘ghetto’, ‘impoverished’ Black students, who lacked 
character and initiative, into their good neighborhood schools (Danns, 2008, p. 67). Nevertheless, 
the Chicago School Board approved the busing plan on March 6, 1968. Less than 1% of 
Chicago’s 580,000 students participated in the voluntary plan (Danns, 2008, p. 72). 
According to Danns (2003), an ideological shift had occurred by 1968, after Dr. King’s 
failed Civil Rights effort to desegregate Chicago neighborhoods. Black school reform efforts 
progressed, governed by attitudes that were less concerned with non-violence and integration, 
and more focused on gaining control of local schools and procuring an equitable education for 
their children (Danns, 2008).  
Black students were not passive agents during the fight for school reform, which was 
evident by the Lawndale community student protests in the fall of 1968 (Danns, 2008, p. 75). On 
October 14th, between 27,000 and 35,000 students gathered to protest their school conditions. 
They listed twelve demands, which included a request for more homework, new and relevant 
course materials, health insurance for athletes, and an increase in Black faculty and 
administrators. Although not all Blacks supported the tactics of the students9, the student 
reformers received a large degree of support and assistance from both teachers and community 
members (Danns, 2003). Community members supported the students by picketing in front of 
the Board of Education and boycotting public schools. After receiving a meeting with the Board, 
students and teachers were granted the promotion of seven Black teachers to assistant principal 
(Danns, 2003, p. 85).   
                                                
9  This cannot be expected, as there is no monolithic ‘Black community’. 
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Chicago Public Schools: A Model for the Nation 
…the problem is that public education is a monopoly.. 
--2003 report of the Commercial Club of Chicago (Lipman and Haines, 2007) 
 
Although the “fear of urban Black upheavals spreading throughout the country during the 
1960s caused school administrators to bend slightly to appease the demands for change”, the 
educational reform campaigns of Blacks and Latinos/as from the 1960s to the 1980s was an 
invaluable component of the grassroots movement to elect Harold Washington as mayor in 1983 
(Danns, 2003; Lipman, 2006, p. 250). Because the former mayor, Richard J. Daley, used huge 
amounts of credit during the Fordist era10, the relationship between Chicago’s mayor’s, and the 
business leaders of Chicago was complex. The city’s finances were directly tied to the happiness 
of private investors, and their faith in the thriving economy and potential of the city of Chicago 
(Ranney, 2003). Due to both the decline in federal resources under President Nixon, and 
deindustrialization, mayors in large cities had to ‘court the markets’ by continuously focusing on 
the stability and improvement of their business climate (Ranney, 2003, p. 104).  
Thus, even with the election of a mayor more favorable to African American 
communities, the conflict between the welfare of the people and the welfare of the business 
community continued to exist. The birth of neoliberalism increased the importance of the 
business community and redefined the use of municipal debt finance, as it was no longer to be 
used strictly for public services, but for private sector activities. Consequently, although Harold 
Washington’s platform was people oriented reform, the impact of neoliberalism and 
globalization on cities, communities, and workers placed severe limitations on Washington’s 
platform of unity and fair share local governance (Ranney, 2003). Still, Washington’s 
                                                
10 Mayor Richard J. Daley sold municipal bonds to private investors in the business community. 
These wealthy individuals and members of the business community purchased the city’s 
municipal bonds because they favored their tax-exempt status. 
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innovations in his four and one half year’s in office set most of the trends in politics used by 
Richard M. Daley’s administration today (Bennet, 2006). He is most known for applying 
affirmative action to municipal contracts, but he also pursued a daring policy program which 
placed a high emphasis on neighborhood infrastructure investment through industrial 
developments, like planned manufacturing districts and industrial corridors, which remain 
significant policy commitments (Bennet, 2006).  
Washington seemingly balanced the interests of both the business community and his 
Black constituents11 (Homel, 2001). For example, although he agreed to build the new White 
Sox Comiskey Park, displacing the largely Black and stable population in Armour Square, it was 
during his tenure that the thirty-year redevelopment of the Loop halted (Danns, 2003; Moberg, 
2006). He protected key manufacturing areas from real estate development to protect jobs. 
Washington’s focus on neighborhood initiatives additionally extended into public education, and 
in the fall of 1986 he convened an education summit with the support of forty representatives of 
business, local universities and junior colleges to develop a plan to both improve the quality of 
high school graduates and guarantee them jobs upon their graduation. The following year, he 
reconvened the summit, appointed a parents community council, and placed parents alongside 
business leaders with the task of restructuring the public school system (Shipps, 1997; Lipman, 
                                                
11 Perhaps he learned from the early experiences of Atlanta’s 1973 mayor, Maynard Jackson. 
Jackson began his administration with a vow to directly affect Black Atlanta by building a mass 
public transportation system, requiring that firms that expected to do business with the city hire 
minority workers, and provide more city contracts to minority owned firms (increasing the 
percentage of city dollars paid to minority firms in his first term from 2 to 33).  His 
confrontations with members of the private sector and public denouncement of  (and refusal to 
consult) corporate leaders failed to slow the trend of decentralization and suburbanization, and 
made little progress for his factory worker constituents who’s private employment options 
continued to diminish. Consequently, he found that although his tactics benefited Black business 
people and middle class professionals, he was unable to satisfy the needs of both low-income 
Blacks and big business.  After a racially polarized second term success, he changed his strategy 
to one better suiting corporate leaders. 
 35 
2006). Although the ‘Learn-Earn Connection’ never emerged, it did lead to the 1988 School 
Reform Act (Shipps, 1997).  
Most would agree that the 1988 Chicago School Reform Act (P.A. 85-1418) was an 
example of radical decentralization in school governance, taking community control further than 
any school restructuring efforts in U.S. history (Epps, 1994; Shipps, 1997). For the first time in 
the history of Chicago schools, schools became legally accountable to economically 
disadvantaged children of color, their parents and their communities and therefore parents and 
communities were legally empowered (Epps, 1994). Control of school governance was turned 
over to parents and community members through Local School Council’s (LSC), formed by six 
parents, two community members, two teachers, a principal and a student member. The Chicago 
School Reform Act was made all the more impressive as it allowed voters to elect a LSC for 
each of the city’s almost six hundred schools. Additionally, principals were stripped of their 
tenure, and councils controlled their hire and termination (Katz, Fine, & Simon, 1997). The 
reconstruction of the parent-principal relationship did more than redefine the relationship of 
power. It allowed parents to directly communicate their expectations to prospective principals, 
and allowed candidates to respond. Councils were also responsible for approving school 
improvement plans and allocating discretionary funds as well as a large amount of state funds 
(Katz, Fine & Simone, 1997; Lipman, 2006). And so, although simply one year before, the 
secretary of education, William Bennett, declared Chicago schools to be the worst in the nation, 
by 1988, with the passing of the Chicago School Reform Act, the Illinois State Legislature 
established one of the most far reaching displays of democratic participation by ensuring 
neighborhood control.  
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In 1995, the Illinois General Assembly reversed Chicago’s radical school reform, and 
seized control of the public schools from parents and community members. The governance of 
the Chicago Public School system was placed into the hands of the mayor, Richard M. Daley. 
He, in turn, promptly passed the reigns over to the business sector, replacing distinctions like 
‘general superintendent’ with ‘chief executive officer’. What occurred within the seven years 
from 1988 to 1995 to cause such policy retractions has been described by some as simply a shift 
in governing strategy resulting from LSCs that operated with little financial and organizational 
training, subsequently producing parents and community members who failed to successfully 
restructure neighborhood schools (Shipps, 1997). Others charge that although the school reforms 
were radical, decentralization was surface in nature, allotting limited decision making abilities to 
parents and community members through LSC’s (Epps, 1994). The most important decisions, 
those involving employee union negotiations, system wide budgets and the awarding of major 
contracts continued to be made by the general superintendent of schools, the Chicago Board of 
Education, and the central office staff.  
And still although in theory the reform focused on community control, corporate business 
associations were silent but key organizers in the 1988 reforms, and their critiques of the 1988 
law informed their participation in the 1995 law, which resulted in mayoral control (Shipps, 
1997). It was after facing resistance from the central office during their attempts to offer advice, 
that business associations invited civic and community groups to help in their efforts to 
restructure the school governance system (Shipps, 1997). Many African American education 
activists believed that political and business leaders within the White community did not care 
about the education of ethnic ‘others’ within the city enough to provide adequate educational 
funding for the Chicago Public Schools. They remained skeptical about the school reformers 
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hidden agenda (Epps, 1994). The results of the 1987 coalition between corporate business 
associations and civic and community groups resulted in the writing, lobbying and 
implementation of the Chicago School Reform Act (Shipps, 1997). With this in mind, the leap 
from a law which focused on community control to one that ignored community voice does not 
reflect the erratic nature of the Illinois legislature, but the long standing representation of 
corporate interest (Shipps, 1997).  
After varying educational policy reforms in many different directions, three years later, in 
1998, upon visiting Chicago, then President William Clinton declared that the Chicago Public 
Schools system was a model for the nation (Katz, Fine, & Simon, 1997). Clinton’s praise of the 
system was not for its democratic involvement of local communities, but for its focus on 
accountability and the re-centralized control of schooling. His own administrations Goals 2000 
plan, and its partner the National Skills Standards Board, was also heavily shaped and supported 
by corporate allies. These relationships demonstrate how corporate entrepreneurship has come to 
blur the boundaries between public and private school management (Shipps, 1997). 
Similar to an occurrence leading to the business influence in New York City, the 
relationship between the private sector and the Chicago Public Schools system was cemented as 
a result of the 1979 CPS financial crisis. Business leaders approached the governor with their 
concern about the negotiability of their debt notes and, to solve the crisis, a resolution was 
planned. However, what began as a corporate bailout became a corporate takeover by 1995 
(Shipps, 1997). The resolution forced all of the members of the board of education to resign, 
granted an emergency loan to the school system and established the Chicago School Finance 
Authority (SFA). The SFA has been described as the fiscal watchdog of the system, maintaining 
and exercising its authority. The support of the SFA, the Chicago Commercial Club, the mayor, 
 38 
and community school reformers, made the Chicago School Reform Act possible (Shipps, 1997). 
Unfortunately, with one preoccupied with budget efficiency and the other nervous about the 
preparedness of the future work force, both the SFA and the corporate sector showed little 
patience for the trial and error methods of the LSC’s (Katz, Fine & Simone, 1997). LSC’s did not 
form their own organization until 1994, and as such, they lacked a unified voice. A definite 
disconnect existed between what was discussed ‘downtown’ and its reflection on the everyday 
realities and meanings for those that attended and worked within Chicago Public Schools (Katz, 
Fine & Simon, 1997). Eventually by 1994, it was agreed by all involved that the central office 
and local schools should be realigned towards a complimentary and mutually beneficial working 
relationship. But the consensus was short lived because there were not enough signs of obvious 
and measurable progress to quell corporate concerns (Shipps, 1997). In the end, tensions between 
the city and state government, an underlying fiscal crisis, national disinvestment in public 
education, and the politics of a big city broke the foundation of the Chicago School Reform Act 
(Katz, Fine & Simon, 1997).   
The new chief executive officer of the Chicago Public Schools, Paul Vallas, placed over 
one hundred LSC’s on probation and truncated their authority. Accountability became a hot 
term, and the SFA was eliminated in order to broaden the scope of the mayor’s six appointed 
trustee’s. The public school deficit quickly vanished and capital to build new schools 
materialized. Vallas aggressively approached the problem of low performing schools by creating 
a ‘watch list’ for those with low test scores and a system of probation—complete with probation 
managers, who held great authority (Katz, Fine & Simon, 1997).  
The 1995 recentralization of schools resonated with a lot of families. The Chicago Public 
Schools system has historically failed to adequately educate large segments of its population, and 
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finally someone was being held responsible for student’s academic progress. This topic is 
complicated when using neoliberal rhetoric that equates buzz words like ‘accountability’ and 
‘testing’ with justice and equality (Lipman, 2006). Academic progress is measured by 
standardized test scores, and all students and schools are evaluated as if from one homogenous 
group. Former President Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) is built around simplistic 
binaries that sort students and schools into failing or successful, good or bad, and punishes or 
rewards them accordingly (Lipman, 2006). Moreover, the response of different school districts 
and student cohorts is linked to both the political power of school administrations, and both the 
past and present racial and class advantages of their respective communities. Additionally, CPS’s 
various special programs, schools, and instructional techniques have been instituted in ways that 
reinforce the already racially and economically segmented realities of CPS students (Lipman, 
2003). In most Chicago Public Schools, White students are overrepresented in advanced 
placement and college preparatory classes, and students of color are underrepresented. So, while 
selective enrollment schools and magnet schools are relatively immune from accountability, the 
penalty of grade retention, test drills, and basic skills assignments fall heavily on students of 
color in ‘failing’ schools (Lipman, 2006).  
During the 1990s the foundation was laid for Chicago’s Renaissance 2010 public 
education policy and on June 24, 2004, at an event hosted by the Commercial Club of Chicago, 
Mayor Daley revealed it to the world. The plan for gentrification and the displacement of many 
people of color announced the closing of sixty to seventy Chicago Public Schools and the 
opening of one hundred “new” schools, two-thirds of which were to be privately run and staffed 
by non-unionized employees (Lipman & Haines, 2007). Before education can be placed in the 
marketplace, choice must be created, and Renaissance 2010 provides charter schools, public 
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schools, and contract schools to be consumed (Lipman & Haines, 2007). One third of the 
schools, CPS performance schools, were to be governed under Renaissance 2010 policies and 
funds, and each were given five-year contracts, which came with the benefit of the loosened 
restrictions for unions and LSC’s (Lipman & Haines, 2007). The governance of the remaining 
two-thirds of schools, contract schools and charter schools, was contracted to outside non-for-
profit vendors through CPS. The contract and charter schools could be then re-contracted out to 
for-profit education management organizations (EMOs). Each school is required to compete for 
start up funds, in the private sector, to supplement the public dollars received in their initial 
budget. Renaissance 2010 connects both the accountability policies of the past, and the 
privatization of the future. It has implications that extend to unions, real estate, community 
governance and employment wages and benefits (Lipman & Haines, 2007). Renaissance 2010 
additionally legitimizes the role of corporations in the private sector to make crucial decisions for 
public education, without the input of the community or any degree of public accountability. 
Race, Space and Educational Opportunities in Chicago 
 
The debates surrounding the achievement gap usually focus on either the cause or the 
cure to this particular social ailment. More specifically, and on both fronts, much of the 
discussion centering on the achievement gap either involves an analysis of the family, the 
student, or the school (Ogbu, 2003; McWhorter, 2001; Lareau, 2002). Possible causes of Black-
White achievement disparities are usually either attributed to the disproportionate allocation of 
funds (economic), the lack of cultural capital of low-income families and students of color12 
                                                
12 When I use the term students of color, I am primarily referring to Black and Latino students.  
Also, when speaking of students of color within the confines of this paper, I recognize the close 
link between race and class in issues of educational equity and academic achievement, and 
therefore, I am writing of specifically low-income students of color, and the academic disparities 
that these students face within the American public educational system.  I recognize the 
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(sociological), institutional racism or barriers (structural), and finally, the self-defeating belief’s 
of the students themselves (psychological). Much of this research agrees that the differences 
between Black and White students and those between affluent and low-income students begin 
very early in a child’s life, and these divisions are reinforced just about every day.  
In her examination of family attributes, Lareau (2002) writes that race plays less of a role 
in the parenting practices between middle class and low-income families than she originally 
expected. In fact, the methods employed by both Black and White parents of the same class were 
more likely to be identical than not. Still it is important to note that Black parents viewed race as 
significant in the lives of their children. They stressed the importance of their children learning 
what it meant to be Black in today’s society, and they monitored their children outside of home 
for ‘signs of racial problems’ (Lareau, 2002, p. 760). Yet Lareau (2002) argues that social class 
is what matters most in childrearing. It is the cumulative effect of parental life experiences, 
occupation, education, socioeconomic background and access to resources. Enrolling children in 
extracurricular programs, sports, summer camps, and other activities requires access to private 
transportation and a flexible work schedule, not to mention the added cost of purchasing 
uniforms, paying instructors and coaches, or the occasional hotel and food costs for overnight 
stays. Lareau (2002) found that middle-class White children made academic gains during the 
summer, while low income Black kids lose ground during this time.  Interestingly, she finds that 
for kindergartners, in spite of gains during the school year, the existing gap combined with 
summer loss accounts for almost the entire Black-White achievement gap.  
Lareau’s (2002) finding that middle class parents made a deliberate and sustained effort 
to stimulate children’s development and cultivate cognitive and social skills is extremely 
                                                                                                                                                       
implication of unifying the terms, ‘students of color’ and ‘low income’, and I am by no means 
implying that all students of color are low-income. 
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important. These parents were found to consistently transmit identifiable advantages to their 
children. For this Lareau (2002) has coined the term ‘cultural logic’. Due to their awareness of 
the declining middle class, parents were even more committed to the development of a broad 
array of social skills and talents within their children. As the competition for credentials 
increases, mandatory standardization stratifies the population along cultural lines—and just as 
access to economic capital before it, this hierarchy allows the professional and managerial 
middle class to pass on its cultural capital to benefit their children (Apple, 2001; Lareau, 2002).  
The informal knowledge and skill required to decode what is expected in schools, 
matched with the cultural capital possessed by more affluent parents, is an example of the 
conversion of economic capital into cultural capital (Apple, 2001). According to Lareau (2002), 
while middle class children spent their time involved in activities controlled by adults, working 
class and poor children spent the majority of their time in unstructured leisure activities. The 
activities of children from working-class or poor families were primarily centered around the 
home. Summer was seen as a time for relaxation. Credence should be given to the skills of these 
parents, who were more likely to deal with anxieties associated with unreliable transportation, 
providing food, access to healthcare, physical safety and the like. Given their own reality, they 
preferred their children’s lives to be relaxed and happy with the burdens of life averted until later 
on in adulthood. This childrearing practice, she termed ‘natural growth’. Lareau (2002) 
considered it more child-centered because children’s leisure activities were not continually 
monitored or interrupted by parents and their days ebbed and flowed according to the child’s 
interests and familial obligations. 
Chin and Phillips’ (2004) findings directly contradict those of Lareau (2002). They 
conclude that most parents from all social classes equally desire to actively cultivate their 
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children’s talents and skills. Middle class parents ability to construct highly stimulating summers 
for their children is instead attributed to greater financial ability, flexible work schedules, and 
knowledge of how to match their child’s interests with activities. Additionally, Chin and Phillips 
(2004) assert that by a certain age, the agency of the child must be factored into this equation as 
their role in their development is instrumental and varies according to the personality and 
motivation of the child. The authors posit several explanations as to why each study (Lareau 
(2002); Chin and Phillips (2004)) produced findings that contradict the other. First, Chin and 
Phillips (2004) sample was composed of primarily immigrant families. It is important to 
recognize that some recent immigrant groups have traditionally performed well academically, 
even when attending the most deprived American schools. Therefore, we must take care not to 
arbitrarily apply an ‘ethnic-cultural-capital’ model of success, and as Bankston (2004) writes, we 
must recognize that these are not “inherent ethnic properties brought from homelands, but the 
result of responses to the challenges and deprivations of the host country” (p. 176).  
  Also, Lareau’s (2002) study focused on the school year while Chin and Phillips (2004) 
examined the summer, and it is reasonable to hypothesize that childrearing practices may change 
seasonally. For example, working class and poor families may expect the school to engage their 
children during the school year and therefore practice concerted cultivation during the summers. 
Alternately, middle class families may practice concerted cultivation during the school year, 
viewing summers as a time for skill building. Furthermore the population samples of each 
project varied by region, ethnicity, and citizenship. Chin and Phillips (2004) took samples from 
Black, Latino/a, Asian, and White, first and second-generation immigrant families from a large 
western city; Alternately, Lareau (2002) sampled Black and White families from both a mid-
western university town and a northeastern metropolitan city. 
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Ultimately, Chin and Phillips (2004) argue, each study used a different sampling strategy 
and this contributed to the contradictory results—Lareau underestimates social class differences 
in childrearing philosophies while Chin and Phillips overestimate. Either way, these scholars 
each place the blame of continuing academic disparities on differential familial practices and 
social class, maintaining that race is not as strong a factor. Still, other theorist would contend just 
that, maintaining that race and culture are strong factors in achievement, while class is less 
important. 
Still, it is clear that racial differences persist after adjustments for social background. 
And, since Black wealth has grown at the same time that it has fallen even further behind the 
wealth of Whites, explanations aside from class are indeed due (Oliver and Shapiro, 1997). Enter 
Steele’s (1995) theory, stereotype threat—a social-psychological predicament that can arise from 
well-known negative stereotypes about a group. The notion of stereotype threat highlights the 
source of classic deficits in standardized test performance, and emphasizes that the process of 
testing is not group neutral. Instead of viewing achievement disparities as the result of a group 
deficit or inability to properly assimilate, his analysis presents the “social psychological 
predicament of race, rife in the standardized testing situation, that is amenable to change” 
(Steele, 1995, p. 810). After all, Hernstein and Murray’s (1994) assertions that racial disparities 
are the result of functionalism, Ogbu’s (2003) notion that Black students have internalized a 
‘sambo mentality’ and believe their intelligence is inferior to that of Whites, or McWhorter’s 
(2001) rant on lazy and self-sabotaging Black students does not exist in a vacuum (Hernstein and 
Murray, 1994; McWhorter, 2001; Ogbu, 2003, p. 77). For instance, results like those from 
Downey and Pribesh (2004), which examined White teacher bias when evaluating Black 
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students, reaffirm that race in the classroom matters. Students are unable to leave their race at the 
door as some might have you to believe.  
And so, despite the existence of countering research—that which shows that Black and 
Latino/a students, especially those in segregated minority schools and with minority teachers, 
tend to have loads of optimism about their future education and desired professions (Goldsmith, 
2004), that which finds that Black students remain as fully identified with schooling as White 
students (Morgan and Mehta, 2004), or that which despoils the myths that single-parent homes 
negatively affect Black student achievement (Battle, 199813)—many strategies to improve the 
achievement results of Black students begins with the assumption that there is a deficiency 
within Black students. These ‘at-risk’ students are then enveloped in a language of failure 
(Ladson-Billings, 1998).  
 It is almost as if, with Brown, the sociological connections between race and access to 
opportunities have simply vanished, in favor of the much preferred practice of focusing on the 
individual and the school. Just as African American history is typically portrayed as beginning 
with slavery—or the Emancipation Proclamation, African American educational history is 
presently most often as beginning after Brown. This historical readjustment makes it much easier 
to contend that Blacks simply no longer care about education, are disinterested in schools, or 
even worse, are inherently lacking culturally and socially to make substantial gains academically. 
The works of DuBois (1903; 1935), Anderson (1988)14, Bennet (1993) and Siddle-Walker 
                                                
13 This research analyzes the impact of SES on the educational achievement of Black students in 
single versus dual-parent families. At the lower level of SES, Black students in single parent 
families score significantly higher on standardized tests than their peers in dual-parent homes. 
The reverse is true for students at higher levels of SES, where dual-parent students outperform 
their counterparts in single parent families. 
14 Anderson begins with a historical lesson detailing the perseverance of ex-slaves in the 
development of a system of universal education which, they hoped, would supplement their 
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(1996)15 are forgotten, and suddenly the state becomes the hero that has in the past provided 
social reforms, complete with the required funding, and that now offers revolutionary education 
reform, all of which to no avail. It becomes easy to accept that the government has simply done 
all that it could do, and perhaps the time has come to privatize the public education system if 
only for the sake of efficiency.  
 Our sights should be directed towards understanding Black academic progress over time, 
through historical and contemporary analysis, because as Anderson (2007) astutely reveals, the 
current racial hysteria and competition surrounding the ‘test-score gap’ is neither the first nor the 
last gap on the way to full equality (Anderson, 2007). There was first the debate on the ‘literacy 
gap’, and after that there was the ‘elementary school attendance gap’, which was followed by the 
‘high school completion gap’, and later the ‘college graduation gap’, ‘the graduate and 
professional degree gap’, and of course the ‘income gap’ (Anderson, 2007). Although the 
standardized performance gaps between Black and White students is substantial, it is no more so 
than the ‘gaps’ proceeding the one we now face, and since the framing of the entire discussion 
has been distorted to discount the failures of White students to meet federal and state standards 
as well, the complexity of achievement is not addressed (Anderson, 2007). Anderson (2007) 
reveals that Black and Latino/a students are not alone in national trends, White students have not 
                                                                                                                                                       
transition into emancipation. He then connects education to the systematic oppression of the 
formerly enslaved asserting that their education was an explicit threat to the rule of the planter 
class.  Initially, mass education of former slaves occurred through methods of “self-teaching” 
and “native schools”, which were schools established and sustained by ex-slaves, in the absence 
of other methods education.  
15 Siddle-Walker takes an historical look into Black-White educational segregation of the 
Caswell County Training School rejecting the notions of inferiority attributed to the educational 
environment of said schools. This research focuses on the effective or positive benefits 
associated with the segregation of Black students within the south, with emphasis placed on the 
environment in which the students were trained. Her work stands in stark contrast to the popular 
images of Black segregated schools that were inadequate, lacked material resources, and were 
therefore inferior.  
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made substantial progress on standardized tests since 1970, while with respect to White students, 
students of color have made the most significant gains on standardized tests over the past thirty 
years. And, given that White students are disproportionately educated in the most favorable 
conditions, while students of color usually end up receiving the worst of what is available from 
high poverty schools, the failure of White students to improve test scores over the last three 
decades should present a clearer portrait of the complexity of the path towards educational 
equality (Anderson, 2007, p. 17). 
 The achievement debate is complicated, and many argue that neither racial nor class based 
arguments provide adequate explanations alone. Particularly because the racial emphasis creates 
a problem of concrete evidence in this contemporary and politically correct society (covert 
discrimination is difficult to prove, as is stereotype threat in action); while a class based 
emphasis urging the lower classes to unite fails to address the issues of specific racial groups and 
leaves the historical legacy of race unblemished. Subsequently, using arguments that focus on 
race or class alone can be counterproductive (Ladson-Billings, 1998). Although neither method 
is free of weakness, both racial and class arguments are necessary if we truly want to understand 
existing inequality (Ladson-Billings, 1998, p.35).   
Oliver and Shapiro (1997) suggest adding the indicator ‘sociology of wealth’ to the 
analysis of racial disparities. This indicator is described as a grounded approach to understanding 
the racial differences that occur during wealth accumulation. Oliver and Shapiro (1997) maintain 
that the analysis of wealth—not income, education, or occupation—is important because it 
combines both arguments of race and class while revealing the effects of historical factors. The 
authors define wealth as a particularly important indicator of individual and family access to life 
chances, and the command of financial resources a family has accumulated over time as well as 
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those inherited throughout generations. Wealth possesses the unique ability to create 
opportunities and secure a certain standard of living for not only the original earners but their 
heirs (Oliver and Shapiro, 1997, p. 2). The discussion of wealth, which differs from what is 
typically used by economists, is instrumental in understanding the current data on racial ‘gaps’.  
 The approach Oliver and Shapiro (1997) apply to understanding the racial differences of 
accumulation exposes the unique historical and contemporary impact of both class and race in 
America. Thus, continuing disparities in wealth must challenge our perceptions of race and 
issues of social justice, if only because current wealth discrepancies among Blacks and Whites 
with similar credentials and achievements are vast and persistent (Oliver and Shapiro, 1997). 
Adding wealth to other indicators also provides a more accurate and powerful 
explanation of social inequality, which can be used to understand public policy issues related to 
racial inequities. For example, Blacks and Whites have historically faced divergent opportunities 
to gather and generate wealth. From Reconstruction (when the Southern Homestead Act of 1866 
failed to extend the 1862 Homestead Act to freedman, making Blacks a landowning class) to the 
suburbanization of America (which was encouraged and principally financed by the federal 
government), the actions of the federal government through taxation, transportation, and housing 
policies of the 1930s to the 1960s has excluded all but few Blacks (Oliver and Shapiro, 1997). 
As late as 1991, the Federal Reserve study of lending patterns shows disproportionate mortgage 
denial rates for Blacks that had little, if any, relation to neighborhood or income (Oliver and 
Shapiro, 1997). No matter where Blacks chose to live or how much they earned, banks were 
reluctant to lend. In these ways, the state has fostered homeownership and asset accumulation for 
members of some groups at the expense of others, and in the process this practice has led to 
public and private policies that promote residential segregation. 
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Residential segregation can hardly be explained by the market or individual preference. 
Segregation patterns were structurally perpetuated by the Home Owners Loan Corporation 
program, created during the Roosevelt era. This program introduced standardized appraisals of 
the fitness of particular properties and communities for individual and group loans, which first 
institutionalized then rationalized racially discriminatory practices in lending (Oliver and 
Shapiro, 1997). These practices limited Black access to both the suburbs and government 
mortgage funds. Later, these regulations and policies were adopted by the Federal Housing 
Authority (FHA) which then suggested to its appraisers in it’s manual that to retain 
neighborhood stability, properties should utilize restrictive covenants and subdivision regulations 
to ensure that they continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes (Oliver and 
Shapiro, 1997). The remnants of these practices continue to exist in mortgage lending, as banks 
reject qualified Blacks for mortgage loans much more often than similarly qualified Whites.  
Residential segregation for low-income residents amounts to more than shared spaces 
with those sharing similar features (Oliver and Shapiro, 1997; Ladd, 1998). Spatial isolation, the 
unique segregation of Black Americans and the consequences suffered as a result of racial 
segregation, is the principal structural feature of American society responsible for both the 
perpetuation of urban poverty and the major cause of racial inequality (Massey and Denton, 
1993). Consequently, although the residential segregation of Blacks is viewed charitably as a 
natural outcome of impersonal social and economic forces in American society, neither the racial 
isolation of people of color, nor the creation of the ghetto is normal. In this research project 
ghetto is defined as a set of neighborhoods that are exclusively inhabited by members of one 
group, within which virtually all members of that group live. By this definition, no ethnic or 
racial group in the history of the United States has ever experienced ghettoization even briefly, 
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except for African Americans (Massey and Denton, 1993, p. 19). The ghetto has not occurred by 
chance. It is the result of well-defined institutional practices, private behaviors, public policies, 
and the deliberate decisions of White Americans to deny Blacks access to certain housing 
markets (Massey and Denton, 1993, p. 11). There is an economically motivated rationale for the 
racial isolation of Blacks, and Massey and Denton (1993) remind us that White apprehensions 
about racial mixing stem from their belief in the immediate threat of undermined property values 
and reduced neighborhood safety, when Blacks are introduced to traditionally White spaces (p. 
94).  
 The residential segregation of our nation affects economic disparities and both contribute 
to the racial segregation within the Chicago Public Schools system. The Illinois funding formula 
allocates funding to schools based on local property taxes (the wealth of the neighborhood). This 
intensifies existing disparities in the educational opportunities and resources available to low-
income students. There is a strong connection between social and spatial mobility, and given that 
segregation perpetuates poverty, the barriers to spatial mobility are in effect barriers to social 
mobility. Hence, the confinement of people of color to segregated neighborhoods is a very 
powerful impediment to their socioeconomic progress (Denton and Massey, 1993). The cause of 
poverty and its relationship to inferior schooling is structural and institutional racism (Ladson-
Billings, 1995). 
The systemic discriminatory practices in home ownership policies are particularly vile 
because home ownership is the single most important means of accumulating assets (Oliver and 
Shapiro, 1997, p. 8). Equally troublesome in terms of both income and wealth accumulation, as 
late as 1999 Black workers suffered the most severe extent of intentional job discrimination 
nationally—constituting 57% of the minority victims of discrimination while making up only 
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49% of the minority labor force (Blumrosen and Blumrosen, 2002, p. 116). In fact, for each 
minority person affected by discrimination in the Blumrosen and Blumrosen (2002) study, a 
White person gained an employment opportunity. Disavowals citing isolated events, individual 
accomplishments, or some lack of marketable skills will not suffice here (Loury, 1998; 
Blumrosen and Blumrosen, 2002). It is not accidental that Whites are the beneficiaries of 
intentional discrimination against people of color in the labor force (Loury, 1998, p. 216), and it 
is not such a stretch to imagine exactly who benefits from the practice of housing discrimination.   
And so, with the knowledge that Chicago’s public school districts are funded based on local 
property taxes, the ability to understand exactly why educational inequities continue to persist 
becomes much less muddled, especially given that research attests to the dilapidation of the 
physical school buildings, and the overall disenfranchisement of indigent children and families 
who lack both wealth and resources, and are therefore less likely to wield the political clout 
necessary to improve their lot (Kozol, 1991). The power of racism is material, economic and 
cultural, and it permeates all facets of the political economy and thereby continues to be central 
to the politics of education (Lipman, 2004). We have not an achievement gap but an education 
debt, and this is where the focus should lie (Ladson-Billings, 2006). 
 Instrumental in the commitment to an equitable education for all students, regardless of 
race or class, is structural change via legal and social reforms. If we seek to end the negative 
effects of race and poverty for students in the classroom, we must also look outside of the 
classroom, and into society to attempt to end racism and poverty there. Several decades of 
education reform have failed to bring about any substantial improvement to the schools 
populated by racially and economically isolated students of color. With each new decade spouts 
some educational initiative or another, from Ford’s “Equal Educational Opportunities Act” to 
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Reagan’s “A Nation at Risk”, Clinton’s “Goals 2000”, the Bush administration’s “No Child Left 
Behind” (NCLB), and the latest President Obama’s “Race to the Top” (RTTT). There is never a 
lack of political rhetoric promising to improve America’s schools.  
Successful schools are not a well kept secret. Schools that actively practice the inclusion 
of the local community in deciding school matters and the inclusion of the school in community 
factors (Smrekar, 2003)16, high expectation of success and respect for all students, internal 
accountability, small classes, strong and purposeful leadership and commitment, extensive 
parental involvement (Frazier-Trotman, 2001; Yan, 1999; Smrekar, 2003), and quality staff and 
professional development (McGee, 2003)—above all, it’s the shared vision that stakeholders buy 
into and work together to achieve (Towns, Cole, and Serpell, 2001).   
Ultimately, educational reforms must be understood within the context of a fluid state 
that holds both competing and contradictory goals; and education policy simply as the product of 
specific social and economic agendas that are usually presented as the result of logical economic 
imperatives (Lipman, 2004). Neoliberalism has become hegemonic as a mode of discourse and 
its ways of thought have been incorporated into the ‘common-sense’ ways in which we interpret 
and make sense of the world. It is founded on political ideals of individual freedom and human 
dignity, central values of American civilization (Harvey, 2005, p. 3). The adamant demand for 
testing, reductive models of accountability, standardization, and the strict control over both 
pedagogy and the curricula is seen as the only option left for urban schools in the restructuring of 
global markets (Lipman, 2004). Both the answer and focus then shift toward improving 
accountability by improving standardized tests. The next ‘rational’ step would then be to spend 
                                                
16 Early literacy programs, other early childhood programs for students, and assuring that 
students meet their health, safety, and nutrition needs fall into this camp. 
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more on complex tests worth teaching towards (Harvey, 2005). This kind of rationale leads to 
education reforms like vouchers, school choice, national standards, and national tests.  
 Harvey (2005) succinctly sums up neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic 
practices that suggests that human well-being can be advanced by freeing individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (p. 2). In this theory, the role of the state is 
simply to create and preserve an appropriate framework that guarantees the quality of money, 
structures that protect property rights, and ensures a properly functioning market—by force if 
necessary. When analyzed within the context of a capitalist economy with a strong push towards 
adapting a market based school system, accountability standards may just be another gimmick 
used to sell us on the need to rid ourselves of public schools entirely in favor of privatization 
(Apple, 2001). Dominant interests usually convince the vast majority of Americans to accept 
unequal power relations and massive social inequalities that are constructed as common sense 
(Apple, 2001; Lipman, 2004). Without the proper focus, when public schools inevitably fall 
short of accountability standards, their credibility will diminish and with this, public support for 
their continued improvement is undermined. This is a contradictory process, by which the state 
shifts the blame for the very inequalities in access and outcomes it has historically promised to 
reduce from itself and onto our schools, individual teachers, parents, and children while 
simultaneously maintaining control in key areas (Apple, 2001). 
 54 
Chapter 3 
 
Research Design 
 
Data 
 
As stated earlier, the larger objectives of this project is to explore the structural influences 
that shape the educational opportunities for low-income groups and communities of color. I 
document the dominant narratives of communities of color as they assert their rights to 
participate in the schooling of their children. To undertake this goal, the research questions are 
designed to first assess the demographic characteristics of primarily Black neighborhoods in the 
city and then to investigate changes in the geographic distribution of Chicago Public Schools 
(CPS) with predominantly Black students from 2004 to 2010. The research questions for this 
project are again as follows: 
1. What is the school community response to the Renaissance 2010 policy? 
 
2. What are the main explanations for community reactions to the Renaissance 2010 
education policy? 
 
The subsidiary question for the second research question is as follows:  
 
1. Is there additional evidence to support community response to Renaissance 2010? 
  
Collectively, these research questions provide the foundation for an analysis of school choice, 
participatory democracy and educational opportunities for students of color attending Chicago 
Public Schools.  
This project relies primarily on secondary data analysis and observation at the Chicago 
Public Schools board of education meetings, and community organizational meetings. The 
human subjects research element of this project occurs in these observations, and the 
‘participants’ for this portion of the research are those in attendance at the various meetings of 
interest. Both participants and their meeting discussions are being observed, however, there are 
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no planned interventions/interactions with human subjects. In addition to published research on 
Renaissance 2010 and communities of interest, the investigator will use newspaper articles, CPS 
parent (http://pureparents.org) and CPS teacher websites (http://coreteachers.com and 
www.teachersforsocialjustice.org), and observations at public meetings to capture the concerns 
of the community and the actions taken by residents of Chicago in response to the Renaissance 
2010 initiative. Such sources (newspaper articles, official documents, and internet resources 
expressing community reactions to Renaissance 2010 or urban school reform particularly in the 
city of Chicago) will help to ensure that I have an accurate understanding of the changes 
occurring throughout the city's educational landscape. 
Introduction to Community Organizations 
 
The below introductions to community organizations are brief adaptations taken directly 
from their organization websites.  
Caucus of Rank and File Educators (CORE). The Caucus of Rank and File Educators 
(CORE) is composed of teachers, retirees, Paraprofessional School Related Personnel (PSRPs), 
parents, and community members. CORE seeks equitable public education in the city and fights 
to ensure a worker and student centered Chicago Teachers Union (CTU). Members of CORE 
organize to attend the Board of Education’s citywide hearings for charter schools and the 
monthly public participation Board meetings. CORE members charge that the agenda of 
Renaissance 2010 is to attack neighborhood schools. As an organization, CORE has also filed 
discrimination charges for the turnaround policy of the Chicago Board of Education, alleging 
that that policy disproportionately affects Black teachers.  
Parents United for Responsible Education (PURE). The organization, Parents United 
for Responsible Education (PURE), originated in 1987 during an infamous 19 day school strike. 
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During the strike, members of what would soon be known as PURE parents, held classes for 
Chicago Public School students outside of City Hall, marched at City Hall, and began to 
organize to give parents a voice in school issues. Currently PURE’s Board of Directors, 
membership includes around 800 economically and ethnically diverse Chicagoans. PURE 
continues its early goal of enhancing the quality of public education by supporting, informing, 
and advocating for parents by ensuring that their voices are heard by the school administration 
and the Board of Education. PURE provides workshops for parents, and has created a help 
hotline to directly provide information to parents and Local School Council (LSC) members. 
Additionally, PURE publishes four newsletters that serve parents, LSC members and other 
school leaders by keeping them abreast of current and past educational issues throughout the 
city.  
Teachers for Social Justice (TSJ). Teachers for Social Justice (TSJ) is an organization 
composed of teachers, administrators, pre-service teachers, and other educators working in 
public, independent, alternative, and charter schools and universities in the Chicago area. 
Members are committed to education for social justice. Members continue to create and recreate 
anti-racist, multicultural and multilingual classrooms and schools that are grounded in student 
experiences. Activists believe that all children should have access to an academically rigorous 
education. Members of TSJ reject Chicago’s model of school reform because it is heavily geared 
towards accountability standards and high-stakes tests. This organization was created to 
counteract current CPS policies, which it views as stifling public discussion and debate. 
Members are committed to working with parents, students, other educators and community 
members to collectively contribute to school policy discussions and create more equitable 
schools for all Chicago students. 
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Description of Research Variables and Terms 
 
The variable socioeconomic status or hhmed, is composed of data from the 2000 U.S. 
Census reports on neighborhood demographics (median household income). 
The variables Black, White and Latino/a are taken from the definitions used by the 2000 
Census to describe African American, Caucasian, and Hispanic residents. 
The variable ‘Ren10’ describes Renaissance 2010 schools. Renaissance 2010 school 
point data and achievement data will be used beginning with the creation of the first cohort of 
Renaissance 2010 schools in 2005 and will continue until March 2010, which marks the end of 
the data collection phase of this dissertation. As of November 28, 2009, 92 of the proposed 100 
Renaissance 2010 schools have been opened in the city of Chicago. 
The variable school type distinguishes Renaissance 2010 schools from preexisting 
neighborhood schools (traditional), selective enrollment schools, and magnet schools. School 
type for Renaissance 2010 schools is divided into three categories: contract schools, performance 
schools, and charter schools, which are explained in detail below. Additional information about 
Ren10 schools can be found in Appendix A.   
According to the CPS website, the goal of selective enrollment high schools is to provide 
academically advanced students with a challenging and enriched college preparatory experience. 
Selective enrollment schools offer a rigorous curriculum consisting of primarily honors and 
advanced placement (AP) courses. Teachers at selective enrollment schools expect students to be 
internally motivated and engaged with their studies. These schools focus on developing the 
critical and analytical skills of students by promoting diverse academic inquiry. Selective 
enrollment schools are competitive and require different modes of entry.  
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Chicago’s magnet schools usually exist without neighborhood attendance boundaries. 
These specialized schools have a curriculum focus on one subject area, for example math, 
science, or language. Magnet schools may not provide an accelerated curriculum and were 
created to serve as the primary tool for desegregation in 1973. There are currently a total of fifty-
two magnet schools; forty-six elementary and six high schools. Magnet schools can also be 
selective enrollment schools and student enrollment may depend on random selection in a 
lottery. 
The Chicago Public Schools system describes charter schools as independently operated 
public schools that operate outside of the state laws, district initiatives and board policies that 
regulate traditional neighborhood public schools in the city. Instead, charters operate according 
to Illinois Charter Law. Charter school teachers are not employees of the city of Chicago, and are 
therefore unable to benefit from the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) collective bargaining 
agreement. Instead, teachers in charter schools are employees of the non-profit charter school 
governing board or a subcontracted management organization hired by the board. Charter 
schools created after 2003 require 50% of the teachers to be certified. 
The Chicago Public Schools system describes contract schools as independently operated 
public schools under Renaissance 2010. Contract schools are managed by an independent 
organization, which employs teachers who work for the non-profit organization. Teachers at 
contract schools are not employees of the city of Chicago, so contract schools are not subject to 
the collective bargaining agreement of the Chicago Teachers Union. Contract Schools may have 
an advisory body comprised of parents, community members and school staff. All contract 
school teachers must be certified. 
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The Chicago Public Schools system operates and employees CPS teachers and staff for 
performance schools. Performance schools are therefore subject to the collective bargaining 
agreement between CPS and the Chicago Teachers Union and other labor organizations. 
Performance schools are granted flexibility on areas of curriculum, school schedule and budget. 
Instead of Local School Councils (LSC’s), performance schools have an Alternative Local 
School Council (ALSC), composed of parents, community members, and staff. 
This data set is appropriate for answering the research questions for this project primarily 
because: 
1. The data from CPS and NCES on school characteristics and student academic 
preparation exhibits practical examples of the mayor’s choices for educating different 
segments of Chicago’s children (the data exhibits the phenomena in question). 
 
2. The data gained from attending CPS board of education meetings and the meetings of 
involved participants (parents, teacher, community) as well as information gained from 
accessing their websites, published papers, and archives, provides the counter narrative to 
the dominant stories and publicity for the Renaissance 2010 initiative.  
 
3. The site for the project, Chicago, is also a good area to study a large urban city (space) 
and its school involvement because the location is fairly close to the home institution of 
the researcher and much of the information is easily accessible to the researcher. CPS 
provides demographic data online, as does NCES, and the majority of the parent/teacher 
groups. Finally, the expectation of travel to weekly and monthly meetings occurs within 
city lines). 
 
Procedures 
 
This project uses a mixed methods design that integrates both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches in the research methods, collection and analyses of data, and when making inferences 
about the data set and research hypothesis. The qualitative procedures for gathering data selected 
for this project, particularly observations and document/internet analysis components, will be 
especially useful in exploring and capturing the multidimensionality of community resistance to 
local educational policy (Krathwohl, 1998). The methods for this project are designed to give 
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voice to the students, parents, teachers, and community members of traditionally underserved 
communities in the city of Chicago. An authentic presentation of counter-stories requires that 
researchers, as outsiders, value reflexivity as a pedagogical strategy (Duncan, 2002), as failure to 
do so could cause more harm than good. Duncan (2002) warns of the consequences of the 
disconnect that occurs when researchers with shared vocabularies have fundamental differences 
in the ways in which they understand their work and positionality within the field. Citing 
Delgado’s (1996) notion of ‘false empathy’—which occurs when a person believes herself to be 
identifying with others, when the identification is purely superficial or shallow—Duncan (2002) 
warns that only harm can occur when researchers and other outsiders falsely empathize, and 
adopt paternal approaches to remedying perceived problems. To avoid the dangers of engaging 
in the abstraction and detachment which reinforce the negative stereotypes about people in urban 
communities and schools (Duncan, 2002), member checks and the reflexive journal technique 
will be employed in this research project, to help to ensure accurate representations of the 
voice(s) of resistant communities (Teddle and Tashakkori, 2009). 
To a large degree, this project focuses on the geography of opportunity for education in 
the city of Chicago. I follow the strategy outlined by William Tate in an article entitled 
“Geography of Opportunity”: Poverty, Place, and Educational Outcomes” in the 2008 issue of 
the Educational Researcher. In the article, Tate (2008) explores the spatial relationships between 
education, employment, and industrial science. The overall purpose of this study is to understand 
community response to public school transformation in the city of Chicago under the 
Renaissance 2010 initiative. A mixed methods design is necessary to investigate and analyze any 
trends and details regarding school placement and Chicago demographics, because neither 
qualitative nor quantitative methods are alone sufficient. The quantitative component of the 
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study evaluates the spatial distribution and density of public schools throughout the city; while 
the qualitative component focuses on contextualizing Renaissance 2010 by centering community 
knowledge and experiences. The qualitative and quantitative components of the study occur at 
the same time in this parallel methods design.  
 Like most others who utilize a mixed methods approach to investigate research 
questions, this project relies on pragmatism as its philosophical orientation, to reject such 
concepts as one “truth” or “reality” as well as dichotomous oriented solutions which are 
presented as the only option for educational obstacles (Clarke, 2003). I believe that by employing 
a mixed methods approach at the onset of the project, both critical race theory (which usually 
focuses primarily on qualitative methods) and spatial theories like geography of opportunity 
(which rely on quantitative methods) can be integrated to best interpret what mayoral control has 
meant for public education and students of color navigating the city of Chicago. 
Data Collection 
 
This project employs a mixed methods sequential design, collecting and analyzing both 
quantitative and qualitative data, which will then be integrated into the results section. 
Qualitative Component: Observation. Due to the nature of this particular school 
reform, and its subsequent quickly changing environments, the planned responses of community 
members to ‘turnaround’ schools (the opening and closing of schools, termination of teachers, 
transition of students to different schools) can be captured by attending the meetings of 
concerned and involved parents, students and teachers. To prepare for the data analysis, the 
investigator will attend the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) board meetings and public school 
closure hearings to gain an understanding of the concerns of community members, parents and 
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teachers regarding the city's Renaissance 2010 program, as well as to find out information 
released to the public concerning the changes to the public school system. 
 Public school closure, consolidation, and turnaround hearings are first held in the Board 
Chamber at 125 S. Clark Street in Chicago, Illinois. The hearing duration is approximately two 
hours per school, and public comments begin during the last hour. School closure, consolidation, 
and turnaround hearings are additionally held at the proposed school. The board announces exact 
dates of the public hearings after the list of proposed school closures, consolidations, and 
turnarounds is released. 
The monthly board meetings are held on the 5th Floor in the Board Chambers, at 125 
South Clark Street in Chicago, Illinois. Registration for the public participation component 
occurred from 8:00 a.m. – 9:00 a.m. on the 1st Floor of the Clark Street Lobby. Public 
participation for these meetings began at approximately 10:30 a.m. and ends at 12:30 p.m. I 
attended six CPS board meetings, they occurred on the following dates: October 28, 2009, 
November 23, 2009, December 16, 2009, January 27, 2010, February 24, 2010, and March 24, 
2010.  
Observation at meetings helps to ensure that I have a greater understanding of the main 
concerns of parents, teachers and community members regarding Renaissance 2010. Data 
collection during the observation at meetings will be done using both notes typed onto a laptop 
as well as a pen and paper. Observation data was of immense value when completing the 
narrative component of the data analysis. Notes included member opinions and remarks on 
school reforms, the dates of the meetings, organization names, and at times the names of 
meetings leaders and members. However, identifiable information was secured and there will be 
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no dissemination of identifiable information, as stated on the research notification form available 
for participants. The research notification form is located in Appendix B. 
I attended meetings to gain both community narrative and contextual knowledge of the 
affect of the Ren10 initiative on students and communities, as well as an understanding of the 
main concerns of community members, parents, and teachers. Each of the community groups 
have written platforms opposing Renaissance 2010, and one is provided as an example in 
Appendix C. Additionally, each organization appears to either conduct research or to have some 
relationship with individuals or groups that do conduct research. Including the perspectives of 
members from these organizations, as gathered via their websites or other publications, and their 
testimony at board meetings, will help to ensure that the views of participants are adequately 
represented in this work. I provided both verbal and written versions of the research project 
detailing its objectives, methods, and introducing its significance to any members of these 
organizations that requested the information. Those in attendance who prefered that their 
comments not be used or considered were encouraged to verbally inform the investigator on site, 
Jasmine Johnson.  
Quantitative component: Using the 2000 Census and GIS. The data collection phase 
of this project also involves secondary sources obtained from newspapers, the city of Chicago's 
public school website which publishes school information (school location, total number of 
students by grade; racial demographics of students; and percentage of free or reduced lunch 
students), and U.S. Census data will provide the demographic information and geographic 
boundaries of Chicago neighborhoods where schools are located. This data will be supplemented 
by the data obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), which provides 
school location data (school address). 
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This project uses secondary data from the public reports of the city of Chicago, retrieved 
online through the Office of Research, Evaluation and Accountability (retrieved from The 
Chicago Public Schools, Office of Research, Evaluation and Accountability website: 
http://research.cps.k12.il.us/cps/accountweb/), as well as census data retrieved from the ESRI, 
Census 2000 TIGER/Line data website (ESRI, Census 2000/TIGER/Line data retrieved from 
http://www.esri.com/data/download/census2000_tigerline/index.html). TIGER is a common 
format from the enumeration maps of the U.S. Census, composed of vector files containing 
topology. TIGER files are block level maps of every village, town and city, including geocoded 
block faces with address ranges and street numbers, and this exists for the entire United States 
(Clarke, 2003). Because it is composed of vector files, TIGER represents points, lines, and area 
features very accurately and are far more efficient than grids. The major limitations of this 
research project lies with the inability to secure yearly cook county demographic data beyond 
public census tract information, which is collected every ten years. In an attempt to partially 
correct for this limitation the demographic information for Chicago neighborhoods from the 
1990 Census is included as are the data projections reported by the University of Chicago’s Map 
Collection. The images resulting from this analysis will contribute to the foundational argument 
of an uneven geography of opportunity for children of color in the city of Chicago.   
Data Analysis 
 
This project involves the integration of triangulation techniques (observation, document 
analysis and secondary analysis) to understand race and space in Chicago Public School policies. 
During the final stages of the project, a mixed methods approach contributes to the data analysis 
by allowing the researcher to simultaneously ask confirmatory and exploratory questions. Both 
provide some insight into the city’s investment or disinvestment in Chicago’s communities of 
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color. The quantitative research questions address the density of schools throughout the city, by 
ward or census block group and the qualitative data contributes a community narrative to the 
project. Community knowledge is used to help to make sense of the maps and spatial 
relationships discussed in chapter four. 
The quantitative component of this project addresses the research questions using 
geographic information systems (GIS) software to produce maps that spatially depict 
Renaissance 2010 school placements and school closings by race, household median income, 
rental/owner status, and population. GIS is a unique tool for capturing, storing, retrieving, 
transforming and displaying spatial data from the real world for a particular set of purposes, 
which are then usually used for geographic analysis (Clarke, 2003). GIS has radically changed 
the way that institutions, organizations and towns conduct business, as well as the way civilians 
live, work, and travel so much so that the value and validity of GIS is not often questioned. In 
1992, the GIS industry in the U.S. completed its federal standardization efforts, the Spatial Data 
Transfer Standard (SDTS), which created terminology for features and data structures that have 
become conventional (Clarke, 2003). Most commonly, GIS is recognized for its use in 
community planning, however it is also used to capture information on land holdings, to enforce 
pollution controls, with consumer GPS navigation systems, and for environmental queries, just to 
note a few. In most cases, and with this project, GIS is based on the best available data at the 
time, and therefore as with other software applications, incomplete or outdated data has 
implications on the accuracy of results in real time. Still, GIS is of great necessity to this project 
precisely because of its ability to handle the distinct research questions raised with this project. 
These questions are best addressed and analyzed spatially. 
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To better understand the relationship between Renaissance 2010 schools and 
neighborhood demographics, kernel density estimation will be combined with chloropleth maps. 
However, before the kernel density estimation can be applied, the data obtained from the 
Chicago Public Schools website, the 2000 Census, and NCES was cleaned and then geocoded to 
a point location based on street address and zip code. After geocoding all schools, I focused on 
all Chicago Public Schools, Ren10 schools, and closed neighborhood schools to understand how 
the Ren10 policy has changed schooling for CPS students of color. 
By using a chloropleth map of point data for Chicago Public Schools in 1989, 1995, 
2004, and 2010, for the variables of race, household median income, renter/owner status, 
neighborhood schools, closed schools, and Ren10 schools, I visually depict how Ren10 has 
transformed the geographical distribution of schools throughout the city. School location point 
data (1995-2010), and Renaissance 2010 schools point data (2004-2010), were geocoded using 
GIS software to create a geographical depiction of school locations by type, using a background 
chloropleth map of the 2000 census cook county demographic variables Black, Latino/a, and 
White, and the 2000 cook county census variables hhmed, renter, and owner.  
Kernel density estimation uses point events to depict density as a continuous variable on a map. 
The darkest areas on the map represent a high density of schools and lighter areas indicate low 
school density. The kernel estimation, when combined with the chloropleth maps of race, 
household median income, and population will help to show where schools are (or are not) 
located within Chicago’s wards and neighborhoods. It will also help to understand the relevance 
between Ren10 school placement and neighborhood school closure, by population. It is 
important to note that the density measure used in this project represents the geographic 
availability of schools and not a student’s ability to attend or travel to school. I used a radius of 
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1.3 miles, which should reflect the upper limit of convenient access to school for students. 
Therefore, the kernel density estimation is perfectly suited to answer my research questions.  
This project situates the implementation of the Renaissance 2010 policy within the 
context of neoliberalism, to offer an alternative perspective to what is publicized by the city. This 
project provides a space for the voices of community members of color who are slowly and 
systematically being excluded from democratically participating in the governance of public 
schools. By providing an analysis of the relationship between school choice, community 
involvement, and educational policy in the city of Chicago, another purpose of this project is to 
contribute to the theory of educational opportunity for students of color. It was my goal that the 
results from this study help to challenge narratives which define disparities in achievement 
opportunities as academic achievement gaps, as well as those which assign blame to parents, 
students and communities using arguments based on cultural deficiency models. 
Critical Race Theory and Educational Research 
 
The intellectual origins of critical race theory (CRT) can be credited to the American civil 
rights tradition and the philosophies of its heroes Rosa Parks, Cesar Chavez, and W.E.B. Du 
Bois, the activism and theories from nationalist movements like that of the Black Panthers or 
Malcolm X, and the earlier work of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) (Delgado and Stefancic, 2000). 
Although aligned with CLS, CRT differs in its treatment of the intersection of race and law, and 
the influence of racism on the legal ideology of the United States (Ladson-Billings, 1998). Both 
theories believe that legal consciousness serves to validate power in the United States, however 
CRT scholars emphasize the connections between hegemony, race, and racism in American 
society (Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, Thomas, 1995). Critical race theorists began engaging and 
challenging the nature of law and more specifically colorblind interpretations of law and 
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meritocracy. Deeming these pseudonyms for White, European American hegemonic control, 
they created a body of alternative paradigms that countered those narratives, placing in the 
forefront the perspectives of those who experience multiple forms of discrimination (Parker and 
Lynn, 2002). 
Critical race theory emerged in the mid 1970s. It was the result of the frustration and 
distress experienced by legal activist scholars of color in their dealings with the slow pace of 
racial reform and the retraction of many of the gains created during the Civil Rights Movement 
of the 1960s (Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, Thomas, 1995; Ladson-Billings, 1998; Delgado and 
Stefancic, 2000; Parker and Lynn, 2002). CRT developed in response to the need to understand 
and express the subtle, yet deeply entrenched varieties of racism, which had come to replace the 
blatant and more pronounced Jim Crow expressions of the past (Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, 
Thomas, 1995; Delgado and Stefancic, 2000). CRT was borne of necessity. People of color, 
particularly those within the academy, began centering discussions of race and racism as 
ideology. They argued specifically against notions of race and racism as something that is 
experienced individually and can easily be eradicated (Ladson-Billings, 1996; Parker and Lynn, 
2002). Critical race theorists argued that race is historically and ideologically ingrained deeply 
into America’s consciousness, through choices that have shaped our legal system and the ways in 
which privilege and race are understood (Bell, 1992; Parker and Lynn, 2002). Race has become 
metaphorical, and racism so deeply embedded in social life and economic divisions that it has 
become normalized. This is far more threatening to the body politic than bio-genetic 
classifications of phenotype ever were (Ladson-Billings, 1998):  
…our conceptions of race, even in a postmodern and/or postcolonial world, are  
more embedded and fixed than in a previous age. However, this embeddness or  
fixed-ness has required new language and constructions of race so that  
denotations are submerged and hidden in ways that are offensive though without  
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identification. Thus, we develop notions of “conceptual Whiteness” and  
“conceptual Blackness” (King, 1995) that both do and do not map neatly on to  
bio-genetic or cultural allegiances. Conceptual categories like “school  
achievement”, “middle classness”, “maleness”, “beauty,” “intelligence,” and  
“science” become normative categories of Whiteness, while categories like  
“gangs,” “welfare recipients,” “basketball players,” and “the underclass” become  
the marginalized and de-legitimated categories of Blackness. (p. 9) 
 
Critical race theory is particularly useful to explore how the political discourse in 
Chicago affects the academic achievement of Black students because of its unique dialogue 
between racial inequities, law, and policy. CRT focuses on the inclusion of critical evaluations of 
the role of “law” alongside issues of social justice, equity, and ultimately reform. Critical 
theorists assert that law has traditionally not given expression to the experiences or values of 
people of color (Brooks, 2004) and therefore, CRT is used to challenge the norm of racial 
oppression by analyzing myths, preconceived notions, and cultural wisdoms through the form of 
storytelling (Delgado & Stefancic, 2000). CRT scholars attempt to re-construct validated realities 
with stories and voice that counteract the dominant narrative (Delgado & Stefancic, 2000). In 
this project, materials and narratives of activist organizations (CORE, TSJ, PURE) and 
community members fit quite well with CRT, as they provide both the theoretical construct to 
rethink notions of race and researcher positionality, and the methodological tools to disrupt and 
transform traditional approaches to ethnography (Duncan, 2002). When coupled with qualitative 
research methodologies, critical race theory can and has been be used as a discourse for 
liberation. A tool to define, expose, and then address issues of social justice by situating the lived 
experiences of people of color within historical, legal and contemporary social context. Their 
narratives inform criticisms of Whiteness and White privilege, particularly in educational 
settings (Parker and Lynn, 2002). Although CRT has not often been used alongside empirical 
social science to examine policy, Parks (2007) makes the case that, although not under the name 
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of CRT, there has been much empirical research conducted that has combined race, science and 
legal scholarship. Parks (2007) contends that critical race theorists should apply empirical modes 
of understanding race and racism within legal institutions and doctrine more often. Within the 
community of critical race theorists, there has been some resistance to synthesizing CRT and 
empirical social science in part because some worry that including quantitative data can 
undermine the power of (counter) narrative. I disagree. I recognize the power of perspective that 
can result from a rich descriptive narrative, and I contend that including empirical methods can 
only serve to strengthen the validity of narrative. I therefore employ Parks’ (2007) integrative 
model of CRT, which argues that social science and CRT can together: (a) expose racism in its 
many locations; (b) identify the effect of racism on individuals as well as institutions; and finally 
(c) work together in part as an activist agenda to mount an attack against racism using public 
policy arguments.   
CRT interacts with the classical approaches the traditional sociological theories in its 
valuation of agency, systemic structures and functionalism. With an emphasis on particularity, 
perspective, and context, CRT is applicable to both structural and individual experiences when 
analyzing elements of racial subjugation (Delgado & Stefancic, 2000; Waters, 1994). Critical 
race theory has three main goals: (a) to examine race and racism by legitimating alternative 
interpretations, specifically storytelling and narrative; (b) to recognize race as a social construct, 
without negating the importance of ending expressions of racial subordination; and (c) to locate 
and reveal the different relationships between race and domination (Parker and Lynn, 2002). 
Critical race theorists’ emphasis on narrative as storytelling stems from the history of evidence 
gathering and fact finding in discrimination cases but, for critical race theorists, the stories of the 
victims of discrimination are key to countering the dominant stories on racial discourse which 
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focus on meritocracy, equality and the market (Parker and Lynn, 2002). It is by validating these 
voices and stories that current hierarchal relationships of power can be understood contextually, 
through the racialized relationships on which they were founded (Ladson-Billings, 1998; Parker 
and Lynn, 2002). Naming one’s own reality also contributes to the ‘psychic preservation of 
marginalized groups’ (p. 14) by disrupting the internalization of stereotypic images that have 
been constructed by certain groups to maintain power (Ladson-Billings, 1998). Finally, 
storytelling for CRT can cause a ‘cognitive conflict’ that directly affects the oppressor by 
objecting to the existing stories on education, housing policies, or the market, as justifications for 
the power dynamics that maintain their privilege (Ladson-Billings, 1998, p. 14). By exposing the 
ways in which education laws and policies in Chicago continue to protect White interests over 
those of people of color, this project contributes to the discourse of liberation by offering a 
multilayered presentation of the stories and realities of the teachers, students, and parents who 
refuse to be silenced. Disrupting the rationale of ignoring communities, and communicating 
these experiences is the first step in understanding and addressing the complexities of racism in 
education (Ladson-Billings, 1998; Lipman, 2004). 
CRT exists precisely because of the advantages accrued to, and the meanings ascribed to, 
Whiteness. It is precisely a tool for “the deconstruction of oppressive structures and discourses, 
the reconstruction of human agency and the construction of equitable and socially just relations 
of power” (Ladson-Billings, 1998, p. 9). When used in combination with ethnographic methods 
of observation and document analysis, GIS maps and spatial statistics contribute both visual and 
structurally to the ‘thick description’ used to document institutional racism and community 
voice(s). This project provides the epistemologies, or ways of knowing, of many intersecting 
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groups (parents, teachers, activists, community leaders) and connects theory to practice and 
activism. 
Methodological Assumptions 
 
An important methodological assumption of this project is the acceptance that race 
shapes epistemology (Ladson-Billings and Donnor, 2008). This project rests heavily on the 
foundation created by DuBois’ (1935) notion of a “double consciousness” although the term is 
broadened in this case to include the multiple and varying consciousness of Black Chicagoans 
expected by gender, wealth, socioeconomic status, political view and affiliation and religious 
differences. Although this project focuses specifically on the education offered to Black students 
within the Chicago Public Schools system, it acknowledges that the educational opportunities 
available for low-income students and Latino/a students around the city sometimes echoes those 
experiences.  
Thus despite my focus on African Americans and their experiences I recognize that this 
work is important for any marginalized group. The focus on both Black and Latino/a Chicagoans 
within this project occurs authentically, and is the result of the selection of closed neighborhood 
schools and Ren10 schools. The results of applying the kernel density estimation and chloropleth 
maps to CPS point data requires a focus on both Latino/a and Black neighborhoods, and in some 
cases Black census tracts to a larger extent. This project attempts to understand the 
epistemological legitimacy of Black and Latino/a cultural ‘ways of knowing’, and seeks to speak 
to the “visionary pragmatism” which links the visionary thinking and practical actions of 
concerned parent, teacher and community members surrounding Renaissance 2010 reforms 
(Collins, 1998; Ladson-Billings, 2008). This project recognizes the divergences and internal 
variations within communities of differently situated Chicagoans. As well as the likelihood that 
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those that share similar national or ethnic origins may align themselves politically with the 
mayor and other proponents of privatization who’s ways of knowing take precedent over those of 
directly affected communities of students, parents, and teachers. This project does not seek to 
romanticize the actions or views of those opposed to Renaissance 2010, but to accurately present 
the narrative and agency of Chicagoans involved in educational reforms which fall outside of the 
narratives of the members of the Chicago Board of Education, the mayor, and other interested 
parties. 
Significance of Study 
 
This project is significant because Chicago’s Renaissance 2010 is a model for the nation. 
Secretary of State Arne Duncan and President Obama have applied Chicago’s mayoral control 
and business partnerships to the nation in the way of their newest education policy Race to the 
Top (RTTT). RTTT reinforces testing as accountability, encourages states to adopt data driven 
models, and centers charter school development as a major priority for city leaders. By 
investigating the consequences of Renaissance 2010 for Black students in Chicago this project 
will offer the historical, racial and class implications which can be used to improve the newest 
education policy RTTT.  
Race in western societies is at once embedded, fixed and fluid (Ladson-Billings, 1998)—
constantly recreating itself, while denying its own existence. This project contributes to and 
supports Omi and Winant’s (1994) theory of racial formation, which focuses on the continuing 
significance of race and its constant transformation, or fluidity, in western societies. More 
importantly, this project offers both a macroanalysis and a microanalysis of the intersections 
between race, class and education in its use of mapping and spatial analysis (macro) and its 
qualitative components of participant observation and storytelling (micro). Critical race theory 
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contributes significantly to the significance of this project—not only for its value of narrative, 
but because it can be used to not only understand social institutions but transform them as well 
(Delgado and Stefancic, 2000). The organizations included in the study work specifically to 
center race and include the voice of students, parents and teachers within the political discourse 
surrounding the best course for educating all of Chicago’s students. This data is expected to 
extend the understanding of the impact of spatial isolation in urban school reform and, by 
foregrounding race, this project contributes to the discourse of public space and the negotiations 
of power relations.  
Finally, this research project contributes to the scholarship on geography of opportunity 
and urban school reform in the era of neoliberalism, and its impact on students of color in global 
cities. I anticipate that my research will ultimately allow for a linear depiction of the structural 
influences that limit the educational opportunities of the city’s Black and Latino/a students. This 
project counters notions of student, teacher, and parental lack of agency and commitment to 
schooling, and highlights the continued and historic disinvestment of the city’s public officials in 
its constituents of color. In this way, this project is significant because it analyzes the link 
between policy (Renaissance 2010), democratic participation, and student educational 
opportunity. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Public Education, the Community & the City  
[On Renaissance 2010] We realize that this is politically unpopular but we won’t do the 
easy thing and walk away.  
--CEO Ron Huberman, Committee of Education hearing, 2/21/2010 
 
The Altgeld Gardens public housing development and the Carver School were created 
around the same time in 1944 and, just as Altgeld Gardens welcomed its first residents, the 
Carver School welcomed its first pupils (Altgeld Carver Alumni Association, 1993). And, as the 
Altgeld community grew to fill the residences of Riverdale, so did the student population of 
Carver H.S. In 2000, the neighborhood school became the neighborhood military school. Then, 
six years later, Carver Area High School was ‘turned-around’. It became Carver Military 
Academy, a selective enrollment military school. Local Riverdale students were no longer 
admitted, and instead they were reassigned to Fenger High School. Fenger H.S. is located in the 
Roseland community, five miles away from the Carver facility.  
The entrance of a multitude of new students into a facility with few resources increased 
the preexisting tension between Riverdale and Roseland students. In the summer, a few months 
before the beginning of the fall semester, all CPS employees (including veteran teachers, 
administrators and staff) working at Fenger High School were terminated through a process 
called ‘turnaround’. Out of the 100 terminated teachers, 9 were rehired, and invited to return to 
the campus. Thus, on September 24, 2009, when an after-school fight erupted in the front of the 
South Side neighborhood high school, the neighborhood school was depleted of the majority of 
its institutional knowledge.  
Many of the schools young, first time teachers were not familiar with the neighborhood, 
its students, or its social climate. The new staff was unaware of the preexisting tensions between 
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some of the Roseland and Riverdale students. And many of the students themselves were 
strangers to the neighborhood and the school. News of the fatal beating of honor student Derrion 
Albert, spread quickly. In route to the bus stop, the 16 year old was caught in an erupting mob 
attack near the school building. His violent death did not receive such widespread media 
attention because of the rarity of CPS violence—more than thirty CPS students had been killed 
by May of that year (ABC Local News). Albert’s murder received global attention because his 
beating was taped by a student and posted to YouTube, at a time when the eyes of the world 
were tuned to Chicago. A week later, Chicago lost its bid for the 2016 Summer Olympics.  
By 6am Wednesday, December 16, 2009 parents, students, and community organizers 
from the Riverdale neighborhood were in line. They arrived at CPS’ headquarters downtown to 
sign up to speak for two minutes during the public participation component of the monthly Board 
of Education meeting. Around 11am, shortly after the board meeting began, they presented the 
Board with a 38-page proposal for an open enrollment neighborhood high school that shared 
space with Carver Military. Together students unraveled a 10-foot-long petition with more than 
1300 signatures in support of the Hazel Johnson School for Environmental Justice. One speaker 
noted that the Carver facility was underutilized (26.5% utilized), and had space for at least 1500 
additional students. Another added that the Board closes open enrollment neighborhood schools 
when the facility is just 40% utilized. 
One by one, supporters of the Altgeld Gardens proposal informed the board of the 
negative consequences resulting from their latest education reform. Community members who 
criticized Ren10 in its earliest years again reminded the board of the increased violence in 
‘feeder’ schools. Students currently enrolled at Fenger H.S. testified to the daily violence they 
experienced. Community organizers testified that the school climate created at Fenger H.S. from 
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Ren10’s school turnarounds, consolidations, and closures, was continually repeated throughout 
the city. A displaced teacher made the connection between the recent turnaround and the 
increased violence. He insisted that the community needed a neighborhood school with a Local 
School Council and an experienced staff to prevent other violent outbreaks. In response to the 
school proposal and testimony presented by students, parents, and community members, Chief 
Executive Officer Robert Runcie revealed the plan to place a Chicago International Charter 
School (CICS) on the Carver campus. He then noted that the board would provide additional 
security measures for Fenger, and closed with the fact that his staff had facilitated over 150 
transfers of students dissatisfied with Fenger H.S.   
Supporters of the Altgeld Gardens school proposal requested an emergency meeting 
between CPS officials and residents of the Riverdale community, insisting that in the interim 
Carver Military immediately accept its neighborhood students. Although Carver did not open its 
doors to its neighborhood students, members from the board agreed to meet with community 
members. After ongoing negotiations, the proposal for the Hazel Johnson School for 
Environmental Justice was rejected. Liberty Investors’ CICS would open in the fall of 2010 on 
the Carver campus. CPS representatives suggested that Altgeld students transfer from Fenger, 
enroll in the districts online learning program, or pursue a G.E.D. instead of a high school 
diploma.  
Navigating Place, Space & Politics: Black Chicagoans Before the Great Migration 
To fully understand how CPS administrators and CPS parents, teachers, and students 
became so utterly disconnected one must understand the plan for Chicago’s future and a bit more 
of the city’s history of intersections between politics, power, and race.  
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During the time of national dejure segregation, Chicago was in its earliest phase of 
development and class and labor relations were a primary focus. Throughout the 1840s and 
1850s, the first wave of Black migrants reached Chicago on the Underground Railroad (Boyd, 
2008). Still the race relations of the late nineteenth century were such that Black and White elites 
pursued an integrationist agenda together. Although racial hostility continued to exist, Blacks 
and Whites lived in close proximity with little to no violence primarily because of the following 
three reasons: (a) the distribution and population of Blacks in the city; (b) Blacks posed no threat 
to the labor opportunities of Whites; and (c) Blacks were unable to compete for political power 
in the city (Boyd, 2008). By 1861, there were only about one thousand Blacks in the city, and 
most resided separately from Whites on the less desirable land clustered along the south branch 
of the Chicago River (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). By 1875, Chicago’s earliest settlers 
totaled just under 300,000 residents, and the 3,600 Black settlers were a mere 1.2 percent of the 
total population (Boyd, 2008). Additionally, Blacks worked primarily as domestic and personal 
service workers and were excluded from the trade, manufacturing and clerical positions favored 
by Whites. Due to the labor market segmentation that existed during Chicago’s earliest years 
there was minimal racially motivated job competition (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). 
The combination of their small population and the instability and competitiveness of the city’s 
early machine meant that Blacks made no big waves during local elections (Boyd, 2008).   
To attain political goals, Black leaders relied on client-patron relationships with 
empowered Whites. Their social ties to Whites with political power provided access to the 
resources they needed to themselves become politically empowered (Drake and Cayton, 1993; 
Boyd, 2008). Black elite cultivated social relationships during their business dealings with 
Republican politicians, the wealthy, and liberals who would later become their allies. Politically 
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connected White allies pushed their integrationist agenda in the legislature, while Blacks 
straddled the line between writing letters and speaking at conferences. They were careful to 
maintain a low profile that wouldn’t upset the existing racial harmony (Boyd, 2008). From 1870 
to 1890, Black leaders and their allies focused on repealing the Illinois Black laws, desegregating 
schools, and winning voting rights for Black men. Thanks to both the use of an Austrian Ballot 
(which obscured their existence amongst White representatives) and their connections to central 
White figures, Blacks eventually gained formal representation at the state and county level 
(Boyd, 2008). These community-building strategies continued to be used by the Black elite to 
push for racial equality. Still, at the local level, politically minded Blacks remained unable to be 
elected to the coveted aldermanic seats in their wards. With no bargaining power, Black elites 
focused locally on getting access to material and economic resources for their communities 
(Boyd, 2008). It is important to recognize that these Black elites were chosen as representatives 
not by other Blacks but by White leaders in decision-making positions. Their appointments did 
not signify their ability to represent the views and interests of the majority of Black Chicagoans. 
In fact Black elites had long resisted their forced proximity to other Blacks whom they 
considered beneath them, and they attempted to distance themselves both socially and physically 
from the new arrivals (Boyd, 2008). Similarly, White elites had little connection to the majority 
of Black constituents, and Black elites structured their new leadership roles in ways that would 
be more comfortable for Whites. This meant that they worked to minimize racial conflict and 
regulate the social behavior of other Blacks. These old settlers were beholden to their patrons and 
not the Black populace, and despite the appearance that they represented them, Black elites were 
limited in their ability to completely act in the interests of their constituents (Boyd, 2008). Still, 
within context, what they achieved was quite phenomenal and radical, despite their limitations. 
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Boyd (2008) writes that their strategies and their very ideology was “...grounded in their 
structural position. Their fervent interracialism and dedication to desegregation reflected the 
opportunities available to them given their access to White elites” (p. 7). Because of the work of 
the city’s Black elites, Blacks were not viewed as a threat to White interests. They created a 
space where Blacks could and would push for integration and racial equality at a time when the 
ideology of the nation was in full support of Black inferiority, slavery, and de jure segregation. It 
would not be until much later, after the 1900s, when the Black population would the undefined 
‘comfort’ threshold. Afterwards, Blacks would be seen as an economic, physical, and political 
threat. During their quest for political advancement Blacks transformed from the city’s (albeit 
uninvited and obscure) tolerated residents to its local pariah.  
Jim Crow and the Black Belt: Black Chicagoans After the Great Migration  
During subsequent years, the conditions that produced the early forms of racial harmony 
between Black and White settlers changed drastically. During the first phase of the Great 
Migration (1910-1940), Chicago’s Black population rose by 77 percent, from 278,000 to nearly 
half a million (Street, 2007). Growing numbers of Blacks and Latinas/os joined the competition 
for jobs, housing, and schools, and only the politicians really welcomed the migrants (Drake and 
Cayton, 1993). The rising number of immigrants began competing for the resources that had 
been traditionally reserved for Whites. As Black men entered the manufacturing industry they 
entered the sights of working class White ethnics and became involved in existing labor disputes 
(Boyd, 2008). Additionally, the construction of housing slowed during World War I making it 
more difficult for Whites to relocate in their escape from an increasing Black population (Boyd, 
2008). In response, Whites began to abandon their tolerance for integration and push for 
segregation.  
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White hostility and violence increased as well, and during 1917 the Chicago Real Estate 
Board joined the racial containment campaign by instituting restrictive covenants (Boyd, 2008). 
The older elite’s integrationist agenda was defeated by both the renewed interest in Jim Crow 
and a burgeoning new Black elite. Reigning from 1890-1930 Boyd (2008) refers to the new 
Black elites as ‘self-help advocates’ who represented a professional leadership class that was 
invested in developing (not fighting against) the ghetto created in the Black Belt. Their position 
was a clear shift from that taken by early Black settlers (1870-1900), who pushed for integration. 
Instead they began to throw their support behind developing community organizations and 
institutions in the Black Belt (Boyd, 2008). This ideology was in line with the national 
arguments of other Blacks leaders of the time. During this period, Marcus Garvey advocated for 
self-improvement and racial solidarity, Carter G. Woodson published the Journal of Negro 
History, and the Harlem Renaissance was on the rise.  
Riding this wave, the new Black elites recognized the value of a growing and captive 
market indeterminately confined to one space; they planned to attract both their dollar and their 
vote (Boyd, 2008). Instead of challenging segregation like the leaders before them, they believed 
that creating profitable, Black owned institutions and civic organizations within the Black Belt 
was a path towards political and economic self-empowerment (Boyd, 2008). By utilizing their 
individual relationships with Whites, self help elites planned to establish businesses and 
institutions that catered to Black migrants (Boyd, 2008). While the number of community 
organizations and businesses serving Black Belt residents increased, Blacks also developed 
client-patron relationships with the city’s Republican leadership. Timing was important. Their 
relationships were solidified because of the precarious political balance of power at the time and 
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the ability of the concentrated electorate located in the Second and Third Wards to swing the 
vote (Boyd, 2008).  
For Blacks in Chicago during the Great Migration, political empowerment, political 
representation, and harnessing ones political rights were viewed as more important than 
integration itself (Street, 2007). Each wave of Black migrants was recruited by precinct captains 
and schooled in the voting process, which resulted in a closely-knit community of almost 
homogenous voters (Drake and Cayton, 1993). Precinct captains worked directly with the voters 
and reported to ward committeemen (alderman), who were responsible for “delivering the vote” 
to superiors like then mayor William Thompson (Drake and Cayton, 1993). Black wards helped 
to guarantee the Republican’s stronghold, and ward leaders received many of Mayor 
Thompson’s resources. The growing number of Black voters and the efforts of the Alpha 
Suffrage Club, a women’s political organization founded by Ida B. Wells, were responsible for 
the election of Oscar De Priest, Chicago’s first Black alderman (Boyd, 2008). Blacks were also 
appointed and elected to other city and state offices, and eventually the Black community 
became one of the smoothest running cogs in the machine, taking over both the Second and 
Third Wards as early as the 1920s (Drake and Cayton, 1993). Politically empowered Blacks 
attempted to obtain justice in courtrooms, police protection (including against policemen 
themselves), civil service jobs and their share of street lights, libraries, sewers and playgrounds 
(Drake and Cayton, 1993). Although the foundation of their political power heavily relied on 
their individual relationships with powerful Whites within the machine, these new 
professionalized elites can be credited with establishing institutions and businesses during the 
time of economic deprivation, providing the foundation for the political and social organizations 
of future Black Chicagoans (Boyd, 2008).  
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In creating a safe space with multiple representations of Black economic and political 
success, they manifested stark contrasts to the myths of Black inferiority. And, in developing the 
Black Belt their institutions contributed to Blacks decreased tolerance of racism in the North 
while making the conditions of racial subordination and confinement easier to endure (Boyd, 
2008). Drake and Cayton (1993) write,  
If working as servants, Negroes must be properly deferential to the White people upon  
whom they depend for meager wages and tips. In fact, they often have to overdo their act 
in order to earn a living; as they phrase it, they have to “Uncle Tom” to “Mr. Charley” a 
bit to survive. If working in a factory, they must take orders from a White managerial 
personnel and associate with White workers who, they know, do not accept them as 
social equals. If self employed, they are continually frustrated by the indirect restrictions 
imposed upon Negro business and professional men. If civil servants, they are in 
continuous contact with situations that emphasize their ghetto existence and subordinate 
status. But, when work is over, the pressure of the White world is lifted. Within 
Bronzeville Negroes are at home. (p. 387)  
 
Boyd (2008) argues that in nurturing and developing the Black Belt, the new Black elites 
focus on management of the ghetto failed to provide any leadership for their captive market. In 
failing to directly challenge the conditions of urban racial subordination, their decision to profit 
from the segregation of Blacks in the North reproduced it (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 
2008). Yet Black Belt residents were well aware of the ambitions for power and prestige that 
motivated their leaders, as did they recognize that the power of their leaders was solely 
dependent on Whites who could crush them at any moment (Drake and Cayton, 1993). They 
were skeptical of their leaders and sincerity was not easily discerned. This knowledge fostered a 
large degree of ‘cynical realism’ wherein they accepted their leaders as fallible and their 
expectations of them were realistic (Drake and Cayton, 1993, p. 394). And indeed the economic 
and political interests of Black elites were closely related to the economic interests of their White 
patrons. Both were served by the maintenance of the racial segregation. For example, the 
confinement of Blacks to one area is the very reason that Black officials were elected. Elites 
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recognized that if Blacks were dispersed througout the city, they would not win the vote of 
Whites (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). The high concentration of Blacks in the 
heterogeneous Black Belt on the South Side aided in the seating of Blacks as alderman and 
eventually Congressmen (Hawking, 1991; Grimshaw, 1992; Drake and Cayton, 1993). As the 
ultimate expression of their self-help ideology they strongly believed that if anyone should profit 
at the expense of poor Blacks, it should be them. They theorized that their individual economic 
and political success represented advancement for the race (Boyd, 2008). It was with this logic 
that they embraced the exploitative practices of White property owners to demonstrate the ability 
of Blacks to meet bourgeois standards of American success (Boyd, 2008).    
However, the accumulation strategies they promoted as beneficiary for the entire Black 
race was in direct conflict with the advancement of their individual status. The client-patron 
relationships they established financially relied on the philanthropic and industrial decisions of 
White patrons. Within their self-help framework, their financial and electoral success was 
determined by relationships that encouraged Black political and social leaders to place the 
desires and concerns of Whites over those of economically vulnerable Blacks (Boyd, 2008). The 
political support of Black leaders relied not on their constituents but the political support of 
Whites within the Republican machine. Therefore challenging racial inequities did not outrank 
the importance of the successful delivery of votes. And even if it did, the structure of the 
machine prioritized patronage over issues when distributing rewards, so although Blacks were 
incorporated into the machine, they lacked the power to make demands on the behalf of their 
constituents (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). For example their patronage rewards did not 
address the racial discrimination faced by Black business owners in the Second and Third Wards. 
These businessmen and women started their enterprises with less capital than their competitors 
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and had access to less credit (Boyd, 2008). Racial discrimination limited their ability to expand, 
improve or relocate—all factors that considerably affected their ability to compete with the 
White business owners who dominated the Black Belt throughout the Great Migration (Drake 
and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). Additionally, Black proprietors often complained that Black 
patrons refused to trade with them—their money for their services or goods—and that when 
possible they seemed to prefer to do business with Whites (Drake and Cayton, 1993). In defense 
of their purchasing power many Blacks asserted that both lower prices and a willingness to grant 
credit factored largely into their shopping choices (Drake and Cayton, 1993). And, as indicated 
earlier, Black establishments operated with significantly less capital than their competitors. 
Given these dynamics Blacks were never able to create a sustainable community that was 
economically self-sufficient (Boyd, 2008).  
During the 1920s when Blacks were largely Republican, their small electorate was 
critical in local elections. However by the 1930s, Black wards could barely represent a majority 
in their party during the mayoral election (Grimshaw, 1992). Boyd (2008) argued that one of the 
reasons for the lackluster response of Blacks at the polls during the 1930s and 1940s could be 
attributed to ripples from the Great Depression. The city itself was already facing a financial 
crisis because of a state mandated suspension of tax collections from 1927-1929 (Boyd, 2008). 
The combination of continued spending and borrowing and a backlog of unpaid taxes resulted in 
the city’s inability to pay its workers. These conditions encouraged large numbers of White 
workers to venture back into the service jobs they would not have considered in more prosperous 
times. This increased the competition for labor between Whites and other ethnic groups. Black 
residents in Chicago were disproportionately affected by the disaster primarily because their 
labor was largely concentrated in the most vulnerable service positions (Boyd, 2008). Although 
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many Blacks were employed in other areas, the majority of Black service workers provided 
luxury services (porters, domestics, personal servants, elevator and bathroom attendants) and 
they were therefore first in line to lose their wages given both the local and national economic 
depression (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). The residents of the Black Belt were 
disproportionately affected by the disaster and they resided in a city that was not likely to 
provide relief. Their problems were exacerbated by the continual influx of Black migrants during 
harsh economic times. The social service organizations that served the South Side were 
financially limited and unable to meet the needs of the growing Black community (Boyd, 2008). 
For residents of the Black Belt, the surge of in-migration, combined with inadequate city 
building programs, created a severe housing shortage (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). 
The housing that existed for African Americans was overcrowded and decrepit, while 
simultaneously rare and expensive (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). Thus, Blacks were 
squeezed out of industry while relegated to environments with fixed boundaries that became 
increasingly claustrophobic. And as their resources and economic circumstances deteriorated, 
Blacks became less than impressed with both the machine and the accommodationist strategy of 
elite Black leaders (Boyd, 2008). The racist public policies that implemented and encouraged 
restrictive housing covenants, segregated and inferior health care, severe employment 
discrimination, and overcrowded public schools with double-shifts offset any patronage favors 
(Grimshaw, 1992).   
Instead, a large portion of the Black electorate chose its own representation to fight the 
Democratic machine (Grimshaw, 1992; Boyd, 2008). Blacks representing each social class lived 
in the Black Belt, and although more affluent Blacks lived in the southern end of the district, and 
the poor lived at the northern end, the heterogeneous area allowed for strong coalition building 
 87 
(Hawking, 1991; Grimshaw, 1992). Additionally, because of the racial discrimination Blacks 
experienced in the employment sector, hidden amongst those working unskilled and service jobs 
was a substantial amount of Black workers with middle class values, a middle class education, 
and middle class behaviors (Grimshaw, 1992). Black Belt residents began to throw their support 
behind radical racial organizations that advocated for structural change. Black Belt residents 
became involved with community organizations that took an active stance against housing and 
employment discrimination, and embraced pro-labor/pro-union organization efforts within the 
city (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). In stark contrast to the accommodationist strategies 
of the self-help regime, collective action strategies like pickets, boycotts, and political 
demonstrations became the popular tactic for racial advancement (Boyd, 2008). The party’s 
Black ward leaders had to contend with a middle class that offered candidates who addressed 
racism and mounted repeated challenges against the machine (Grimshaw, 1992; Street, 2007; 
Boyd, 2008). The factionalism within the Democratic Party weakened the machines electoral 
performance in Black wards (Grimshaw, 1992; Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). 
 Unable to deliver the vote, self-help committeemen could claim little of the machine’s 
resources. In 1932, Anton Cermak was elected over the candidate favored by the majority of 
Blacks, William “Big Bill the Builder” Thompson (Grimshaw, 1992; Drake and Cayton, 1993). 
Thus, the Democratic machine was “constructed and acquired its hegemony with scant Black 
support” (Drake and Cayton 1993, p.95). With little Black support Cermak was under no 
obligation to maintain the patronage hires of the previous incumbent and he immediately 
removed a number of Blacks from city jobs, valued appointments, and civil service positions 
(Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). After Cermak’s death in 1934, the new Democratic 
mayor Edward Kelly adopted a more appeasing attitude toward his Black constituents. Not only 
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did he return the revoked positions of the Cermak administration, but he also appointed a Black 
person to the school board, named a Black man as chief of police, appointed another as chairman 
of the Chicago Housing Authority and placed one on the ticket to be a judge of the municipal 
court (Grimshaw, 1992; Drake and Cayton, 1993; Street, 2007; Boyd, 2008). Symbolically Kelly 
supported desegregation, and although he was a Democrat his strategy garnered him the support 
of the city’s Republican Blacks (Boyd, 2008). At the local level, a combination of factors were 
involved in the conversion of Chicago’s Blacks from the Republican Party to the Democrat 
machine. The most commonly cited upon were the “housekeeping” services (fixing potholes, 
collecting garbage) which redefined public services as private favors; the high yield of patronage 
contracts and jobs available after the Democrats acquired a monopoly over city and county 
offices; and the impact of the Great Depression which discredited the Republican party 
(Grimshaw, 1992; Drake and Cayton, 1993). In addition to Kelly’s local efforts, the policies of 
the national administration between the 1930s and 1950s helped to transform Black politics from 
an electorate that was largely Republican to one that was solidly Democratic (Grimshaw, 1992; 
Drake and Cayton, 1993). Drake and Cayton (1993) wrote that people began to “vote for bread 
and butter instead of for the memory of Abraham Lincoln” (p. 88). Collective values played a 
significant role in the conversion of Blacks nationally and locally from Republicans to 
Democrats.  
Although some argue that the Democrat’s New Deal lured Blacks to exchange their vote 
in return for social and economic favors, Black voters valued representation and empowerment 
in addition to the traditional patronage favors (Grimshaw, 1992; Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 
2008). When President Roosevelt began to explicitly address the issues of racial discrimination 
and marginalization in a 1944 speech in Chicago, the partnership between Black voters and the 
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national Democratic Party was sealed (Hawking, 1991; Grimshaw, 1992; Drake and Cayton, 
1993). Grimshaw (1992) argues that although this relationship developed on the national level, 
Black allegiance to the local Democratic machine did not automatically materialize. Black 
voters, won over by FDR’s promise of racial equality, easily distinguished between the 
Presidents New Deal message of the racial equality, and the ‘raw deal’ silence offered by the 
local machine (Grimshaw, 1992; Drake and Cayton, 1993). Grimshaw (1992) challenges 
patronage interpretations with historical evidence that suggests that it was race, and more 
importantly the Democratic machines refusal to address racial discrimination in a real way, that 
turned off the majority of Black voters. Alongside the national Democratic Party’s message of 
racial reform, the local party appeared all the more backwards and racist (Grimshaw, 1992; 
Drake and Cayton, 1993). According to Grimshaw (1992), the racial tension between the 
Democratic Party and Black Chicagoans was calmed when the party ousted its two-term mayor 
Martin Kennelly in favor of its chairman Richard J. Daley. Kennelly, who served after Kelly, 
adopted a similar attitude to his Black constituents as that of Cermak. Hoping to secure the 
White vote Kennelly used racist campaign tactics against Daley, which drove Blacks to the polls 
and to the machine. They wouldn’t turn away again until the emergence of the civil rights 
movement in the 1960s. But at the time that Daley was announced as Kennelly’s replacement, 
his relationship with Black Chicagoans was so bad that the coup was viewed as a positive 
response to their complaints and William “Boss” Dawson, a popular ward committeemen, was 
admired for engineering the plan (Grimshaw, 1992; Boyd, 2008). 
Thus the middle of the 1950s, there was no longer an extreme gap between the rhetoric of 
the national party and the local Democratic Party (Grimshaw, 1992). After the Supreme Court 
struck down restrictive housing covenants in 1948 (Shelly v. Kraemer) a large percentage of the 
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middle class began to exit the Black Belt (Grimshaw, 1992). Between 1950 and 1960, the Black 
population in Chicago doubled, and the addition of new neighborhoods in the Black Belt led to 
an increased representation in city government (Hawking, 1991; Drake and Cayton, 1993). There 
were more precinct captains, ward officials and symbolic appointments. Black entrepreneurs 
began to venture into real estate, insurance, restaurants, taverns, cabs company’s, cosmetics, and 
publishing (Drake and Cayton, 1993). The political system that was created aligned a coalition of 
Black committeemen with ward committeeman William Dawson. Dawson headed a successful 
multi-ward submachine within the Democratic machine with the help of patronage (Hawking, 
1991; Grimshaw, 1992; Cohen & Taylor, 2000; Boyd, 2008). Still his submachine offered the 
same limitations Black Belt residents were plagued with in the past. Although he used racial 
rhetoric to gain Black support, after he officially entered the machine he became silent on racial 
equality issues (Boyd, 2008). As the head of the Black submachine, Dawson’s influence 
extended into several wards and his power grew simultaneously with the increasing Black 
population (Hawking, 1991; Cohen & Taylor, 2000; Green, 2005).   
Many of those migrants settled in the Douglas/Grand Boulevard communities (Boyd, 
2008). One of the main concerns of residents was the availability of private housing, and within 
that issue were specific concerns relating to the discriminatory practices within public housing. 
Although Blacks continued to settle on the South Side of the city, like White residents of public 
housing facilities, business owners in other parts of the city were unhappy with such changes to 
the city. The growing population was of increasing concern to White businessmen who feared 
both the loss of middle class White consumers and the increasing presence of poor Blacks (Boyd, 
2008). Business owners in the Loop and Douglas feared that Black presence would discourage 
the patronization of their establishments and lower the value of their property (Boyd, 2008). In 
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response to their fears of the spread of blight, they united to form the South Side Planning Board 
and succeeded in the passage of the Redevelopment and Relocation Acts. With public funds they 
were authorized to acquire, clear, and sell land at reduced prices to private developers (Boyd, 
2008, p. 34). They also demolished the homes in the area deeming them slums, and replaced 
them with housing options for their employees. In the case of Michael Reese Hospital and the 
Illinois Institute of Technology, they used their authority to expand their campuses (Boyd, 2008). 
The South Side Planning Board and its subsequent actions are one example of White privilege 
disguised as urban renewal. These businessmen were able to claim public spaces, using public 
funds, to protect their private interests. They were additionally able to dispose of the unwanted 
largely Black population that they viewed as a threat to their property interests. Douglas 
residents who disputed the characterization of their homes as slums were subsequently 
displaced—there was no relocation plan established and they could not afford to live in the new 
developments. Second and Third Ward residents continued to receive symbolic representation 
and personal favors while racial power imbalances were left unchecked (Boyd, 2008). If 
anything, the Dawson’s submachine used its resources to stifle the potential uprisings of civic 
and business organizations that sought to challenge the status quo (Boyd, 2008). In fact some 
members of the leadership originally planned to invest in the urban renewal projects until the 
plan gained the negative reputation of the ‘Negro removal’ project (Boyd, 2008). Dissenters, 
particularly a Republican alderman of the Third Ward, rallied thirteen city council members and 
tried to place a ban on the discrimination because it used public funds. Their actions were 
ultimately unsuccessful. The Negro removal plans were perhaps the first instance of 
gentrification in the Second and Third Wards. A massive amount of businesses and families were 
displaced, and the area experienced a large decline in population. With no relocation plan in 
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place, advocates of urban renewal partnered with the Chicago Housing Authority, which then 
planned to construct public housing to serve the dislocated residents (Boyd, 2008). It was in this 
way that both the South Side Planning Board and the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) 
contributed to the concentration of poverty in the Douglas/Grand Boulevard communities. By the 
end of the project, the Douglas/Grand Boulevard communities held the largest concentration of 
public housing in the nation and in close proximity were pockets of affluence (Boyd, 2008, p. 
35). The projects partitioned the poorest Blacks within a highly visible part of the city. They also 
created safe spaces for the middle class and Black elites. Their spaces stood in stark material and 
spatial contrast to their neighbors, and aligned their property interests with the business 
community. The stage had been set, and there was then a large gap between the current and 
potential property values for the area. This encouraged the site to be an appealing place for future 
‘urban renewal’ projects. Throughout the crisis, Dawson and his Black submachine remained 
relatively silent on the issue. Their lack of leadership and failure to challenge both the Boards 
project and the CHA’s solution encouraged not only gentrification and racial displacement but 
laid the foundation for future intraracial and interracial conflict in the area (Boyd, 2008).  
Challenging White Flight: The Chicago 21 Plan 
…one of the great acts in the renaissance of the city… 
--Mayor Richard J. Daley on the Chicago 21 Plan 
Time Magazine, July 2, 1973 
Dawson’s power reached its highest point when he used his clout to elect Richard J. 
Daley. After he became mayor, Daley eliminated Dawson’s patronage abilities and began to deal 
directly with Black Democratic committeemen. Using the political savvy that characterized the 
first half of his administration, Daley never publicly challenged Dawson. He did however check 
his power and designs on building an empire within the machine, by replacing Dawson loyalists 
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with committeemen who were loyal to him (Grimshaw, 1992). He allowed Dawson to retain his 
congressional seat, and quickly eliminated his influence within the machine, in an attempt to 
enjoy continued Black electoral support. At the time, a battle began between Black progressives 
(Timuel Black, Charlie Chew, Fred Hubbard) who organized grassroots campaigns to garner 
community support, and Black candidates who belonged to the Democratic machine. Of course, 
the Black members of the machine, known as the silent six, were likely to politically acquiesce to 
Daley’s policies (Hawkins, 1991; Cohen & Taylor, 2000; Neckerman, 2007). After Daley’s 
structural changes Black committeemen began to deal directly with the mayor. Although this 
dispersed the political power of the Black community, it allowed Daley to acquire virtually all of 
the available power (Hawkins, 1991; Grimshaw, 1992).  
Mayor Richard J. Daley (1955-1976) manipulated the increasing racial tension and 
economic competition in the city to his political advantage. Daley courted Black voters during 
the early years of his campaign by speaking out against restrictive residential covenants (Cohen 
& Taylor, 2000). Organizational loyalty to the machine was replaced by personal loyalty to the 
mayor. Loyal Black politicians were selected for municipal positions that controlled a small 
degree of jobs, but wielded even less political power. Grimshaw (1992) writes that although they 
were expected to be completely faithful, “for Black ward leaders the machine was not the benign 
economic enterprise we find in the literature, where compliance is secured by material rewards. 
It was primarily a paramilitary organization, in which compliance was compelled through 
coercion” (p. 95). Upon his election Daley stripped the council of its budgetary control and any 
other authority it had previously experienced and he ruled the city much like a dictator 
(Grimshaw, 1992, p. 185). If you were not Irish and male during Daley’s reign, you did not 
benefit in any significant ways his leadership (Grimshaw, 1992). He shifted the machines focus 
 94 
from economic decision making to the enhancement of organizational (mayoral) control and 
power (Grimshaw, 1992). So although Black wards delivered the most electoral units, their ward 
leaders received little for their efforts. In fact rewards and promotions did not come from 
competence or political prowess. Instead popular elites or ‘civic leaders’ with little political 
experience and skill were recruited from outside of the ward. Although he had to force some 
wards to accept his appointed leaders over their elected ones, this allowed the mayor to retain the 
control he sought. The ‘silent six’ made relatively few demands of the mayor and the machines 
resources (Grimshaw, 1992). The new system benefited the Democratic machine much more 
than it did any Black community. Between 1940 and 1960, the percentage of White votes 
dropped from 87 to 72 percent while the percentage of Black votes increased from 8 to 20 
percent (Boyd, 2008). The machine received its most reliable voting block while Blacks received 
a much smaller percentage of patronage benefits (Hawkins, 1991; Grimshaw, 1992; Dreier, 
Mollenkopf, & Swanstrom, 2004). More importantly, Blacks were unable to establish a powerful 
presence in a Democratic machine where they were rarely consulted on important issues and 
were excluded from the decision making process (Boyd, 2008). As middle-class Whites 
continued to flee the city, the Democratic machine maintained its control by allowing de facto 
social and economic segregation in neighborhoods, schools, jobs, and housing in exchange for 
the support of working class Whites (Flanagan, 2005; Neckerman, 2007; Boyd, 2008). The 
mayor and the Democratic machine worked to draw White voters in new ways, and the most 
popular vehicle for attracting allies became the patronage rewards of economic revitalization 
projects. The success of those projects became integrally tied to the success and power of the 
mayor and the machine (Boyd, 2008). 
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Encouraged by both federal housing programs and the suburbanization of industry, 
middle-class Whites continued to settle in the suburbs where Blacks not welcome as discussed in 
chapter 2 (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). The suburbs were almost exclusively White 
primarily due to the patterns of institutional discrimination against Blacks through the labor 
market, mortgage lending practices, class and race based redlining, and exclusionary zoning in 
the suburbs (Massey and Denton, 1993; Ladd, 1998; Street, 2007). Suburban home ownership 
became a possibility for relocating White Chicagoans because of the increasing availability of 
federal loan and mortgage programs (FHA, GI Bill) and the prosperity ignited by war-induced 
recovery (Massey and Denton, 1993; Oliver and Shapiro, 1997; Street, 2007). The mass exodus 
of Whites to the suburbs and the Supreme Court ruling against restrictive covenants in 1948 
meant that Blacks could now venture into other areas of the city (Boyd, 2008). The South Side 
Black ghetto expanded eastward into the formerly all White neighborhoods of Oakland, 
Kenwood, and Hyde Park; westward crossing Western Avenue; and south into Englewood, 
Woodlawn, and Chatham (Street, 2007). Attracted to the city with the promise of manufacturing 
jobs, Chicago’s Black population continued to increase and by 1960 there were 813,000 Black 
residents in the city (Street, 2007). At the same time, a second ghetto was created on the West 
Side, as the neighborhoods of North Lawndale, Garfield Park, and Austin were flooded with 
these new Black arrivals (Street, 2007). Earlier that year, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
called Chicago the most segregated city in the nation, and the NAACP found that 91 percent of 
the city’s public schools reflected the patterns of residential segregation (Street, 2007). 
 Street (2007) argues that the combination of Black militancy movements, the urban racial 
violence of the 1960s, and affirmative action policies sparked a costly White backlash against 
both Blacks and the urban poor. This backlash encouraged White flight from many of the nations 
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disproportionately Black cities to overwhelmingly disproportionate White suburban enclaves 
(Massey and Denton, 1993; Oliver and Shapiro, 1997; Street, 2007). The Civil Rights 
Commission estimated that during 1959, each week, 300 White residents left the city and 600 
Black residents arrived (Street, 2007). The suburbanization of industry continued, so when 
Whites left the city center, their purchasing power went with them. Chicago was home to two-
thirds of the regions manufacturing jobs, and the industry employed 30 percent of the Black 
workforce (Street, 2007). Thus, as noted in chapter two, the decline of the manufacturing 
industry in Chicago hit Black workers especially hard. Five years after Martin Luther King’s 
failed summer in Chicago, the city lost about 117,000 jobs and Black communities on the South 
and West sides were economically devastated (Street, 2007; Neckerman, 2007). In fact, the 
primarily Black South and West sides were the only areas of the city to experience such severe 
unemployment during the time. Employment actually increased in the city’s White 
neighborhoods after the mass exodus of many Whites, but decreased in the ghetto when 
hundreds of thousands of Blacks arrived in the city (Street, 2007). The obvious consequence of 
the massive White flight to the suburbs, just as Blacks arrived to the city in droves, was an 
increasingly racially and economically segregated Chicago (Cohen & Taylor, 2000; Neckerman, 
2007; Street, 2007). Blacks and Latinas/os did not possess an equal opportunity to withdraw 
from the city and follow jobs or homes. The abandoned poor, largely Black and Latino/a, 
disproportionately suffered the consequences of a declining job market, an aging housing base, a 
shrinking tax base, and the steadily increasing gap between the social services needed and those 
available (Street, 2007).  
 During the last half of Daley’s administration, from 1960-1976, the racism within the 
local Democratic Party in the areas of housing, education, employment, and the police 
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department was continually exposed, prompting Black voters to challenge the machine (Boyd, 
2008). Examples can be seen in the battle to desegregate the schools, detailed in chapter two, and 
later efforts to desegregate the city’s neighborhoods (Boyd, 2008). In the case of residential 
segregation, challenges were launched on multiple fronts; the most successful was that of 
Dorothy Gautreaux and three others who accused the CHA of racial discrimination in the site 
selection and tenant assignment of the city’s public housing facilities. The court’s ruling in 1969 
agreed with local residents, however the city stalled for five years in an attempt to avoid new site 
selections, and when compelled to do so it simply stopped building (Boyd, 2008). Even less 
successful were the protests and boycotts culminating in the anticlimactic negotiations between 
the mayor, community organizers and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. The resulting Summit 
Agreement was a dog that not only failed to bite, it didn’t bark. King left, Daley reportedly 
received more than four-fifths of the Black vote in his run for a fourth term, and the 
commitments made during the Summit Agreement negotiations were abandoned. In the battle to 
desegregate the public schools several community organizations launched a suit against the city. 
They were supported by several independent reports which recommended that the school system 
be integrated. Still the mayor voted against integration in response to protests from the city’s 
White residents (Boyd, 2008). By this time, Chicago’s mayor had shifted his sights towards 
landing a new electoral base. As the civil rights movement intensified, he became increasingly 
suspicious of Blacks, especially middle-class Blacks (Grimshaw, 1992). He believed that revolt 
would most likely begin in middle-class areas, and his repressive actions reflected his awareness 
that the Civil Rights Movement was a threat to the machine. And he was correct. Middle-class 
Black voters had indeed retreated from the machine. Black Belt residents began to understand 
local conflicts within the national struggle for civil rights. This shift broke the unspoken 
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agreement between the machine and the Black submachine within the machine—the suppression 
of issue-based politics. Boyd (2008) argues that this rift ignited the search for alternative options 
and is responsible for the current use of community-based organizations as a tool for political 
empowerment. In response to the growing threat of the Civil Rights Movement, Daley attempted 
to contain the Black community by replacing existing popular civic representatives with those 
that held no connection to the community. With no ties to residents, he reasoned that the 
communities they represented could not pressure the newest Black elites. However Daley’s 
containment strategies were unsuccessful. At the time of his death, in 1976, he left his successors 
with a rising tide of Black discontent. Having been suppressed and denied representation, the 
Black electorate was ready for revolt (Grimshaw, 1992). The machine withdrew its remaining 
resources and Blacks withdrew from the machine, launching an attack by running independent 
candidates in several elections. Although their reign was short lived, they elected three 
independent aldermen between 1963 and 1967 (Boyd, 2008). There were also signs that there 
was a decline in the overall electoral participation of low-income African Americans in the city, 
therefore the base that the mayor relied on no longer provided a significant winning margin for 
the machine (Grimshaw, 1992). 
During the 1970s, the Black population continued to expand and there were more Black 
aldermen (14) than there had ever been. During their expansion many of the older Black leaders 
died and Daley immediately removed any Black ward leaders that appeared to even moderately 
side with community members (Grimshaw, 1992). The death of former leaders and Daley’s 
replacement of others ensured that few remained who would fight for a redistribution of power 
and privilege. One committeeman, Ralph Metcalf, the first Black elite elevated by Daley, turned 
against the machine by taking a stand against police brutality. When Black residents rioted after 
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the assassination of King, the mayor issued a quite infamous ‘shoot to kill’ order to the city’s 
police force (Grimshaw, 1992). The following year, the state’s attorney Edward V. Hanrahan 
authorized a raid on Black Panther Party leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark that lead to their 
deaths. Sometime before Hanrahan organized a special gang unit to undermine the activities of 
the Black Panther Party, and when its leaders were murdered officials claimed self-defense. 
However subsequent examinations showed that on the night the police arrived, they opened fire 
without provocation upon the sleeping inhabitants of the home. When one of Metcalf’s top aides 
was the victim of police brutality, perhaps this was the final straw. He attempted to have 
disciplinary action taken against the offending officers. When that and his subsequent actions 
were ignored he broke ranks with the machine, crossed party lines to endorse another candidate 
for states attorney, and even considered challenging the mayors re-election (Grimshaw, 1992).  
It was within this political and economic context that Mayor Daley unveiled the 1973 
plan for Chicago. Time Magazine published an article detailing the reasoning behind the plan to 
prepare Chicago for the 21st century. The primary goal of Chicago 21: A Plan for the Central 
Area Communities—to attract middle-class suburbanites to the city. The 21,000 White residents 
‘lost’ to the suburbs from 1958-1973 required the development of a new plan that would ‘entice’ 
them to again choose Chicago (Time Magazine, 1973). The chances of its success was judged to 
be excellent at the time because it was endorsed by a group of powerful, local businessmen—
including top executives of Sears, Marshall Field, and Standard Oil (Amoco)—and was green 
lighted by then mayor, Richard J. Daley.   
The planners behind Chicago 21 not only welcomed these residents, they developed a 
multi-billion dollar strategic plan to actively recruit them. With a budget of one billion dollars a 
year for the next fifteen years, Chicago 21 was set to change the city’s housing options, public 
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school system, and transportation network simultaneously. What is unique about the 1973 
Chicago 21 plan is its admission that a certain group of residents was more preferable and of 
more value than others. It was around this point in time that low-income communities and public 
housing were targeted for what has come to be known as gentrification or revitalization.  
Ethnicity in Chicago: Community Organizations and Political Empowerment 
Between 1970 and 1990, Chicago lost about 60 percent of its manufacturing jobs as the 
deindustrialization of WWII transitioned into the era of economic restructuring and globalization 
(Street, 2007). Although the Black population initially decreased a bit in the city and rose 
moderately in the suburbs between 1970 and 1990, the Black population within the city 
continued to increase along with a large new influx of primarily Mexican Americans (Street, 
2007). As discussed earlier the persistent segregation strategies employed by those in the real 
estate industry, meant that most Blacks and Latinos/as continued to reside to communities that 
were highly segregated. This hyper-segregation can be seen in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Figure 1 
displays the segregated spaces of Black Chicagoans, who continue to be concentrated in large 
proportions to the far north, west, and far south of the city. In Figure 2 we see the location of 
White Chicagoans throughout the city. White residents are concentrated to the north of the city 
as well as to the southwest. Figure 2 also highlights the concentration of Whites on the periphery 
of the city. Figure 3 displays the location of Latina/o Chicagoans throughout the city. Latinas/os 
are highly concentrated in the far north and northwest parts of the city, as well as to the central 
west parts of the city. Together Figures 1 and 3 highlight how large concentrations of Latino/as 
and large concentrations of Blacks maneuver around one another on the west side of the city.   
Although the chloropleth maps in Figures 1-3 were created using 2000 Census data, they 
are supported with data from the University of Chicago’s Map Collection, depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 verifies that the location of Blacks and Latinos/as in 2000 is very consistent with the 
location Blacks and Latinas/os in 1990. 
 
 
Figure 1. Chloropleth map displaying all Chicago Public Schools in 1989 and the location of 
Black Chicagoans as indicated in the 2000 U.S. Census. The darkest areas indicate the largest 
concentration of Black populations. 
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Figure 2. Chloropleth map displaying Chicago Public Schools in 1989 and the location of White 
Chicagoans as indicated in the 2000 U.S. Census. The darkest areas indicate the largest 
concentrations of White populations.  
 
 103 
 
Figure 3. Chloropleth map displaying Chicago Public Schools in 1989 and the location of 
Latina/o Chicagoans as indicated in the 2000 U.S. Census. The darkest areas indicate the largest 
concentrations of Latina/o populations. 
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Figure 4. African American, Asian American, and Latina/o population by census tract, Chicago 
1990. University of Chicago Map Collection. 
 
As employment opportunities faded with social support systems, the poverty of Blacks 
and Latinos/as increased and the income gap between White families and Black and Latino/a 
families widened (Street, 2007). By 1989, Blacks were six times more likely to live in poverty 
than Whites (Street, 2007). Until the 1970s, there was much greater class integration in Black 
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areas of Chicago because residents had a limited ability to join their class within the larger 
society (Drake and Cayton, 1993; Boyd, 2008). This resulted in Blacks of all classes living in the 
same communities, attending the same schools and churches, and shopping in the same stores in 
the inner-city areas of Bronzeville, Douglas, Grand Boulevard and Washington Park (Drake and 
Cayton, 1993). Both changes in the economy and changes in the class composition have 
contributed to less stable neighborhoods today than those in the past, and a sharp decline in the 
social organization of Black communities in inner-city Chicago (Wilson, 1993). It was the 
complete economic disinvestment within Black neighborhoods that led to an extreme out-
migration of working and middle-class Blacks to more stable communities within the city and 
suburbs. Both Drake and Cayton (1993) and Boyd (2008) complicate the notion of a 
homogenous ‘Black community’ throughout their study, detailing the many economic, class, and 
intraracial conflicts between residents of the Black Belt. However, the popular narrative is 
unattached to wide-spread disinvestment and the deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods has 
most times been attributed to the ‘loss’ of the middle-class. Of course, the loss of middle and 
higher income Blacks held political implications for residents within the Black Belt because 
historically the economic and political survival of poor Blacks was intricately dependent upon 
their proximity to elites that were well connected (Grimshaw, 1992; Boyd, 2008). In the late 
1960s during the Dawson-Daley machine, although Blacks had the opportunity to secure 28% of 
the crucial political posts, the ‘powerlessness’ Urban League report released that year revealed 
the insignificance of their share of power (Drake and Cayton, 1993). Although they were largely 
loyal to the Democratic machine, Blacks held no real political power to affect their lives. For 
example, although Blacks represented more than 25% of the electorate, out of the city’s fifty-
nine committeemen, seven were Black. There was one Black congressman out of thirteen, and of 
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Cook County’s judicial policy making posts Blacks held 8 of the 137, or 6 percent. And finally, 
of the Board of Education’s policy-making positions, Blacks held 7 of the 72 posts, or 9 percent.  
 Additionally, the loss of Blacks with higher incomes combined with the rapidly 
increasing (and prolonged) unemployment rates lead to the decline of neighborhood institutions 
like banks, restaurants and professional services (Wilson, 1993). Even churches and community 
groups experienced dwindling numbers of participants and the decline of both informal and 
formal networks did little to maintain neighborhood stability (Wilson, 1993). The result was 
what we now recognize as a ghetto, believed to result from the natural concentration of the poor, 
but what is truly the result of an area lacking the capability to provide inhabitants with basic 
opportunities and resources (Wilson, 1993). So along with the departing jobs and businesses, 
those remaining in distressed communities experienced a different and more extreme form of 
concentrated poverty. It is important to differentiate between the inner-city of the mid-twentieth 
century and the inner-city of today (Wilson, 1993).  
This extreme concentration of poverty can be seen in Figure 5, which highlights the large 
concentration of low-income residents located in areas that are primarily Black and Latino/a. 
Figure 5 reveals the location of 1989 Chicago Public Schools and the household median income 
for Chicagoans by Census block groups. The wealthiest Chicagoans, defined conservatively as 
those with household median incomes of $63,000 and above, are largely concentrated in the 
north and northeast parts of Chicago. Still smaller concentrations of those with a household 
median income of $63,000 and above are located sparingly around the city. Together Figures 1- 
5 indicate that the majority of low-income residents, those with a household median income 
between $2,499 and $30,893, are in neighborhoods comprised primarily of Black and Latina/o 
populations. 
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Figure 5. Chloropleth map displaying Chicago Public Schools in 1989 and the household median 
income of Chicagoans as indicated in the 2000 U.S. Census. The darkest areas indicate the 
largest concentrations of those with household median incomes of $63,000 and above, and the 
lightest areas of the map indicate the largest concentrations of those with household median 
incomes of $30,000 and below. 
 
After working together for the betterment of public education from the 1960s to the 
1980s, the coalition between Blacks and Latino/as crystallized in the election of mayor Harold 
Washington in 1983 (Lipman, 2004; Cortez, 2008). Latinas/os and Blacks united over their 
dislike of mayor Jane Byrne who, in an attempt to wrench the White ethnic vote from Richard 
M. Daley, began attacking any semblance of power held by the Black and Latina/o residents that 
elected her. Although Black residents used the majority of services, Byrne significantly reduced 
the number of Black representation in both public housing and public school leadership. The 
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final straw for both groups was the mayor’s later attempt to remap Chicago’s wards to eliminate 
three Black-majority wards and four Latino/a-majority wards (Grimshaw, 1992). Byrne’s 
strategy was critically flawed and only succeeded in galvanizing a new coalition of Blacks, 
Latinas/os, and lakefront liberals—each motivated to elect new representation. In addition to the 
devastating impact of Reaganomics, Byrne’s defeat by Washington was very much connected to 
the sense of disempowerment that she engendered amongst her Black and Latina/o constituents 
(Grimshaw, 1992). Voters were angry and the turnout for Washington was large. 
Washington had spent years in the machine during the Daley administration, and was 
convinced that the Black community would have to challenge the machine in order to attain any 
benefits from it (Grimshaw, 1992). However his reforms did not only benefit the Black 
community. Caste in a language of the “haves” versus the “have-nots”, Washington’s 
administration established several new commissions that enabled women, Latinos/as, gays, 
lesbians, Asians and others to create their own agenda (Grimshaw, 1992). Community 
cooperation was so fundamental to his agenda that on his first day in office Washington 
announced the institution of the Freedom of Information Act. He later expanded the act to 
include the Affirmative Information Policy, where data was collected specifically for community 
organizations, in response which their limited data gathering capacity (Boyd, 2008).   
His administration supported a balanced growth between the downtown area and the 
neighborhood, community organizations, and neighborhood initiated economic development 
plans. Washington’s inclusion of the public and an open city government were in complete 
contrast to the Daley administration’s reliance on the city’s corporate network (Lipman, 2004; 
Cortez, 2008). He encouraged public participation in the city’s economic development plans, and 
made the city budget hearings public (Boyd, 2008). When he finally gained control of the 
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budgeting process from a resistant city council, he implemented the Chicago Works program, 
which resulted in $1 million improvements to the infrastructure of the Second Ward (Boyd, 
2008). Latino/a and Black leaders capitalized on the openness of the Washington administration. 
By his death in 1987, there were four Latino aldermen, a Mayor’s Commission on Latino/a 
Affairs, and an increase in the percentage of Latino/a city employees (Dominguez, 2007; Cortez, 
2008). Blacks also swept into office under Washington, and by 1987 over 80 percent of the 
Black aldermen elected built their political careers outside of the machine (Grimshaw, 1992).   
Unfortunately, his death exposed the limitations of his reforms, which were more 
personalized than institutionalized. Repeals were immediately implemented (Grimshaw, 1992). 
Immediately following his election the junior Daley, Richard M., revealed a ‘rainbow cabinet’ 
with appointments of twelve Black, Latino/a and Asian commissioners. The appointments 
proved to be largely superficial after both (a) allegations that commissioners held little influence 
and discretion and (b) a smaller inner circle of Daley’s top aides began to shape much of the 
administrations policy (Grimshaw, 1992). Many of the commissions created during the 
Washington administration were stripped of their power and consolidated, and top officials either 
resigned or were fired whenever opposing views were expressed (Grimshaw, 1992). But before 
Chicago’s current mayor was elected there were two Black contenders for mayor, alderman 
Eugene Sawyer and alderman Timothy Evans. The senior Daley appointed both aldermen 
because they lacked both major political ambition and the talents to acquire them, and both failed 
to generate any support beyond small followings within Black wards. Furthermore their refusal 
to work together against Richard J. Daley’s son, Richard M., ensured the installment of the latter 
in the next election (Grimshaw, 1992). Washington’s sudden death also resulted in the 
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deterioration of the alliance between Blacks, Latinos/as, and progressive Whites (Lipman, 2004; 
Dominguez, 2007).  
Although just as concentrated within Chicago as Black populations, there is some debate 
of whether Latinas/os reside in some of the segregated spaces or ‘ethnic enclaves’ that exist 
within Chicago’s seventy-seven official communities (Betancur, 2002; Dominguez, 2007). There 
is no such debate between those who study segregated Black neighborhoods—and even 
nationally, Chicago ranks as the fifth most segregated metropolitan area for Blacks (Street, 
2007). Street (2007) emphasizes, “…Blacks are considerably more impoverished, unemployed, 
and otherwise removed from local and regional labor markets than the city’s rising Latino/a 
populace—this despite Blacks’ much longer large-scale presence in and around Chicago, [and] 
their considerably higher rates of education and English-language usage...” (p.194).  
In Chicago, the debates surrounding Latinas/os is conceptualized as something that 
transpires primarily between Mexicans on the Near Southwest Side and Puerto Ricans on the 
historic Near North Side (Green, 2005; Dominguez, 2007; Cortez, 2008). From 1990 to 2000, 
Latino/a populations continued to grow making the Little Village/South Lawndale community 
one of the largest and most densely populated collection of Mexican descendants in the United 
States—it is second to Los Angeles. Although their numbers swelled in 2000 to surpass Blacks 
as the largest minority group, the absolute size of the Latino/a population did not automatically 
translate into sudden political empowerment or success (Dominguez, 2007). Large numbers of 
mostly Puerto Rican and Black residents between the late 1950s and early 1970s were removed 
from the Near North neighborhoods like Lincoln Park under the guise of urban renewal 
(Betancur, 2002). More importantly, community organizations and residents actively resisted the 
gentrification of West Town, proposing alternative plans. However their plans were quickly 
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dismissed and each was unable to stop White emigration or city disinvestment (Betancur, 2002). 
By 1980 Latina/os represented the second largest minority group in Chicago, and 14% of the 
population, but the groups political position remained minimal. Still, the awareness of an 
emerging Latino/a community, connected by a similar struggle, pushed community leaders to 
continue to make demands in the interests of the heterogeneous Latino/a community (Cortez, 
2008). As Latinos/as numbers increased, so did the strength of the Latina/o grassroots efforts, 
many of which were targeted at improving the educational opportunities of Latino/a students 
(Cortez, 2008). 
Chicago is unique in that it may be the only large American city that employs a top-to-
bottom centralized Democratic Party organization. This greatly empowers elected officials to a 
larger degree that in cities without this kind of political monopoly (Dominguez, 2007). Chicago 
has served as the national model for education reforms for more than a decade, but even before 
Richard M. Daley (1989-) was given control of the public schools, Chicago was one of a few 
cities that had never had a publicly elected school board. Thus, because the Democratic Party 
governs most (if not all) facets of government, Chicago’s political system encourages groups to 
be highly strategic and cohesive in their mobilization efforts (Dominguez, 2007).  
The end of the Washington coalition was marked by a shift in the political alliances 
between Blacks and Latino/as. Dominguez (2007) notes that politically, the relationship between 
Blacks and Latino/as suggests that as political success increases, competition for limited 
resources can be triggered. He argues that the decision to abandon the Black-Latino/a coalition 
was the turning point in the machines ability to recruit Latino/a voters. Chicago’s two largest 
Latino/a political networks, the Independent Political Organization (IPO) and the United 
Neighborhood Organization (UNO), began as grassroots organizations (Dominguez, 2007; 
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Cortez, 2008). Although sometimes at odds, working together or working separately, UNO and 
IPO affiliates solidified the Latino/a electorate. Disillusioned with the emerging political 
competition between Blacks and Latino/as over matters of inclusion and representation, some 
Latino/as aligned themselves with mayoral hopeful Richard M. Daley and the Democratic 
machine (Dominguez, 2007). Dominguez (2007) writes,  “...the Daley-Latino/a alliance will only 
continue to grow at the expense of Blacks” (p. 113). However, the work of Cortez (2008) 
complicates the pro-Daley Latino/a sentiment with narratives from community members who 
question the commitment of Latino/a Daley supporters to fight for the interests of the majority of 
low-income Latino/as.  
Despite this debate, the Latino/a electorate has been able to achieve some degree of 
political representation. In 1988, the electorate fought to provide non-citizens with the right to 
vote and serve on Local School Councils (Dominguez, 2007; Cortez, 2008). Daley established 
the Hispanic Democratic Organization (HDO), which elevated the political visibility of Mexican-
Americans, and catered specifically to working class Latino/as (Dominguez, 2007; Cortez, 
2008). Upon his election Daley pledged that his administration would be defined by classical 
economizing reforms that make the government more efficient and businesslike (Grimshaw, 
1992). Materially this meant cutting back on the city’s workforce by privatizing government 
services using the language of productivity. Therefore his network with Danny Solis, a powerful 
Latino/a businessman, was very much in line with his platform. In 1989, Solis, the former 
executive director of UNO, met with mayor Daley and gained the support of the city’s 
administration (Cortez, 2008). As a political insider, Solis began to represent Latino/a interests 
during the city’s major negotiations, which led to an increase in the projects set aside for 
Mexican communities (Cortez, 2008). In collaboration with other organizations, UNO worked to 
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double the employment of Latino/as at the University of Illinois campus, inking a deal worth $75 
million to the Latino/a community (Cortez, 2008). And by 1998, UNO opened its first charter 
school, Octavio Paz. Finally, in same year that Renaissance 2010 was announced, the UNO 
charter school network was established to partner with CPS and build more charters in Latino/a 
communities (Cortez, 2008).  
Collectively the political representation of Latino/as has increased. Still, class dynamics 
divide the IPO affiliates and the UNO political network. Both groups couldn’t be further apart: 
IPO affiliates work closely with community members, while UNO works closely with city 
administrators (Cortez, 2008). “Outsider” Latino/a community members resent being excluded 
from the decision making process in schools (Cortez, 2008). The most notable example of the 
political feud is revealed in the struggle for the Little Village neighborhood school. In 1998, a 
group of parents and the alderman of the 22nd ward, Ricardo Munoz, successfully attained $30 
million dollars from the state to build a new high school in the Little Village community (for 
students living in the community) (Cortez, 2008). The neighborhood’s only high school, Farragut 
Academy, was severely overcrowded and focused on trade and skill development (Lipman, 
2007). Three years later, after the construction of two high schools apart of the same initiative, 
Little Village parents organized to apply political pressure to CPS administrators and city 
officials (Cortez, 2008). Their 19-day hunger strike is an example of the political empowerment 
of the Mexican community in Little Village (Lipman, 2007). Cortez (2008) asserts, the 2001 
hunger strike was not only the struggle for a new neighborhood school, but the fight to publicly 
voice concerns and participate in public school policy debates. When the Little Village Lawndale 
High School opened its doors in 2005, community members had helped to shape everything from 
the physical design of the building to the curriculum taught in its classrooms (Cortez, 2008). The 
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facility housed four separate college preparatory schools to specifically serve the Mexican-
American community of Little Village and its nearby African American community in North 
Lawndale (Lipman, 2007). 
The construction of the Little Village High School is significant because up until that 
point, all new high schools had been charter or selective enrollment schools. It is also an example 
of interest convergence and should be understood not only as community resistance and political 
representation but within the context of the negative national attention the city received because 
of the hunger strike. This, like the threat of violence when Black residents and Dr. King were 
finally permitted to meet with the senior Daley, is why CPS officials agreed to finally meet with 
Little Village residents. Where Renaissance 2010 is concerned, the major difference in the 
experiences between low-income Blacks and low-income Latinos/as is in part due to (a) massive 
increases in the Latino/a population, (b) the political mobilization of that population, and (c) the 
converging interests between the city’s new Latino/a elite business community and the agenda of 
the machine. It could also be argued that the continued grassroots political empowerment of low-
income Latino/as, combined with a strained relationship with Latino/a committeemen and 
machine representatives, has currently shielded their neighborhood schools from experiencing 
Ren10 school closings like communities on the South Side (Figure 13). Yet more than likely, the 
closing of schools that are first located in primarily Black neighborhoods reflects both: (a) the 
economic and real estate development near the Loop; and I theorize (b) the strategic move on the 
part of the city to avoid encouraging multiethnic coalitions. 
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Alternative Stories of Renaissance 2010 
The community doesn’t want a charter school. We want a public school. 
--Altgeld resident and parent of Fenger student, December School Board meeting 
 
A day in Fenger for me is like stepping into a battle ground, I have to watch my back. Every 
passing period, I’m paranoid because I don’t know if I’m going to get jumped on. We need a 
neighborhood school so we can have safe passage, and don’t have to worry. 
--Fenger High School student, December School Board meeting 
 
Quality education is a right, not a choice. 
--Community member at Democratic Alternatives to Ren10 Workshop, 1/9/10 
 
The tale of Renaissance 2010 is interestingly the intersection of two competing stories: 
that of the Chicago’s current administration, and that of residents of color that are most likely to 
be Black or Latino/a. The city aligns itself with the corporate philosophy of accountability, 
standardization and data driven actions. In the CPS system this takes the form of an aggressive 
commitment to attracting middle-class and affluent families to the city center. The importance of 
schools to the economy was demonstrated when the mayor relocated the schools central 
administration from buildings on the South Side to the newly renovated building in the Loop, 
near both city hall and the Chicago Stock Exchange (Shipps, 2009). Prior to both the 1988 and 
1995 reforms, the school board (although appointed) was a legislative body that voted publicly, 
debated issues, and developed factions. After the 1995 reforms, there was a shift to a ‘corporate-
style’ school board that, like the city council, now serves a pro forma function (Shipps, 2009). 
Although residents are allowed to address the board in two-minute increments, both the 
deliberation and voting process are now closed to the public.   
The current efforts to recruit the middle-class usually negatively affect the large majority 
of preexisting Black (34.6%) and Latino/a (27.8%) residents who are less concerned with 
recruiting the affluent. Instead Black and Latino/a community members are more likely to 
champion efforts that seek to improve the living conditions in their current neighborhoods and 
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increase the resources to those neighborhoods. Most importantly, support for said improvements 
is found when the end goal is a positive contribution to the lives of those currently residing in 
those neighborhoods. Therefore, in practice there is a cosmic disconnection between the values 
of Chicago’s policymakers and the majority of Chicago residents. With this knowledge, it is not 
surprising when the policies implemented by city leaders are met with resistance from 
community members, community organizations and some of their elected officials.  
The Daley administration touts Renaissance 2010 as a policy that creates choice and 
offers both accountability and transparency. Community members reject this analysis, insisting 
that through the Ren10 policy, city administrators appropriate schools and neighborhoods. And, 
under the guise of accountability CPS officials and city administrators blame students, parents, 
and teachers for ‘failing’ schools, strictly for the purpose of privatizing the public school system. 
One of the later goals of this project was to understand why. On its face, Ren10 looks like a 
policy that provides new schools to Chicago’s most traditionally underserved communities. CPS 
officials say that they are committed to improving the academic achievement of Chicago’s 
students by carefully monitoring the standardized test scores of the city’s lowest performing 
schools. The Board of Education reacts swiftly to rid the Chicago system of failing teachers, 
administrators, and deteriorating school facilities.   
One of the contributions of this project is snapshots of Ren10 at work, and what the 
policy looks like across Chicago’s many communities. Figure 6 provides a look at Ren10 schools 
by ward. Most of the Ren10 new schools are located on the South and West Sides of the city. 
Figures 7-9 reveal that the residents on the South and West Sides are primarily Blacks and 
Latino/a. Figure 10 provides the location and concentration of Chicago’s renting population. 
From these snapshots it is clear that the majority of Ren10 schools are located on the South and 
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West Sides of Chicago, in neighborhoods consisting of large concentrations of low-income 
Blacks and low-income Latino/as who rent. With special attention Figure 10, we can see that in 
the gentrifying communities on the South and West sides, the majority of residents are not 
property owners. This is important, because renters (non-property owners) are mobile (can be 
moved). As we see in Figure 11, from 1990-2000 there is much movement within these areas.  
 
 
Figure 6. Renaissance 2010 Schools & Neighborhood Schools by Ward, Chicago. 
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Figure 7. Chloropleth map of Ren10 Schools & Neighborhood Schools by Black population. 
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Figure 8. Chloropleth map of Ren10 Schools, Neighborhood Schools, and Latina/o population.  
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Figure 9. Chloropleth map of Ren10 schools, Neighborhood schools, and White population. 
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Figure 10. Chloropleth map of Ren10 schools and Neighborhood schools by renting population.  
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Figure 11. Change in population, 1990-2000. University of Chicago Map Collection 2001.  
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In part, the population shifts occurring on the South and West Sides of Chicago can be 
explained by changes to the public housing policy at both federal and local levels. Under a 
neoliberal regime, policy that emphasizes privatization, private market deregulation, and the 
mobility of goods and services are favored (Ranney, 2003). This mode of thought has 
substantially affected housing policy in three ways that disproportionately affect the poor and 
determine where they can live. First, government programs largely focus on the privatization of 
public services, which has resulted in severe cutbacks on publicly owned housing. Secondly, the 
emphasis on individual competitiveness in the housing market and the value of individual home 
ownership has relieved local government of the risks associated with maintaining an adequate 
supply of affordable housing. And finally, the expansion of credit and speculation favors 
developers, the wealthy, and middle-class families over the poor (Ranney, 2003).  
These political and ideological shifts have severe consequences for Chicago’s low-
income residents. Most notably, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA)—established to 
administer the public housing in Chicago—rewrote its mission statement in 2003. The original 
statement, written in 1937, read as follows: “to build and operate public housing…for persons 
whose incomes are insufficient to enable them to obtain decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings in 
the private market” (Ranney, p. 130). In 1999 the purpose read, “The role of the CHA is to invest 
in or facilitate housing opportunities. Particularly, with the new freedoms made possible by 
recent legislation, the agency should no longer view itself as primarily an owner or manager of 
public housing” (Ranney, p. 130). As I write this, the CHA website states, “CHA now focuses on 
its primary responsibility as an asset manager and contracts with private professional property 
management firms to manage properties” (CHA Press Release, 2010).   
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  The Clinton administration’s Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 was 
created to decrease concentrations of poverty in public housing and create mixed income 
communities. Daley’s close relationship with the Clinton administration helped to facilitate 
federal grants for his gentrification projects as his corporate partners lobbied for additional 
dollars from the state legislature (Shipps, 2009). The result of income targeting in Chicago has 
been problematic because there is insufficient housing for poor people with incomes less than the 
new requirements allow (Ranney, 2003). Additionally, the one-for-one replacement law (which 
prohibited public housing authorities from demolishing any units that would not be replaced) 
was suspended in 1996 and removed entirely by 1998 (Ranney, 2003). Currently public housing 
authorities can remove units if they are not cost-effective to operate or if they are considered 
obsolete (Ranney, 2003). As a result the CHA has replaced all but three of its large public 
housing facilities with smaller mixed-income communities (CHA Press Release, 2010). Many 
critics of the new agenda have expressed concerns that the smaller mixed-income communities 
are unable to serve the large amount of displaced residents from the high-rise public housing 
facilities built in the 1950s and 1960s (Ranney, 2003). Those residents were primarily Black 
because the South Side of Chicago was the area designated for the public housing developments 
that would contain Blacks. Changes to the national public housing policy and its local 
application contribute to explanations of the decrease in the Black population from 1990-2000 on 
the South and West Sides.  
Erasing the Community: Ren10 and Neighborhood School Closure 
Neighborhood schools have traditional neighborhood attendance boundaries—so students that 
attend the local public school traditionally live within the neighborhood’s boundaries. Given the 
large decline in populations on the South and West sides, from 1990-2000, and reports that this 
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trend continues, it seems likely that neighborhood school closures would largely occur in areas 
experiencing a decrease in population. From 1995 to 2010 this appears to be the case (See 
Figures 12, 13, 14). School closings are located primarily on the South and West Sides, within 
communities that experienced a population decline. Between 1990 and 2000 areas with 
traditionally large concentrations of Whites and Latinos/as have experienced a population 
increase (See Figure 11). Whites are largely on the North and periphery of the city, and schools 
have been primarily closed on the South and West Sides. A University of Chicago report (2007) 
estimates that the population trends expressed in Figure 11 have continued into 2010 with White 
and Latino/a populations experiencing growth in the city, and Black populations experiencing a 
decrease in population (Goerge, Dilts, Yang, Wasserman, & Clary, 2007). Therefore, Figure 12 
and Figure 13 are consistent with we would expect—few Ren10 school closings in areas with 
increasing populations.   
The literature suggests that the small number of closed Ren10 schools in Latino/a 
communities can be explained in part by the political empowerment of the group and the 
effectiveness of the Latino/a electorate and grassroots organizations to protect many of their 
neighborhood schools (Dominguez, 2007; Cortez, 2008). And with an increasing political 
representation, through struggle, Chicago’s Latina/o population has in large part been able to 
avoid the loss of neighborhood schools in their communities. In Figure 13, it is important to note 
that some of the closed schools in have a large concentration of Blacks. For example, the two 
schools closed in Ward 12 are located in areas with high concentrations of Blacks. With this in 
mind the total of school closings in primarily Latino/a neighborhoods changes from around ten 
schools to around seven, and schools that have closed share their boundaries with large 
concentrations of low-income Blacks.  
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Figure 12. Chloropleth map of Closed Ren10 schools and White population, 1995-2010.  
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Figure 13. Chloropleth map featuring Ren10 closed schools and Latino/a population, 1995-2010. 
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Figure 14. Chloropleth map of Black residents and Ren10 closed schools, 1995-2010. 
 
Closed schools overwhelmingly occur in wards with declining Black populations on the 
South and West Sides. The majority of school closings are also heavily concentrated in Wards 2 
(15 closings), 3 (14 closings) and 4 (6 closings), which are closest to the Loop and Lake 
Michigan. Combined, these wards have lost a total of 35 schools. Each ward is in close 
proximity to the lakefront, the museum, and the Loop. So while this area is undergoing a massive 
depopulation process, as a result of the decreasing availability of affordable homes, the area is 
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currently experiencing a massive surge in real estate development (Green, 2005). Ward 2 
contains the South Loop, one of the city’s fastest growing gentrifying neighborhoods (Ranney, 
2003). It is in close proximity to the lakefront, the museum, and the Loop. Real estate 
development is booming and the South Loop is overflowing with lofts, single-family homes, 
town homes, and both mid and high-rise apartment and condo’s (Ranney, 2003; At Properties 
Chicago Real Estate website, 2010). The price of real estate in the South Loop ranges from 
$74,000 for a condo, to more than $3 million for a single-family home (@properties Chicago 
Real Estate, 2010). Ward 4 contains Bronzeville and Kenwood, two neighborhoods filled with 
both newly constructed and historic mansions and brownstones, in addition to mid and high-rise 
town homes, lofts, and condo’s. From 1980 to 1990 the median home value in the area increased 
from $25,000 to more than $125,000 during the first phase of the gentrification process. This 
year the price of real estate in Bronzeville and Kenwood ranged from: $3,900 to more than $2 
million, and $17,000 to $2.5 million, respectively (@Properties Chicago Real Estate, 2010).  
The gentrification of the South Loop, Tri-Taylor, and Bronzeville (Douglas/Grand 
Boulevard) communities affects a cross section of the Black population. First large numbers of 
renters and public housing residents who cannot afford to remain in the area, and second home 
owners who worry about their ability to handle increasing taxes. Middle-class families are also 
concerned about the southward movement of commercial and real estate developments, as both 
carry the threat of both political and physical displacement by Whites (Boyd, 2008). Ranney’s 
(2003) findings are supported by the statements of many Black residents at the school Board 
monthly meetings as well as those made at the public closure/consolidation/turnaround hearings. 
One parent and alum of a local school stated, “New people are moving into our community, and 
I no longer live in the district, but I [my children] commute” (Parent, Consolidation and 
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Relocation Hearing, 2/8/10). Community members testified to the decreasing availability of low-
income housing and the decreasing availability of schools (near them) that their children could 
attend. Community members from the South and West Sides repeatedly expressed that although 
they no longer lived in the vicinity of the neighborhood school, they commuted (in some cases 
for more than one hour) so that their children could maintain their connection to their 
neighborhood school. The most overwhelming theme expressed during the data collection 
process was that the neighborhood schools were like a family. The communities within them and 
those that had surrounded them for generations were strongly attached and had in most cases 
established very intricate community networks.  
Parents, students, and faculty view neighborhood schools as an extension of the 
neighborhood and of themselves. A school social worker that worked at the school for 21 years 
commented, “If (the school) closes it won’t just hurt the school, it will hurt the neighborhood” 
(1/28/10). A visibly moved student agreed noting, “(School) is a family. When you separate our 
students you give our family a divorce. We want to stay together, and we want to leave side by 
side. I want to email (school counselor) from college” (1/28/10). And still, another community 
member expressed, “Turnarounds are detrimental to the established relationships” (1/27/10). A 
current parent and 1997 valedictorian of the neighborhood school stated:  
I live across the street from (school). (School) is much more than a school. It’s a  
body of love that communicates a home through fun filled gatherings, annual  
picnics and close personal contacts... This overall makes (School) a safe learning  
environment for every and each one of our youth that attends (school). (School) is  
surrounded by caring neighbors who make sure that the school is safe, clean, and  
a wonderful learning environment. (1/28/10)  
 
The ‘School as Home/Family’ theme means that community members overwhelming 
identified with their neighborhood schools. Assertions that the neighborhood school (its teachers, 
administrators, and staff) failed students in some way were taken personally, and many students 
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appeared to internalize the ‘failing’ mantra. At one hearing, after countless students cried, 
apologized, and promised to ‘do better on the tests’, the Board of Education’s hired mediator 
Frederick Bates, Esq. responded,  
I want to make a comment to the students before I call the next testifier. No  
matter what happens with your school it is not an indictment on you, it’s not  
someone judging you. Okay? Its all the adults, okay? It’s not on you. (1/28/10) 
 
Afterwards, the assistant principal of the school provided the most recent standardized test scores 
of students, and other data, each suggesting an upward trend in student scores and yearly overall 
gains. Her comments were as follows:  
I’m an assistant principal at (School). I am here to ask you not to close our school  
or any CPS school. I did not come here to apologize for our current upward  
trends. The record shows that each year (School) has made gains. Instead I came  
to share with you the reasons why I think (School) should remain open. We have a  
89.7% attendance rate, but what you failed to show the audience, I guess, is that  
when we have a student absent from the building, we might have 6 students  
absent because our students consist of families. So, when one stays at home, all  
six stay at home. We constantly visit homes (for truancy)…we go to boarded up  
houses where our students once lived. When you talk about our students, you’re  
talking about students in temporary living conditions. (1/28/10) 
 
Over all parents and community members provided a consistent counter narrative to the Boards 
story of underperforming urban schools and the need to close them and replace them with charter 
schools. Their narratives attested to: (a) the brilliance of their students especially given the 
resources removed from their schools and community disinvestment; (b) detailed the steps taken 
which demonstrate the commitment that teachers and administrators have towards the success 
and well being of their students; and (c) challenged the way that performance model was 
constructed and manipulated to produce failing schools. Parents, students and community 
members insisted that they were indeed involved in their neighborhood schools. Even more so, 
parents, teachers, students, and community members consistently requested a school-community 
partnership that included both substantive parental involvement as well as district transparency. 
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In many cases, parents, teachers, students, and community members offered unsolicited 
recommendations to the Board specifically how Ren10, and the public school system in general 
could be improved. In response to the CEO’s statement that he had recently created a student bill 
of rights, the student organization Chicago Youth Initiating Change replied that they (students) 
had already solicited the input of three thousand CPS students to create a Student Bill of Rights. 
They questioned his ability to create a Student Bill of Rights without consulting students with 
statements like, “We know our schools the best. Allow us to transform our own schools”. Their 
rights included: (a) the right to hire and terminate faculty and staff; (b) the right to a free and 
quality education; and (c) the right to elect a student Board representative that communicates the 
needs of students at all CPS schools. Their student representation plan: CPS students proposed 
that each CPS high school elect a student representative to represent the student body. After all 
schools have a representative, one general representative is then elected (by students) to 
represent their issues during the Board of Education meetings. The Bill of Rights created by 
students reflects their desire for educational autonomy and student representation. Their concept 
of what constitutes ‘student rights’ is completely different from that of the districts CEO. His list 
included: (a) the right to go to a receiving school that has performed at least 20% better on the 
CPS performance policy when their neighborhood school is closed; (b) when the receiving 
school is more than 1.5 miles away from their closed neighborhood school, CPS will provide 
transportation; and finally (c) a published safe passage plan that communities can review.   
Students, parents, teachers and community members continually assert their right to 
democratically participate in the creation of policies that affect their lives. They represent strong 
communities who advocate for academically sound schools within their residential boundaries, 
and they continue to express a great desire to work with the Board in creating good schools for 
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all children. The constant miscommunication or willful ignorance of the district and its refusal to 
include them incites confusion, suspicion, and hostility. Community members are experts in their 
students and the resources of their neighborhoods, and they continue to offer criticism of Ren10. 
For example, the impracticality of turnarounds/closures/and consolidations for students is 
characterized by the following student critique, 
 How can seniors get college recommendations from teachers who hardly know them?   
You don’t experience what we do on an everyday basis. There should be a student  
representative from every school that is invited to come to Board meetings. Why are they  
(board meetings) held in the mornings on school days? (January Board Meeting) 
 
The following statements also represent the second overwhelming theme repeated throughout the 
data collection process—the need for school-community partnerships: 
 Partnerships between community and schools are essential. [Reforms should] not be  
done to the communities but with communities. (Teacher, January Board meeting) 
 
Parents were turned away from Tilden. There should be parent-school partnerships but 
parents are treated like strangers. The LSC is not involved in any school changes. (Parent, 
January Board meeting) 
 
Smaller classes work—this [Ren10] is incongruent with combining schools. When 
[School] combined it got on probation. True reform is with us and not to us. The Chicago 
Teachers Union opposes Renaissance 2010. (Chicago Teacher’s Union President, January 
Board meeting) 
 
We know our schools the best. Allow us to transform our students. Students lose their 
lives waiting for entrance to charter schools. This isn’t working. We need individual 
solutions for individual schools. (CPS student, January Board meeting) 
 
Parents, students, teachers, and community members also detailed a variety of ways in which the 
CPS administration engaged in practices that disproportionately affected the educational 
resources and opportunities of their students. The following statements echoed the general 
sentiment during the data collection phase:  
Give us the funding you give magnets. (8th grade student, 1/28/10)  
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Smaller classes work, why are you combining (consolidating) schools…(School)  was 
consolidated and was put on probation… (Chicago Teachers Union President, January 
Board Meeting) 
 
No one concentrates on our progress, just our failures… (Student at School hearing,  
1/30/10) 
 
We deserve as much as the rich do. (Parent at hearing, 1/30/10) 
 
I haven’t seen one turnaround school outside of our community. (Alderman Ed. Smith at 
Education Committee hearing to propose a moratorium on school closings, 2/21/10) 
 
These policies benefit your class, not the working class majority. (Community member at 
January Board meeting). 
 
We need individual solutions for individual schools. (Student at January board meeting) 
 
All students should have this kind of school. There should be equal access to good 
schools, not only for the gifted. (Parent of students attending a CPS magnet school, 
January Board Meeting) 
 
The parents and community members from some schools arrive with prepared statements 
and data that contradict the assessments of their schools by CPS administrators. Teachers and 
administrators clearly take offense to what they call “the inaccurate data publicized by the CPS 
administration” and the conclusions drawn from that data (Community meeting, 1/9/10). Many 
community members argue that the Board defames the character of the students and staff at 
neighborhood schools. One community member stated, “They are talking about us like our kids 
aren’t smart…like we aren’t smart” (School hearing, 2/3/10). Another parent added, “We are not 
your poster child for low performance” (School hearing, 1/27/10), a teacher asked, “If this is not 
an indictment against the students or teachers, then who?” (School hearing, 2/3/10), and still 
another insisted, “(CPS is) telling the media that the kids are low performing just because you 
want to give the school to someone else” (January School Board Meeting). Instead of comparing 
schools with very different student populations and conditions to one another or measuring 
performance against an abstract level, community members assert that a true and valid 
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assessment of student performance would include an entrance/exit evaluation as well as 
comparisons between schools in the same area (with similar student/family demographics). 
Many of the schools slated for closure, they argued, had scores above those of other schools in 
the area. Additionally, each of the schools reported that their students standardized achievement 
scores had significantly improved each year.  
Parents, students, teachers, and community members who testified at monthly board 
meetings and February’s school closure hearings repeatedly emphasized the value of the 
neighborhood school to the surrounding community. Most stressed that their disdain for Ren10 
comes from the knowledge that after years of continued disinvestment, neighborhood schools are 
publicly discredited then closed. The buildings are then renovated and turned over to education 
management organizations and charter school companies. Because they are privately owned and 
managed the schools replacing their neighborhood schools are not required to include the 
community in its decision-making process. Formerly open enrollment neighborhood schools are 
replaced by charter schools or contract schools that may or may not admit their children. They 
voiced concerns over the safety of students traveling through the territories of multiple street 
gangs to schools they considered no better (and in some cases worse) than their neighborhood 
school. Above all, the majority of parents, students and community members consistently chose 
their neighborhood school.  
Still it seems likely that when populations decrease there is less need for many of the 
schools that served them. When evaluating the kernel density estimation maps from 1989 to 
2010, what we expect to find is that in neighborhoods with increasing populations (Latino/a, 
White) the density of schools increases as well. And Figures 15-18 support what we would 
expect---in areas with increasing populations we find more schools.  
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Figure 15. Kernel Density Estimation, 1989 Chicago Public Schools by ward. Radius = 1.38 mi 
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Figure16. Kernel Density Estimation, 1995 CPS Schools by ward. Radius = 1.38 mi 
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Figure 17. Kernel Density Estimation, 2004 Chicago Public Schools by ward. Radius = 1.38 mi 
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Figure 18. Kernel Density Estimation, 2010 Chicago Public Schools by Ward. Radius = 1.38 mi  
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Alternately, for neighborhoods experiencing decreasing populations, we would expect 
that the number of schools would decrease (as supported by Figures 12-14, with special attention 
to Wards 2-4), as would the density of schools within those areas. We would expect a lower 
concentration of schools where there are signs of decreasing populations. However (Figures 15-
18) show that the opposite is the true. For the most part from 1989 to 2010, the density of 
schools located on the South and West Sides of the city—areas experiencing such drastic loss in 
neighborhood schools—remains the same. With particular attention to the gentrifying areas on 
the South and West Sides, a continued infusion of charter and contract schools within areas 
experiencing a large population decline suggests that more is going on.   
The schools closed under the Ren10 policy overwhelmingly occur in neighborhoods that 
are heavily populated with large concentrations of low-income Blacks. Given the city’s early 
goal of recruiting middle-class White’s to the city, as stated in Chicago 21, it is my contention 
that under the current neoliberal administration, Renaissance 2010 works in conjunction with the 
Chicago Housing Authority and other public institutions to implement policies that encourage 
gentrification and that allow the city to clear the land of its large concentration of Blacks and low 
income residents. This is done under the guise of urban renewal, and most times the displaced 
inhabitants are blamed for allowing the neighborhood, its schools, and its residential areas to 
degenerate. After disinvesting in the communities and blaming them for the conditions that are 
the result of the city’s disinvestment, neighborhood spaces and places are re-claimed. Just as 
CPS administrators and city officials announced in 2004, Ren10’s new schools are 
overwhelmingly located in low-income neighborhoods. Given the city’s complicated and ever 
changing point system, which is applied to validate the closing of ‘failed’ schools, it is unlikely 
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that CPS administrators predicted the need to replace about 103 neighborhood schools with 100 
Ren10 schools, six years in advance.   
These findings suggest that given the city’s 1973 mission to repurpose the city for the 
perceived needs of middle-class Whites, the school closings are apart of a much larger plan to 
change the demographics of the city itself. The narratives of members from community 
organizations, as well as those of CPS students and parents support the analysis that Ren10 is a 
policy to cleanse urban areas. For example, De La Cruz was a school with 98% low-income 
students and a 20% special education population. They excelled academically, met Adequate 
Yearly Progress three years in a row and had even received an award from the city to honor their 
academic achievements. Still, the school was slated to close with the Board citing the physical 
structure as beyond repair. A week before De La Cruz closed, contractors arrived and began to 
renovate the facility, and by the next academic term the De La Cruz facility was home to a new 
charter school (Community member, Committee on Education and Child Development meeting, 
2/22/2010).   
The De La Cruz narrative is repeated in schools across the city. In the case of school 
closure for facility deterioration, many community members report that upon closure or 
consolidation of neighborhood schools, the facilities are infused with public funds. This occurs 
in schools that have been requesting improvements to their facilities for years. In one case, a 
student revealed that air conditioners were being installed during the last week of school, 
although the school was on the list to close. Community members, students, and teachers at one 
South Side school testified that a few days after receiving notification that the Board was 
considering closing their school, hundreds of boxes were delivered to the facility with 
instructions to begin packing. The alderman of the ward, Alderman Dowell, added, “Sending 
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moving equipment before the vote is inappropriate.” Community members expressed low 
political efficacy and little faith in the validity of the community participation component that 
followed. The arrival of moving boxes a week before the Board was to vote, and before the 
public participation process was a clear signal to community students, teachers, administrators, 
and parents that there was little legitimate interest in involving them in the public school policy 
decisions that affect their lives. Additionally, the Board’s decision to begin renovations to a 
facility that has been deemed beyond repair, in their presence, results in an increase in hostility 
and mistrust amongst displaced students, parents, and teachers. 
Their narratives and distrust are rooted in, not only their current experiences with Ren10, 
but their knowledge of and experience with its predecessor, the Mid-South Plan. The Mid-South 
Plan was created during the urban renewal projects for the Douglas and Grand Boulevard 
communities (Boyd, 2008). It was designed to close twenty of the twenty-two schools in the 
area, and replace them with what we now know as Renaissance 2010 schools (Brown, Gutstein, 
and Lipman, 2009). Implemented as early as 1997 through reconstitution, and in conjunction 
with the Chicago Housing Authority’s ‘Plan for Transformation’, schools were closed, public 
housing facilities were demolished and students were moved from place to place. A large 
majority of the public housing facilities that were dismantled served large concentrations of 
African American parents, students and community members on the South Side of the city 
(Brown, Gutstein, and Lipman, 2009; Shipps, 2009). However it is important to note that 
although the individual residents of the South Side communities are primarily Black, they are not 
its only stakeholders. White institutional residents like Mercy and Michael Reese Hospitals, De 
La Salle High School, the First National Bank, the Illinois College of Optometry, and the Illinois 
Institute of Technology (IIT) represent sizable and powerful stakeholders that are not to be 
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ignored (Boyd, 2008). Evidence of this occurred a generation before when the community was 
powerless against IIT when it demolished commercial property and homes, displacing between 
forty-five to fifty thousand residents to expand its campus (Boyd, 2008). The declining 
neighborhood, a direct result of the university’s incomplete investment in the neighborhood, 
produced less than successful results for the campus. IIT continued to experience decreasing 
student enrollment and declining faculty retention. After the expansion, the president of the 
university claimed that the negative perception of the surrounding community continued to 
produce mixed reviews in the marketplace for the campus (Boyd, 2008). Shortly thereafter the 
university, realizing that’s its continued growth and vitality was deeply entangled with the 
surrounding neighborhood, got a grant from the McCormick-Tribune Foundation to enhance the 
campus and attract additional capital for the revitalization of the area (Boyd, 2008). IIT 
administrators began to create a plan for the neighborhood, which included shutting down the 
local public transportation station at 35th and State Street. The suggestion was not well received 
by residents, however after continued and unsuccessful protests local organizations decided to 
collaborate with IIT—it was better to be defined from within that from without (Boyd, 2008). 
The plan that resulted from the grassroots efforts of the neighborhoods organizations, Restoring 
Bronzeville, was refused by the city. Instead their role became that of a community-building 
intermediary, a place where developers could publicize and explain their projects and the 
community could ask pointed questions. The authority of the community was minimal (they 
could not approve or deny the plans of developers) and served as more of a representation of 
community approval, than the actual mechanism for it (Boyd, 2008).   
The product of IIT and the city’s economic development project was the Mid-South Plan. 
The aspects of the Mid South Plan that relate to the local public schools bear remarkable 
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similarity to Renaissance 2010. The Board notified parents of students in Mid-South schools on 
the last day of school that their neighborhood school would be closing (Brown, Gutstein, & 
Lipman, 2009). The Mid-South Plan ran parallel to the demolition of public housing units on the 
South and West Sides. The accountability argument was refined during the execution of the Mid 
South Plan, for students, parents, and teachers. In the spring of 1996 Daley changed the process 
of promoting students, connecting their performance on the nationally normed Iowa Test of 
Basic Skills (ITBS) to their retention or promotion to the next grade. Accountability for 
educators came during Reconstitution. Again, ITBS test scores were used to determine whether 
schools would be put on probation, and the performance standard was incrementally raised each 
year. The consequences of probation were (a) Local School Councils lost their authority, (b) 
principals could be terminated by the CEO, and (c) the discretionary budget of the school was 
turned over to ‘external assistance partners’ (Shipps, 2009). In reconstituted schools, teachers, 
principals and other staff members were required to reapply for their jobs. Re-hired teachers 
experienced increased shame and less autonomy when the district enforced scripted lesson plans 
(Shipps, 2009). In addition to the loss of LSC authority, parents received a taste of the mayor’s 
interpretation of accountability in 2000. He initiated parent report cards, which included twenty-
three evaluation marks for variables like “spends quality time with child” (Shipps, 2009). After 
six years, the mayor’s education reforms were highly criticized. He replaced CEO Paul Vallas 
with Arne Duncan, who removed the district’s mandated scripted lesson plans. And, after advice 
from the U.S. Department of Justice that the districts retention plans were discriminatory, he 
amended the process. The CPS retention policy continues to disproportionately retain African 
American students (Shipps, 2009). 
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‘Improvements’ to the Mid-South Plan have transformed its education component into 
what we now know as Renaissance 2010. The Mid-South Plan introduced privatization on a 
much smaller scale and only seven of the thirty-eight probation high schools could be usurped. 
Individual, school, and district wide results of the ITBS were widely available and therefore 
probationary status was easily challenged. Furthermore, many of the district’s policies were 
criticized as discriminatory or insulting to parents, teachers, and administrators. There was too 
much coddling required. With Renaissance 2010 the probation criteria was changed to include a 
larger amount of schools within the pool of probationary schools. The language of the Illinois 
School Code was changed to refer to schools as ‘attendance centers’. And the general attendant 
was given the power to use ‘objective criteria, not just an increase in test scores’ in deciding 
whether a school should remain on probation (Illinois School Code Section 34-8.3). 
Furthermore, the state’s school code now states that if the Board of Education or the general 
superintendent has reason to believe that “a school is in educational crisis it may take immediate 
corrective action, including the actions specified in this section (34-8.3), without first placing the 
school on remediation or probation” (Illinois School Code Section 34-8.3). Corrective action 
includes closure, consolidation, and turnarounds, and the school board develops the criteria that 
defines ‘educational crisis’. More importantly, the factors that were used to determine probation 
status were complicated. Each school is now judged using fourteen separate (non-specified) 
measures, worth three points each, for a total of forty-two points (Ryan Crosby, Director of 
Performance Policy for CPS, Consolidation Hearing, 2/8/10). The district attempts to confuse the 
public with closure/consolidation criteria that relies on a value added metric, regression analysis 
and other ‘subjective variables. In one instance community members used the stated criteria, and 
found errors with the Board’s calculation. When they refuted their school’s arrival on the 
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proposed closing/consolidation/turnaround list, the CEO suggested that they simply didn’t 
understand the formula. The community concluded that their school was selected because it had 
recently received a new addition and was in better physical condition than nearby schools. 
(Alderwoman Lyle, Committee on Education and Child Development hearing, 2/21/10). 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
Resistance in Contested Spaces 
Throughout the data collection process there were multiple protests, press conferences, 
workshops, and rallies—each created to express resistance to Renaissance 2010. Almost 
immediately the collaboration between parent organizations, student organizations, teacher 
organizations and community groups, was clear. One example of the united community of 
resisters occurred on Monday, February 22, 2010 in the Council Chambers of City Hall. It was 
on that afternoon that Alderwoman Pat Dowell of the 3rd Ward and Alderwoman Freddrenna 
Lyle of the 6th Ward requested that a meeting be called for the Committee on Education and 
Child Development. The request was made on behalf of the Chicago Educational Facilities Task 
Force, and was signed by the two aforementioned alderwomen in addition to Alderman Toni 
Periwinkle of the 4th Ward, and Alderman Howard B. Brookings Jr. of the 21st Ward. The city’s 
Education committee, whose members are appointed alderpeople from thirty-three of Chicago’s 
wards, had only met once during the academic school year, although most of the city’s schools 
would close for the summer in three months.   
More than two hundred community members filled the rows of the Council Chambers 
that afternoon. Many planned to testify in hopes of persuading the committee to recommend that 
the Board of Education immediately discontinue its current practice of school closures, 
consolidations, and turnarounds. However, at the start of the hearing, the chairwoman of the 
committee, Alderwoman Latasha R. Thomas of the 17th Ward, informed the groups of parents, 
teachers, and community members that the hearing was closed to public testimony. After a 
lengthy argument between the chairwoman, Alderman Ricardo Munoz, and supporters, and most 
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notably after Munoz’ continued assertions that Thomas’ actions were illegal, the chairwoman 
relented. She did however remind her colleagues that, “We in City Council are not their 
governing board. We have no jurisdiction over CPS.”  
The two alderwomen that called for the meeting had done so in response to the affect of 
Renaissance 2010 on their wards. At the hearing they proposed two resolutions:  
1. Resolution sponsored by Alderman Dowell and Alderman Lyle requiring a moratorium  
of one year be placed on current and future school closings, consolidations, turnarounds,  
and phase-outs until comprehensive strategy of transparency, community involvement,  
and public accountability can be developed to include recommendations from the  
Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force (PR2010-7) 
 
2. Resolution sponsored by Alderman Dowell and Alderman Lyle asking for the Board of  
Education to appear and present all underlying data, objective findings, criteria and other  
considerations for the selection of all schools subject to the aforementioned actions in the  
2010 school year on date and time prior to February 24, 2010 (PR2010-8). 
 
The recommendation of the Chicago Education Facilities Task Force was the imposition of a 
one-year moratorium, and the deadline listed, February 24, 2010, was the date of the next Board 
meeting. It was on that date that Board members would vote to close, consolidate, turnaround or 
phase-out 14 schools. The explanation for the recommendations of the Task Force were as 
follows: 
(a) The profound impact of such actions on entire communities; (b) That acute 
community knowledge of both the resources and dangers within their communities had 
not been valued, specifically regarding issues of safe passage; (c) The CPS leadership has 
made decisions to close, consolidate, phase-out and turnaround schools with insufficient 
input from affected communities; (d) Instead decisions were made based on inaccurate or 
outdated data that failed to consider recent improvements; (e) Many of the schools slated 
to close or consolidate experienced years of significant academic and capital 
disinvestment; (f) Before any drastic actions are taken, the CPS administration must 
examine its policies regarding the distribution of resources for academic and capital 
needs; (g) That the CPS leadership has demonstrated the lack of a comprehensive long-
term planning by failing to fully consider the development and growth  necessary to 
create and maintain accessible neighborhood schools; (h) Throughout the process of 
school reconstitutions many good teachers and administrators that have established a 
positive relationship with their students have been thrown into the job market during 
harsh economic times; (i) Many studies have found that there is are negative academic 
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and safety impacts for students with high rates of mobility; (j) Given the Boards lack of 
transparency and refusal to involve the community in the decision-making process, there 
is a growing distrust of CPS decisions; And finally (k) many of the new schools that have 
been created under Ren10 and schools that have been reconstituted are not performing 
better than the schools they replaced, and in many cases they are performing worse.  
Alderwoman Thomas closed with the following statement, “It is not in our mandate to 
outsource education simply to remove it from our list of things to do.” (2/21/10) 
 
Illinois State Senators William Delgado and Jacquelyn Collins traveled from Springfield 
to endorse the recommendation, and they submitted the written testimony of Senator Cynthia 
Soto. The senators requested ‘a pause’ until a meeting could be held by the comprehensive Task 
Force created with House Bill 363 (HB 363). House Bill 363 unifies neighborhoods by bringing 
community-based organizations from every part of the city (Grand Boulevard Federation, Pilsen 
Neighbors, Blocks Together, Designs for Change), the CTU president, the Principals 
Association, CPS board members, CEO Ron Huberman, and two senate members together to 
discuss alternative methods for Chicago Public School reforms. Because the governor signed 
HB363, and the task force was scheduled to meet within the month, he voiced concern that the 
Board continued to close, consolidate, and turnaround schools based on its own political agenda.   
Senator Collins discussed the necessity of equal access to quality education for participatory 
democracy. Compared to other states, Illinois contributes a relatively low share of funding to its 
public schools, which makes local funding disparities much larger than they might otherwise be 
(Shipps, 2009). Collins informed the committee that she and others in Springfield were working 
on the lack of funding issue for Chicago Public Schools and removing the states over reliance on 
property taxes to support education. Senator Collins emphasized that all stakeholders should be 
involved and that the Board offered no hard data to validate why schools were proposed for 
turnaround, consolidation, and closure. In closing, she expressed displeasure with the Boards last 
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minute notification that a school within her district was closing stating, “I received a call the 
night before, which is disrespectful” (2/21/10). 
After the testimony from the senators and alderpeople, the members of the Board (Ron 
Huberman, Dr. Barbara Easton-Watkins, and Robert Runchie) were excused for a meeting, and 
Alderwoman Thomas promised that they would return within the next twenty minutes. Although 
the hearing continued for more than two hours afterwards, the Board members never returned. 
Droves of children did arrive. They had to leave their handmade protest signs and posters in the 
hall, and they were not permitted to comment. 
The fact that the Board members left before the public was allowed to voice its concerns, 
combined with their historic failings to attend the public hearings on school 
closures/consolidations, makes their rhetoric of transparency and public accountability all the 
more repugnant. Community members repeatedly comment on the lack of respect they are 
shown. During a school closure hearing one community member testified, “Someone with 
authority and responsibility should be here. The community showed up in thirteen below 
weather, we travel 10 miles away, and yet no authoritative person is here today.” (Community 
member, School Closure Hearing, 2/3/10) 
Beyond the role of the passive consumer there appears to be no sincere desire to involve 
community members in developing and improving the district’s education policies. However, 
those that contest Ren10 refuse to be silenced. As I finish this project, the CORE slate has 
overthrown the current Chicago Teachers Union administration. CORE, a grassroots 
organization of teachers, successfully campaigned against the CTU slate by promising to offer 
true reform and insert the voices of teachers, students, and parents. The organization was created 
in response to the refusal of the CTU leaders to organize teachers to oppose Ren10 school 
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closings and privatizations. Although the current president of the CTU, Marilyn Stewart, 
rhetorically opposed Renaissance 2010 during my data collection process, many teachers 
complained that she had not been vigilant in protecting their interests in the late 90s when these 
policies gained momentum (Shipps, 2009). Their leadership complaints are in reference to the 
1995 change in the school law that set restrictions on the Chicago Teachers Unions ability to 
achieve non-pecuniary gains through collective bargaining (Shipps, 2009, p. 124). Teachers were 
prohibited from striking for eighteen months and the Board was granted the ability to terminate 
teachers and principals, the previous responsibility of state hearing officers. Class size, teaching 
assignments, school schedules and ten other previously bargained workplace conditions were 
removed from the school code. The mayor asked CTU representatives to allow the anti-union 
restrictions, and promised to remove the restrictions after he gained control. Although he kept his 
promise, the failure of CTU leaders to oppose the law (which additionally granted the CEO the 
special authority to sanction schools with remediation, probation, reconstitution or intervention) 
produced many disgruntled teachers who felt that appeasing the mayor was largely motivated by 
personal gain. 
The institutionalization of neoliberal rationales has resulted in the removal of a 
disproportionate amount of Black teachers. Between 2000 and 2008 White, Latina/o, Asian and 
Native American teachers have experienced a percentage gain. During the same time Black 
teachers have experienced a net loss of 2,469 teachers, a nine-point percentage drop (PURE 
Parents, 2010). Yet the underlying rationale for their termination continues to be under dispute. 
The city reports that it has faced massive budgetary losses, coupled with decreased student 
enrollment and state funds. They conclude that the termination of many teachers has been the 
unavoidable result. Still, experienced and displaced teachers report that although they have been 
 152 
removed from their schools they are in a state of limbo, where they have continued to receive 
their salary with little to no likelihood of returning to the job unless it is as a substitute. The 
narrative of community members, in this case a disgruntled faction of teachers that has broken 
off from the Chicago Teacher’s Union, is that an innumerable amount of talent and resources are 
wasted each day because skilled teachers have no placements. Their narratives contradict those 
of city officials who claim that their reforms are cost effective and efficient. In response to the 
city’s actions, displaced Black teachers have filed equal opportunity complaints and have, with 
the support from CORE, enlisted an attorney to represent them in a civil suit. The suit charges 
that the massive dismissal of primarily Black veteran teachers and their replacement with 
uncertified White teachers is racially discriminatory. By the end of the project, community 
members, parents, students, and teachers continued to resist Renaissance 2010.  
Summary of Findings  
In 1988, participatory democracy was institutionalized in the form of Local School 
Councils. By 1995 the legitimacy of parents and community members to make substantive 
decisions about public schooling was continually questioned, and that doubt was reflected in 
changes to the Illinois School Code. As an institutional actor, CPS officials use the Renaissance 
2010 policy to first close neighborhood schools, and then to repurpose those facilities for charter, 
contract, and otherwise privately managed ‘new’ schools. At this time, the snatch and run 
process is tuned to communities on the South and West Sides where residents are primarily low-
income and Black. Their communities are in the process of ‘revitalization’ or ‘gentrification’, 
and therefore the current residents are not valued by the current administration. To the CPS 
administrations claim of school failure, community members provide a counter narrative that 
performance measures are structured in ways that label 1/3rd of Chicago Public Schools as 
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‘failing’. Their collective narratives make the case that academic progress is not the issue and 
that since the mayor’s office has taken control of the schools, it is inappropriate to continue to 
attribute failure or blame to the teachers, students, and administrators within those schools.   
The community narrative that their neighborhoods are targeted is supported by the 
empirical data as well. The chloropleth maps produced from this study indicate that indeed, the 
majority of neighborhood schools closed with Ren10 are located in areas that are primarily Black 
and low-income. Together this projects kernel density maps and chloropleth maps suggest that 
although there have been large drops in the proportion of low-income Blacks on the South and 
West Sides, there has not been substantial change to the density of schools within those areas. 
This evidence supports the community narrative that their neighborhoods are being targeted, 
especially neighborhoods that are in close proximity to Lake Michigan and the city’s central 
business district which have experienced the majority of neighborhood school closings. 
Critics may argue that such changes reflect the redevelopment or reinvestment in South 
Side and West Side neighborhoods, and that the displacement of low-income residents is the 
natural result of free market competition. Others may argue that in some areas, middle-class 
Blacks and Latino/as are themselves the gentrifiers. However, the benefits received by some 
Blacks or Latino/as do not detract from the structural disenfranchisement of others. Within the 
Douglas/Grand Boulevard communities, low-income residents have expressed an equal fear and 
hostility toward middle-and-upper income Black residents as they did toward White outsiders 
and neighborhood institutions (Shipps, 2009, p. 112). Low-income residents of gentrifying areas 
have little control over the revitalization process that occurs in their neighborhoods. They 
understand the connection between their exclusion from the decision-making process and how it 
threatens their ability to remain in their neighborhoods (Shipps, 2009). Like all communities, the 
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residents on Chicago’s South and West Sides are a very dichotomous population in terms of 
need, and economic differences translate into diverse sets of preferences (Shipps, 2009, p. 110). 
However, again the benefits received by middle-class Blacks do not translate into direct benefits 
for members of the entire race.  
 Furthermore, despite the constant references to residents as customers by several Board 
members, and its use of neoliberal language, there is nothing ‘free market’ about Renaissance 
2010. To the contrary there is immense state and local government manipulation specifically 
geared towards ensuring the success, longevity, and profitability of private corporations. By 
lobbying Springfield, the CPS administration and the Chicago business community have used 
law to disempower communities and their Local School Councils. In changing the percentage of 
required unionized and certified teachers, city officials have removed the threat of unionized 
labor or empowered parents, both unwelcome outsiders. The shut out begins before the physical 
spaces have been taken over, and usually occurs immediately after the announcement that a 
school has been slated for closure. Despite claims to the contrary, the private sector could not 
have entered the public education ‘market’ or multiplied within it without government support.  
The institutionalization of this policy has reproduced racism within housing, education 
and employment policy. Together, these policies disproportionately and negatively affect low-
income Blacks in the city. Betancur (2002) suggests that descriptions of gentrification as a 
market practice that allocates land for the best possible use, or the process of substituting a 
poorer group for a wealthier one, typically ignore the highly destructive processes of race, class, 
ethnicity, and alienation that result (p. 807). He maintains that the right to community is a 
function of a group’s economic and political power and that the process of gentrification is truly 
a set of forces that manipulate class and race to determine market outcome (Betancur, 2002, p. 
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807). City officials have structured policy specifically for the purpose of acquiring and 
redeveloping the spaces that low-income Blacks inhabit. Within housing policy, the Chicago 
Housing Authority’s incorporation of neoliberal rational has resulted in the displacement of large 
proportions of low-income blacks. It has both privatized public housing and excluded the 
majority of low-income residents from directly benefiting from the new ‘mixed income’ 
developments. They are instead forced into the private market with vouchers which, given the 
turn away from social service supports, can be permanently revoked for minor infractions. 
Although the city has created an increasing percentage of displaced low-income Black residents 
(as a result of the demolition of public housing units), the application process is closed for all 
public housing facilities. The Chicago Housing Authority website fails to indicate if, or when, 
the application process will re-open.   
Currently Chicago’s education policies have worked in conjunction with public housing 
policy to displace two identifiable groups, low-income Black students and families, and Black 
teachers. Ren10 is a racially and economically discriminatory policy that is carried out in the 
name of efficiency and accountability. It labels public schools as failures, and in cases where that 
is impossible, buildings are deemed structurally unsound. Ren10 works to aid in the removal of 
low-income Blacks by destroying the neighborhood schools, the anchor of many communities, 
which unite generations of residents. Using Ren10, city officials then repurpose those schools for 
future residents, and more importantly, they facilitate the creation of opportunities for private 
profit with public funds. Chicago’s latest education policy rests on the assumption that private 
education, any private education, is better than what the public can offer. Although charter 
schools are quite new, many preliminary research studies report that, although they enroll 
significantly fewer students with special needs, they do not perform any better than the schools 
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that they replace (Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2009). Still, charter and Ren10 
schools that open in buildings that were originally neighborhood schools receive more resources 
than preexisting schools. Shipps (2009) writes that although they are attended by three percent of 
the city’s students, sixty-two percent of Ren10 new schools have their capital needs fully funded, 
compared to forty-five percent of neighborhood schools. Finally, through Ren10, city officials 
have lobbied to remove the possibility of both organized labor and organized parents within 
Ren10 schools. These actions wholeheartedly benefit private investors.    
Implications for Future Research 
Institutional racism thrives in Chicago’s education system because it relies on a few 
rarely questioned assumptions. The first is that all students are not equally deserving of quality 
schools. Some are simply better prepared and more intelligent than others. These students 
deserve quality schools—magnet academies—which are infused with material and economic 
resources that structure their achievement. Their teachers have autonomy, their classes are small, 
their curriculum requires them to critically think, and their environments are structured in ways 
that nurture multidimensional academic and social development. Their parents are involved, their 
teachers are qualified, and the students themselves ‘try’. For the remaining student population, 
the narrative is much different. Test scores are the way we measure their growth. For these 
students, no matter how many resources you give them, it doesn’t improve their test scores, and 
the traditional line is that ‘throwing money at these schools’ doesn’t help. These students need 
discipline and they must be taught social skills. Their teachers are over paid and highly 
unqualified, their parents are uninvolved and the students refuse to learn. If the above are taken 
for granted, the relevant question becomes, who decides which students can attend the ‘good’ 
schools?    
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With a global economy that is in a recession, and the promotion of individual self-interest 
above all else, when it comes to the competition for educational resources, political 
empowerment and participatory democracy become exceedingly important. Earlier this year, in 
March 2010, Azam Ahmed a reporter for the Chicago Tribune broke the story that the former 
CEO of the Chicago Public Schools system and the nations current Secretary of Education, Arne 
Duncan, maintained a running list of friends who required assistance gaining entry into the city’s 
highest performing (read: good) public schools. That such a list exists is a validation that there 
exists a two-tier school system within the city’s public schools. Any resident could tell a visitor 
which schools are the ‘good schools’ and which are the ones they should avoid. Each resident 
knows that to gain entry into the ‘good schools’ requires a bit of luck, a touch of smarts, and a lot 
of connections. Although the news was announced with shock, I don’t know anyone who was 
surprised that such a list existed.   
CRT provides both the language and historical and contemporary context to discuss the 
changing landscape of a public education system that simultaneously provides the best and worst 
educational opportunities for Chicago students (Rossi and Gotlab, 2009). When applied to the 
recent example of magnet school admissions, CRT can be used to highlight how property 
interests outweigh the interests of people of color. Therefore, when the Chicago Public School 
chief executive officer Ron Huberman announced at the December school board meeting that 
race would no longer be used in the admissions decisions of the city’s highly selective magnet 
schools, the passionate protests from communities of color attending the meeting can be 
understood within the context of racialized power and economic subordination. Admission 
requirements for magnet schools is important in Chicago not only because such schools are 
selective, but because the students who attend have access to an enriched curriculum which 
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emphasizes critical thinking, logic and reasoning. The restriction of access to this curriculum 
highlights whiteness as property, specifically the right to include or exclude (Harris, 1993; 
Ladson-Billings, 1998). As the legal requirement of racial equity ends, the school board has 
replaced the goals of desegregation and equal representation within magnet schools, with an 
increased support of the choice provided by Ren10. Their fear of lawsuits for preferential 
treatment and colorblind rationales are used as a justification for the preservation and 
solidification of hierarchal relationships of power that solidify White spaces, while sacrificing 
the rights of the othered.  
The history of people of color and Chicago politics reveals that cooperation with the 
machine can translate into political, economic, and social survival. Usually the greatest benefit 
for Blacks and Latino/as is achieved when interests align. Derrick Bell, one of CRT’s founders, 
refers to this phenomenon as interest-convergence. Interest-convergence maintains that 
advantages for people of color, low-income people, and other marginalized groups is encouraged 
and attained only when the advance is in the self-interest of Whites (Bell, 1995; Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2000). The concept of interest-convergence is instrumental in understanding the 
position of Chicago’s political movers and shakers on issues of race and social justice in the 
context of civil rights laws and reforms. It is not such a leap to expect that those with similar 
interests bond together to fight for what is best for them at the time, or that alliances can be made 
in order to produce intended consequences. Within the highly racialized city of Chicago, with 
extreme polarity’s between residential, educational, and even employment options, we see this 
phenomena play out spatially throughout the city. For example, although currently Latina/o 
communities have avoided massive amounts of school closings, historically we know that 
protection from the machine can change with the wind. The current exclusion of Latino/as from 
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some of the devastations of Ren10 occurs in part because group interests, or more specifically 
the interests of Latino/a elites, converge with the city’s business community. However, the city 
has continued to express its goal to recruit middle-class and affluent residents to the city. It is 
likely that the majority of Latina/o neighborhood schools remain because it is politically 
unpopular and stringently contested, and just as likely that it is also a divide and conquer 
political tool used to decrease the strength of those who oppose the city’s specific definition of 
urban revitalization.    
Within Chicago, people of color continue to work from both within the machine’s 
political framework, and from without through community-based organizations, to retain and 
manifest the goods and services they desire. All schools that qualify for closure, consolidation, or 
phase out action are not included on what is usually known as ‘the list’. The criteria for the final 
selection process are unknown to community, school, and parent leaders. By the CEO’s own 
admission, the list is not final. Schools can be removed at any time, and community members 
recognize and contest the subjective nature of the selection process as the right to remove and 
exclude at will. CORE and other community organizations like Teachers for Social Justice and 
PURE work with schools and parents to fight school action at every turn. CORE members 
celebrate that their efforts have lead to the removal of a steadily increasing number of schools 
from the list, since the practice began. The mounted attack usually includes a direct rebuttal of 
the CEO’s assessments of a school. For example, if the school is slated to close for 
underperformance, community organizations, parents, and students provide additional data that 
suggests improvement and/or a different analysis of the school data. If low enrollment is the 
issue, community organizations, parents, and students provide a list of benefits that accompany a 
small school atmosphere. These are usually identical to those provided by the district in support 
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of its Small Schools initiative. The existence with the district of both a push for small schools 
and a push to close them (termed under-enrollment) is indeed confounding. And finally, when 
schools are slated to close because of a failing infrastructure, the school community provides 
their own inspectors and contractors who testify to both the preferred economic benefit of fixing 
the structure over demolishing it. Their estimates are usually lower than those provided by the 
city officials who have concluded that the school is too costly to renovate.  
In some cases, schools are removed from the list and in others they are not. Those that 
receive the most community support and those that have provided what could be considered 
irrefutable evidence, are most likely to be spared. However, the underlying rationale of the 
CEO’s decision to remove a school remains unknown. It is important to note here that the Board 
of Education has never voted against the CEO’s recommendations for school action. When 
schools are removed from the list, it is done by the CEO, and before the closed vote of the Board. 
His rationale for changing his recommendation is phrased as a commitment to working with the 
school community and as proof of the flexibility and rationality of the central administration, 
and, of course, proof of the ability of community members to become involved and provide a 
suitable plan for solutions to fix their shortcomings. Community members disagree of such 
characterizations of their neighborhood schools and continue to list the ways in which city and 
CPS officials have structured the opportunities of their children. The city remains a contested 
space. 
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Appendix A 
 
Comparison Chart: CPS Schools 
 
 
Figure A1. Chart describing the similarities and differences between charter schools, performance schools and 
contract schools in the city of Chicago. http://www.ren2010.cps.k12.il.us/types.shtml  
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Appendix B 
 
Researcher Notification Form 
 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign  
             
Department of Educational Policy Studies   
                                     1310 S Sixth Street, Champaign Illinois 61820 
                 Phone: 217 244 0919   Fax: 217 244 7064 
 
 
Notification of Researcher Presence 
 
Title of Project: Beyond The Failing School: Race, Space & Achievement in Chicago Public 
Schools 
Responsible Principal Investigator:  Dr. Laurence Parker  
Other Investigator(s): Jasmine Johnson   
 
This is a notice to inform you that Jasmine Johnson, a graduate student at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, is conducting research on the educational policy Renaissance 
2010.  In order to understand the response to the policy by community members, parents and 
teachers, the investigator is attending the public meetings organized by the Chicago Board of 
Education, Parents United for Responsible Education (PURE), Teachers for Social Justice, and 
the Caucus of Rank and File Educators (CORE). 
 
The larger objective of this project is to explore the use of public schools in the re-creation of 
spaces of marginalization and isolation, by city officials and corporate leaders in their path 
toward ensuring that the city of Chicago becomes a global city. To undertake this goal, the 
subsidiary research questions are designed to assess the demographic characteristics of primarily 
Black neighborhoods in the city, to provide the proper context for understanding community 
responses to the geographic distribution of Chicago public schools (from 2004 to 2010). Thus, 
the primary question for this project is twofold.  It first seeks to understand the school 
community’s (parents, teachers, administrators, students) response to Renaissance 2010, in 
schools that are predominantly African American. It then seeks to understand the reasons for 
those responses. In the end, results from this research will help to challenge narratives which 
define disparities in achievement opportunities as academic achievement gaps, as well as those 
which assign blame to parents, students and communities using arguments based on cultural 
deficiency models.  
 
There are no anticipated risks associated with this research project, other than those normally 
associated with daily life and the attendance of public meetings. Personal information will 
remain confidential, and nothing that you say will be attributed to you by name or any other 
identifiable information. No personally identifiable information will be shared with others, 
and all personal information will remain confidential. All data will be kept on a protected 
flash drive, which will be stored in a locked file cabinet in the home of the researcher for a 
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period of three years.  Stored data contains no personal information of individual students, 
teachers, parents or commnity members. 
 
Please contact Jasmine Johnson at 773-778-1303 or jjohnso6@illinois.edu or Dr. Laurence 
Parker at 217-244-9014 or parker3@illinois.edu with any questions, or concerns about the 
research. You may also call Dr. Laurence Parker if you feel you have been injured or harmed by 
this research. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, please 
contact the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board at 217-333-2670 or via email at 
irb@uiuc.edu. 
 
Participation in this project is voluntary and the participant may discontinue at anytime without 
any penalty or loss of benefits to which the participant is otherwise entitled.  Results from this 
research will be used to satisfy the requirements for the completion of the Educational Policy 
Studies doctoral program at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  The results from 
this research may also be used for the purposes of future research publications. 
 
If you prefer that your comments and or ideas not be used for the purposes of this research 
project, please verbally inform the site investigator, Jasmine Johnson.   
 
If you consent to allowing your comments and or ideas to be used for the purposes of this 
research project, no further action is required. 
 
Please feel free to retain a copy of this research notification letter for your personal records. 
 
Thank You, 
 
 
 
Jasmine Johnson 
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Appendix C 
 
Community Organization Renaissance 2010 Position 
 
TSJ Position on Renaissance 2010     
 
Teachers for Social Justice is a network of Chicago area teachers committed to critical, anti-
racist, multicultural, participatory, democratic education. We believe that real school 
improvement requires the full participation of those with the most stake in high quality public 
education for all students –families, students, community members, and committed teachers and 
administrators. We oppose Chicago Public Schools’ Renaissance 2010 Plan for the following 
reasons: 
 
1. Renaissance 2010 will give private organizations and “venders” the power to decide what will 
happen in public schools. Public institutions need democratically developed public solutions. 
 
2.The plan is not designed to improve the education of children who presently live and have been 
living in the Mid-South and other low-income African American and Latino/a communities. If it 
were, then the resources targeted for 2010 would have been designated to improve schools in 
those areas long ago. In fact, these schools have been historically under funded and under 
resourced. 
 
3. Renaissance 2010 blames low-income African American children and their families. It implies 
the only way to have good schools in these areas is to have mixed income schools. This assumes 
the children in the schools now are somehow the cause of education failure, and they can only do 
better when they are with middle class kids. Or, schools can only improve if they are moved out 
altogether. In fact, there are good schools that serve low-income children of color. The reality is 
that the cause of a failed education system is a history of racism, lack of equal opportunity to 
learn, deindustrialization, and disinvestment in communities of color by corporate interests and 
banks with the support of political leaders. If city officials, including the school board, cared 
about the children, they would do something about that. 
 
4. Renaissance 2010 is not just a school plan. It is part of a much larger plan for gentrification 
and for moving out low-income African Americans and some Latino/as from prime real estate 
areas, in fact from the city altogether. These are the areas where the proposed school closings are 
concentrated. Gentrification is a central source of profit for developers, banks, and investors and 
a key element in making Chicago a global city of increasing inequality in housing, income, 
quality of life, and use of urban space. 
 
5. Renaissance 2010 is a plan to introduce choice, privatization, and the marketplace into public 
education. Every parent becomes an individual consumer in the education market, rather than 
communities working together with educators to improve their schools. Research internationally 
shows that choice plans increase education inequality, leaving those with the least resources in 
the worst schools. 
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6. Renaissance 2010 is a plan that will disempower communities by eliminating Local School 
Councils and disempower teachers and other school workers by weakening their unions. 
Although school closings and privatization will affect specific neighborhoods now, they are just 
the tip of the iceberg for what will happen in other areas of the city. According to press reports, 
this is just the first stage of plan to overhaul the system as a whole. 
 
7. Renaissance 2010 is a plan developed by powerful business and political interests. The plan 
the mayor announced in June was clearly spelled out by the Commercial Club of Chicago over 
one year ago in its report titled, Left Behind, dated June 2003. The Commercial Club is an 
organization of the most powerful corporate, financial, and political leaders in the city. That is 
why there has been no meaningful participation from the communities affected. This plan was 
devised a year ago by the CCC. Mayor Daley announced Renaissance 2010 at a Commercial 
Club of Chicago event. A plan to sell Renaissance 2010 to the public, the communities affected, 
teachers, and administrators was developed and rolled out by AT Kearney, a corporate 
consulting firm, that is providing “thought leadership” to CPS officials. The plan for 
“communicating” Renaissance 2010 and getting “buy in” was presented at a CPS planning 
meeting on May 6, 2004, before any public hearings to supposedly get community input. 
 
So the question is: Who will decide what kind of education our children should have, the 
Commercial Club of Chicago, mayor Daley, and the big real estate developers? Or parents, 
communities and teachers? 
 
There is an alternative beyond failing schools and business-led education. There are examples of 
city schools that are grounded in children’s lives, cultures, and identities, that are anti-racist and 
pro-justice, that have a rigorous curriculum and are hopeful, joyful, and visionary, and that teach 
children to think critically about the world we live in so they can actively participate in making it 
more just. That Renaissance is possible. TSJ is working with community members, families, 
students, unions, and progressive school reform organizations to oppose Renaissance 2010 and 
develop these real alternatives. 
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